The Church, Dictatorships, and Democracy in Latin America



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6.

Uruguay (1973-1990)

A Long Silence and a Moral Referendum

During the civilian-military dictatorship that governed Uruguay from 1973 to 1985, the church played a modest and at times ambiguous role regarding the promotion of human rights. Uruguay has a strong laicist tradition, and the church's influence is very limited compared to the considerable influence it wields in Argentina, Chile, and Brazil. Furthermore, the hierarchy was divided and did not present a united front before the government. Nevertheless, the archbishop of Montevideo, Carlos Parteli, a progressive, lent moral support, although not always publicly, to the Christians who fought for human rights.

However, the most interesting aspect of this history was not so much the church's role during the dictatorship itself, but rather its direct participation in the campaign to return to democracy and in the movement to bring human-rights violators to justice. In Chile and Brazil the military left power on the condition that they would not be tried and judged. In Argentina, where the military leaders were brought to trial, the hierarchical church disapproved of that process, although there were some bishops and many rank-and-file Christians who did support it. In Uruguay the Christians who belonged to the Justice and Peace Service (SERPAJ) played an even more decisive role than in Argentina in mobilizing the people to rectify past injustices. Although they did not achieve their objective, at least on the legal level, they did win a moral victory because they turned the question of human rights into the number one national issue.

FROM WELFARE TO REPRESSION

For years Uruguay seemed to be one of the big exceptions with respect to the rest of Latin America. It is a small country with a population predomi-

nately of European ancestry, and for most of its history since independence it has been blessed with prosperity and apparently solid democratic institutions. Indeed, it was a model for the rest of the continent. It is also a highly urbanized country: in the sixties a little over half of the population lived in Montevideo. Since the days of José Battle y Ordóñez (president, 1903-07; 1911-15) an equilibrium was established between the two traditional parties, the Blanco (White) and the Colorado (Red), a fact that contributed notably to internal stability. On two occasions, 1933 and 1942, this stability was interrupted by military takeovers. Nevertheless, the two parties resolved their differences and restored their traditional pact. Most important, Battle and his successors forged a national welfare state that controlled the economy and satisfied the basic needs of its citizens. The role of the state was so large that at one time it employed 30 percent of the labor force.[1]

But this idyllic state of affairs came to an abrupt close in the sixties. First, the economy suffered a recession, and society entered a state of paralysis. As one observer noted, there was no room for social or economic mobility.[2] The absence of opportunities, combined with the recession, produced resentment among workers, university students, and young professionals. In 1967, amid growing social tension and following the death of President Oscar D. Gestido (elected in 1966), the vice president, Jorge Pacheco Areco, assumed the presidency. Pacheco decreed several harsh measures ("immediate security measures") to repress expressions of social discontent. During his administration Uruguay's famed welfare state turned into a police state. Pacheco was particularly worried about an outbreak of guerrilla activity, a phenomenon that had never occurred before in Uruguay.

The Tupamaro Movement for National Liberation, founded in the early sixties, reflected the frustration of the radicalized middle classes. It was made up principally of students and young professionals, with a smaller percentage of blue-collar employees and workers. Numbering around a thousand, they were carried away by romantic visions of copying the Cuban revolution and applying the guerrilla tactics of Che Guevara to Uruguay.[3] In the beginning they limited their activities to robbing banks and offices of transnational companies, but increasingly they turned to terrorist violence. In 1970 they carried out their most spectacular action: they kidnapped several diplomats and murdered one of them, Dan Mitrione, an American adviser to the Uruguayan police. As a result of these kinds of actions, they lost whatever initial popular sympathy they might have had. In 1972 the government dramatically escalated its counterinsurgency measures and managed to wipe out the Tupamaros.

BORDABERRY AND THE CIVILIAN-MILITARY REGIME

Pacheco's successor, Juan María Bordaberry, took the final steps to institutionalize the new police state. Elected president in 1971 with the support of

the Colorado Party, Bordaberry, a conservative Catholic, was the president of the Federal League of Rural Action. In June 1973, with the support of the armed forces and under pressure from them, he closed down parliament and began ruling by decree. He widened the nets to capture not just Tupamaros but all persons suspected of having ties with the left. In June, 1976, after a run-in with the military, he resigned, and the military designated another civilian to be president—Aparicio Méndez. Uruguay was now virtually a bureaucratic and authoritarian military dictatorship with a civilian as a figurehead. The Uruguayan military, although less experienced in the art of governing than the Argentine military, followed the same doctrine of national security as their counterparts in the rest of the southern cone. They scheduled elections with the objective of legitimizing their hold over the country, calling for a plebiscite in 1980 to ratify their permanence in power. What they did not plan on, however, was to be defeated, which is exactly what happened. That surprise defeat signaled the beginning of the end of the military, who were finally obliged to call for free elections in 1984.

THE REPRESSION

In its study *Nunca más* ("Never Again"), SERPAJ observed that the repression in Uruguay was not as spectacular as in Chile, where the presidential palace went up in smoke, or as in Argentina, where thousands were murdered.[4] Uruguay's repression was characterized instead by the high degree of sophistication in the means used to control the population and by the length of the detentions. The number of persons who died as a result of state terrorism was relatively small compared to the other cases. According to SERPAJ, there were around 160 detainees who disappeared, and most of them were Uruguayans who lived in Argentina: another proof of the complicity between the national security regimes.[5] On the other hand, according to the People's Permanent Tribunal, between 1968 and 1978 "approximately 55,000 persons were detained in jails and military headquarters, which is to say one in every 50 inhabitants."[6] A report published by the Organization of American States refers to 80,000 persons "detained, abused, or tortured."[7] Furthermore, given Uruguay's small size, it was relatively easy to impose nearly total control over the country. Fortunately, Uruguay's long liberal-democratic tradition, which did not include the death penalty, served as a buffer and prevented it from going through Argentina's "dirty war" experience, which included thousands of extra-legal executions.

THE CHURCH: A PROFILE

It is a commonplace to note that Uruguay is the most secularized society in Latin America. For several historical reasons—Uruguay was colonized

when Europe itself began going through a secularization process—the Catholic church found itself in a society that was at times hostile toward it, although the principal attitude was one of indifference. According to a study done in the sixties, less than half the population professed to be Catholic.[8] The church in Uruguay was never rich or a great landowner. It did, and does, have sufficient spiritual authority to convoke a considerable number of the faithful on the occasion of certain processions. In 1934, for example, some 100,000 Catholics attended the Corpus Christi procession.[9] Given the small population of Montevideo, that turnout was more than respectable. In 1981 there were 12 bishops (the Uruguayan episcopal conference was founded in 1965), 599 priests of the secular clergy and 394 priests belonging to religious orders and congregations. Furthermore, 61 percent of the religious clergy were foreign born, compared to 15 percent of the diocesan clergy.[10] Compared with Brazil and Argentina, the church in Uruguay is very small.

The Uruguayan church entered the modern world very gradually. The first winds of change were felt when Carlos Parteli, who had been coadjutor archbishop since 1966, had been named archbishop of Montevideo in 1976. Parteli, who had studied in the South American College in Rome, was named bishop of Tacuarembó in 1960. As new archbishop of the capital city he put into motion a pastoral plan that emphasized the importance of the laity, especially the youth. During his administration (he resigned in 1985) he came to be a much beloved pastor and was, without doubt, the key churchman during the dictatorship. There was another progressive bishop, Marcelo Mendiharat of Salto (1968-85), but Mendiharat was expelled by the military in 1972, depriving Parteli of much needed support among the largely conservative hierarchy. Among the leaders of the conservative wing were the Jesuit bishop Carlos Mullin, of Minas, and Antonio Corzo, of Maldonado and Punta del Este. Corzo became the main spokesman in the church against communism. Overall it was a divided hierarchy and hence very limited in what it could do.

Nevertheless, many Catholics began to take progressive stands in politics. The first Catholic political party in the country was the Civic Union, founded in 1912. Although small, it was esteemed by many because of the intellectual and moral quality of its main representatives. In the sixties a new generation of professionals and university students pushed to modernize the party, and in 1962 the Civic Union changed its name to the Christian Democratic Party of Uruguay. Two years later a conservative group in the party broke off to form the Civic Christian Movement. The Christian Democratic Party began taking increasingly progressive positions and finally ended up as the driving force behind the United Front, which was founded in 1971. The United Front was a populist coalition of all the leftist parties, which included the communists and socialists. Its candidate was Líber Seregni, a retired general. The Tupamaros supported the United Front, although numerically the Tupamaro sympathizers may have represented only 5 percent of the total electorate.[11] The Front won 18.3 percent of the vote in the election.[12] The fact that the Tupamaros supported it tended to polarize the elections

and to provoke much hostility toward the Front. Many Catholics in the Christian Democratic Party, as well as most leftists, among whom were to be found many priests and religious women, sympathized with the Front. What surprised many was the attitude of the official church toward the Front. In its declaration on the elections the episcopal conference warned Christians not to support either Marxist or liberal ideologies. But in the same document the bishops stated: "We did not find sufficient reason to recommend nor to exclude any of the current parties as a legitimate choice."[13] The influence of Parteli was clearly observable in this declaration, which tacitly approved of the presence of Catholics in the Front.

THE CHURCH VIS-À-VIS THE REGIME

Between 1968 and 1974 the hierarchy, following Parteli's leadership as head of the episcopal conference, assumed a cautious but critical position before the civil-military regime. In June 1972 the conference emitted a declaration that pointed to the atmosphere of violence in the country. The bishops condemned the violence caused by the subversives, but they also censured the government's arbitrary reactions, which did not distinguish between subversives and others who wanted change without violence. In their words: "To give in to the temptation to treat as subversives those who have merely wanted renovation will only serve to multiply the number of people tempted to resort to violence."[14] In a public response Bordaberry himself rejected the bishops' statement as simplistic, and then went on to justify the use of drastic means by pointing to the "intransigent and intolerant" nature of the country's subversives.[15]

However, this initial critical attitude soon dissipated and the hierarchy began looking more and more like their Argentinean counterparts. This step backward was most noticeable from 1974 on. One factor to explain this change in the bishops' attitude was the near total control the security forces exercised over society and even over the church. On several occasions priests and religious women were arrested and submitted to interrogations. In August 1972 Román Lezama, a Jesuit, was arrested and imprisoned because he was believed to have contact with the Tupamaros. Although he was freed in December, he was obliged to present himself every ten days at a military base to give an account of his activities.[16] But the most notorious case was that of Bishop Marcelo Mendiharat. That same year Mendiharat, the bishop of Salto since 1968, was forced to submit to an interrogation. As it turned out, his niece's husband had been accused of giving diocesan funds to the Tupamaros. Although Mendiharat stated that he had no knowledge of any such activity, he was known for his progressive views. On the occasion of a trip he took outside the country, the other bishops advised him not to return in order to avoid being arrested. He remained in exile from 1972 to 1985.

Parteli himself was forced to support acts of hostility. The most dramatic occurred on the occasion of the Corpus Christi procession in November of 1973. On the very day of the procession, the biggest in the country, the government suspended permission for the procession on the grounds that earlier in the morning anti-government leaflets had been distributed in the churches. Parteli protested the government's arbitrary decision and noted that the leaflets had been thrown out of the windows of passing cars, clearly the work of the government itself.[17] Even more destructive than government harassment were the efforts of rightwing Catholics and the conservative bishops to undermine Parteli's leadership. During his *ad limina* visit to Rome in 1974 he was surprised when Pope Paul VI himself chastised him for bad leadership of the church in Montevideo. Later the pope apologized to Parteli in a letter, noting that he had not taken sufficiently into account Parteli's own report of the state of the archdiocese.[18] But the damage was done, and Parteli was deeply hurt by the pope's criticism. From that point on he softened his criticism of the government and did his best to search for consensus among his fellow bishops. But in this case consensus meant giving in to the conservatives, such as Corzo and Mullin. Corzo was a militant anticommunist, and Mullin was a personal friend of Bordaberry, whom he frequently visited.[19] As a consequence of this change in orientation, after a promising beginning the bishops limited their actions to sending private messages to the government.[20] It was not until the 1980 national plebiscite that the hierarchy once again began to take more energetic and positive stands.

THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

In November 1980, 57 percent of the Uruguayan electorate voted against a new constitution that would have legitimated the armed forces as permanent guardians of the government.[21] Given this unexpected rejection, the military worked up another plan. In 1981 they designated Gregorio Alvarez, a retired general, president of the country. In November 1982, according to the new plan, elections were held within each political party. In calling for these elections the government in fact recognized the parties as legitimate. In all the parties the groups most opposed to the government won.

With these elections the demand to return to democracy grew. Street demonstrations, held with or without permission, grew in frequency and in size. On May 1, 1983, an enormous crowd showed up to celebrate Worker's Day, and in November the parties summoned the whole population to show up for another civic act in front of the obelisk in the park named after Battle y Ordóñez. It was, according to all accounts, the largest gathering in the history of the country. In the meantime, the politicians entered into dialogue with the military. In the Park Hotel seven high-level meetings were held during 1983. The civilians continued to organize marches and demonstrations in order to persuade the military that it could not stop the transition to

democracy. In spite of this public pressure, the military held firmly to the decision to exclude from the dialogue all leftist parties and certain politicians on the right whom it considered intransigent. Among the latter was Wilson Ferreira Aldunate, the leader of the National Party. On the other hand, the military freed Líber Seregni, the head of the United Front. The most acceptable broker for both sides turned out to be Julio María Sanguinetti, of the Colorado Party, a fact that favored his candidacy to succeed the military as president. In August 1984 the military and the politicians solemnly signed the Naval Club Pact, by which they agreed upon the final details for the transition, which included presidential elections in November. As foreseen, Sanguinetti became a candidate, won the election, and assumed the presidency in February of the following year. Nevertheless, just as in the case of Chile, the military left power only after binding the civilians to accept certain terms, which included conducting their own military affairs without civilian interference.

THE CHURCH IN THE TRANSITION

On the occasion of the 1980 plebiscite the bishops published a declaration criticizing the government's proposed constitution. In it they affirmed: "There is no real dialogue, nor legitimate social consensus, without a scrupulous respect for the will of the majority."[22] Most of all, they rejected the attempt to suppress basic liberties in the name of "national security." The episcopal conference also distributed to the parishes pamphlets intended to orient the laity regarding the plebiscite. In one of the points the bishops expressly condemned the doctrine of national security. Discussion groups were formed and the general consensus generated among Catholics was one of opposition to the military's constitution.[23] During the electoral process the bishop's conference made other public statements that motivated discussion in the parishes and in lay groups.

SERPAJ AND HUMAN RIGHTS

More important than the bishops' statements, however, was the role played by SERPAJ. In April 1981 a small group of militant Christians decided to carry out the first public act denouncing human-rights violations since the beginning of the dictatorship. They were encouraged and advised by Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, the Nobel Peace Prize winner in 1980. Until 1984 SERPAJ was the only human-rights organization in the entire country. The founder and driving force was a young Jesuit priest, Luis Pérez Aguirre, whose personal charism served to attract many idealists to the cause. Since 1975 Pérez Aguirre had worked in defense of abandoned or abused children. He founded a home on a farm for the children, which he called La Huella. At the end of

1979 he founded the magazine *La Plaza*, which aimed to stimulate dialogue among Uruguayans on the country's social and political problems from a Christian perspective. In 1982 the magazine was suppressed. That notwithstanding, the young Jesuit managed to get his campaign off the ground.[24] Soon SERPAJ became a model for other human-rights groups with more specific objectives. In 1977 the Mothers and Relatives of Uruguayans Disappeared in Argentina was founded. With the aid of SERPAJ other groups were founded: The Movement of Mothers and Relatives of Those Accused by Military Justice (1982), and The Mothers and Relatives of the Disappeared in Uruguay (1983), which worked closely with the former group. In 1984 SERPAJ collaborated in founding the Institute of Legal and Social Studies of Uruguay, which aimed to offer legal counsel to the victims of human-rights violations.[25]

In 1983, as a consequence of two dramatic events, SERPAJ became the focus of national attention. In June SERPAJ denounced the torture of twenty-five youths who had been detained. This was the first time in Uruguay that the victims and their families dared to denounce publicly, and with proof, human-rights violations committed by the forces of order. The scandal created was so great that the military broke off dialogue with the civilians on the transition to democracy and on August 2 the government decreed the suspension of all political activity. At once SERPAJ responded with a measure totally unknown in a country so secular and European as Uruguay: it called upon the citizens to participate in a hunger strike. Pérez Aguirre, along with another priest and a Methodist minister, fortified themselves inside a former convent and began their fifteen-day fast, scheduled to end on August 25, the day of national independence. Many other activities accompanied this central event: marches, which included the clanging of pots and pans, and blackouts, in which people voluntarily left their homes in darkness. Archbishop Parteli tried to visit the hunger strikers but was stopped by a military cordon. Finally SERPAJ was declared outside the law. But by that time the hunger strikers had achieved their objective: they prodded the political parties, unions, and popular organizations to mobilize themselves. Concretely, SERPAJ organized the Multi-Sector Commission, which summoned all important civic groups to come together to forge one great campaign for returning to democracy. Among other activities the Multi-Sector Commission helped to mobilize the thousands of Uruguayans who turned out for the November meeting before the obelisk in Battle Park. Later, in 1984, as a result of SERPAJ's initiative, the National Coordination of Human Rights, which pulled together all human-rights groups in Uruguay, was founded.[26] All during 1984 and 1985 SERPAJ organized many demonstrations and marches to bring attention to the cause of the families of the disappeared and imprisoned. By means of these activities SERPAJ managed to turn the human-rights issue into a topic of national debate. All the political parties felt obliged to take up the banner of human rights and to pressure the military to moderate its conduct. Later, as Father Aguirre observed, it became evident that the

parties were more interested in promoting their image than in promoting the cause of human rights.[27] Once in power, the parties backed away from their promise to try those responsible for gross violations of human rights.

THE NATIONAL REFERENDUM

In March 1985 Uruguay's parliament approved the Law of National Pacification, which granted amnesty to political prisoners and all those who had been exiled for political reasons. The law expressly excluded from the amnesty all those who had been responsible for meting out inhuman treatment or detaining persons who later disappeared.[28] The law represented a great victory for the civilians and especially for the human-rights groups. It seemed as though Uruguay was about to follow the example of Argentina when it returned to democracy. However, in the course of the year the politicians went back on their word. As the official investigation proceeded, the military proved to be very uncooperative, and in private conversations with political leaders military leaders let it be known that they considered the Pacification Law an act of pure vengeance. In December parliament produced the Law of Limitations on State Punishment, which extended the original amnesty to include all military and police involved in acts of repression or torture during the dictatorship. The new law annulled all the exceptions that had been made regarding human-rights violators in the Law of National Pacification.

On the same day that parliament voted for the new law, the human-rights groups organized a demonstration that included the mothers of the disappeared. Afterward, three women, Elisa Delle Piane, Matilde Rodríguez, and María Ester Gatti, organized a campaign to have a national referendum to annul the general pardon granted by the government. In January 1987 the National Commission Pro-Referendum was created. Most politicians and observers were skeptical about the possibility of the referendum getting off the ground, and the government used tactics to intimidate the organizers. Nevertheless, the campaign soon turned into a veritable national crusade. SERPAJ and the other human-rights groups collected signatures throughout the country. Finally, in December 1988, the National Commission Pro-Referendum handed over to the Court of Elections a list of 630,000 signatures: a number far above that required by law. Indeed, it was a very respectable number, considering Uruguay's small population. The Elections Court examined the signatures and announced that the referendum would take place in April. For the first time in the entire history of Uruguay the people in general, as opposed to the traditional political parties, had imposed their will. Morality had won over pragmatic politics.

The referendum engendered impassioned debates over human rights everywhere in Uruguay. It also provoked, for the first time, an honest and frank assessment of the country's recent history, including the role of the armed forces. On April 16, 57 percent of the country voted in favor of a full am-

nesty and 42.5 percent voted against.[29] This was without doubt a defeat for the human-rights groups, the mothers and relatives of the disappeared, and other victims of repression. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the vote against the amnesty won in Montevideo by 56.4 percent. This meant that the vote in favor of the pardon won in the interior, where tradition prevailed and where there was considerably less repression. Although the defeat discouraged the human-rights groups, nonetheless many saw the campaign to hold the referendum as a moral victory. As a result of that campaign many more Uruguayans were made aware of human-rights issues. In particular, SERPAJ used the slogan made popular in the years after Medellín—There is no peace without justice—as its principal argument. In spite of the defeat SERPAJ intensified its efforts to assure that some justice would be done. Following the example of Argentina and Brazil it produced its own *Uruguay: Nunca más* ("Uruguay: Never Again"), published in 1989, with abundant collected testimonies on tortures, detentions, and disappearances during the dictatorship. Unlike similar reports in Argentina and Chile, however, SERPAJ's investigation was not the fruit of an official commission, but rather the work of a private group with the aid of volunteers and the cooperation of witnesses and victims who had suffered during the process.

THE CHURCH: A NEW IMAGE

Many things changed in Uruguay during the long civil-military dictatorship. One thing that changed was the naive belief that long dictatorships, typical of the rest of Latin America, could never occur in Uruguay. Another change was the general perception many Uruguayans had of the church. For many, raised in a secular atmosphere, the church's role in defending human rights and promoting democracy was a surprise. In general, the church gained a new respectability as a result of the role played by Parteli and other progressive churchpeople, and especially by SERPAJ. For conservative Catholics the new activist role of the church was highly inconvenient.

This change in roles can be perceived in certain incidents and gestures. One somewhat humorous indication of how times had changed was a visit the leading Masons of Uruguay paid to Archbishop Parteli during the tense days of the transition to democracy. The Masons proposed issuing a joint statement with the Catholic church calling for the military to continue its dialogue with the civilians. Parteli politely declined the invitation but proposed that each make a separate statement.[30] Another example occurred as a result of John Paul II's visit in May 1988. President Sanguinetti was so impressed by the pope and the popular response to the pontiff's visit that he fully approved the proposal to keep a great white cross that had been raised in the center of the capital as a permanent remembrance of the visit. Finally, when Sanguinetti's successor, Luis Alberto Lacalle, a practicing Catholic, took his oath of office in 1990, he participated in an ecumenical service pre-

sided over by the Catholic archbishop of Montevideo. This was the first time since 1894 that a Uruguayan president had participated in a public and official religious service.[31] Although Uruguay continues to be a highly secular society, the church now enjoys status as an important social force that it never enjoyed before.

43. Interview with Archbishop Rolón.

44. *Sendero*, May 6, 1988, p. 2.

45. *Discursos y mensajes de su Santidad Juan Pablo II en su visita al Paraguay, 16, 17, 18 de mayo de 1988* (Asunción: Universidad Católica, June 1988), pp. 58-59.

46. *Anuario Paraguay 1988*, p. 321.

47. Carter, *El Papel de la Iglesia en la caída de Stroessner*, p. 122.

48. *Anuario Paraguay 1988*, p. 488.

49. Ibid., p. 511.

50. Rolón, *No hay camino . . . ¡Camino se hace al andar! Memorias*, pp. 107-108.

51. Paraguayan Episcopal Conference, *Teología de la liberación* (Asunción, October 20, 1988), p. 32.

52. Carter, *El Papel de la Iglesia en la caída de Stroessner*, pp. 132-133; Rolón, *No hay camino . . . ¡Camino se hace al andar! Memorias*, p. 112.

53. Rolón, *No hay camino . . . ¡Camino se hace al andar! Memorias*, p. 118.

54. Ibid., p. 121.

55. Carter, *El Papel de la Iglesia en la caída de Stroessner*, p. 139.

56. Víctor Jacinto Flecha, "Historia de una ausencia: notas acerca de la participación electoral en el Paraguay," *Revista Paraguaya de Sociología* 80 (January-April 1991): 79.

57. Paraguayan Episcopal Conference, *El Proceso de transición hacia la democracia* (Asunción, July 25, 1990).

6 Uruguay (1973-1990)

1. Gonzalo Varela, *De la República liberal al estado militar: Uruguay, 1968-1973* (Montevideo: Ediciones del Nuevo Mundo, 1988), p. 24.

2. Ibid., p. 65.

3. Ibid., p. 147.

4. Servicio Paz y Justicia (SERPAJ), *Uruguay: Nunca más*, 3d ed. (Montevideo, 1989), p. 7.

5. Ibid., p. 285.

6. Tribunal Permanente de los Pueblos y SERPAJ, *Tribunal Permanente de los Pueblos: Sesión uruguaya, abril 1990* (Montevideo, 1990), p. 11.

7. Germán Rama, *La Democracia en Uruguay: una perspectiva de interpretación* (Montevideo: ARCA Editorial, 1987), p. 170.

8. Enrique Sobrado, *La Iglesia uruguaya: entre pueblo y oligarquía* (Montevideo: Alfa Editorial, 1969), p. 35.

9. Juan Villegas, *Historia de la Iglesia en el Uruguay en cifras* (Montevideo: Universidad Católica del Uruguay Dámaso A. Larrañaga, 1984), p. 87.

10. Uruguayan Episcopal Conference, *Guía de la Iglesia uruguaya 1981* (Montevideo, 1981), p. 144.

11. Rama, *La Democracia en Uruguay*, p. 157.

12. Varela, *De la República liberal al estado militar*, p. 116.

13. "Declaraciones de la CEU" [CEU: Uruguayan Episcopal Conference], September 15, 1971, p. 2.

14. "Declaración del Consejo Permanente de la Conferencia Episcopal Uruguaya," June 12, 1972, p. 3.

15. Héctor Borrat, *Uruguay 1973-1984: i messaggi e i silenzi* (Bologna, Italy, 1984), p. 109.

16. Román Lezama, S.J., "Una historia de prisión," mimeographed pages, archive of OBSUR (Observatorio del Sur), Montevideo.

17. Carlos Parteli, "A la comunidad católica de Montevideo," November 1, 1973, archive of OBSUR.

18. "Reseña histórica de nuestra pastoral de conjunto (1966-1984)," p. 19, archive of OBSUR.

19. Interview with Father Andrés Alessandri, S.J., director of the Fabve Center during the dictatorship, and interview with Carlos Parteli, archbishop of Montevideo, 1966-85, Montevideo, February 26, 1993.

20. These confidential messages sent to the government were published by Borrat in *Uruguay 1973-1984*.

21. Diego Achard, *La Transición en Uruguay* (Montevideo: Instituto Wilson Ferreira Aldunate, 1992), p. 37.

22. Uruguayan Episcopal Conference, "Ante el próximo plebiscito constitucional," November 12, 1980.

23. Interview with Patricio Rodé, vice-director of OBSUR and director of Social Pastoral Services of the archdiocese of Montevideo, 1983-85, Montevideo, March 3, 1993.

24. Many of the articles published in the magazine *La Plaza* are reproduced in Father Pérez Aguirre's book, *Predicaciones en la plaza* (Montevideo, 1985). Also, interview with Father Luis Pérez Aguirre, S.J., Montevideo, February 26, 1993.

25. Tribunal Permanente de los Pueblos, p. 67.

26. María del Huerto Amarillo and Antonio Serrentino Sabella, "El Movimiento de derechos humanos en el Uruguay," *Cuadernos Paz y Justicia* 4: *La Defensa de los derechos humanos en la transición democrática uruguaya* (July 1988), p. 33.

27. Ibid., p. 34.

28. Tribunal Permanente de los Pueblos, p. 56.

29. Ibid., p. 107.

30. Achard, *La Transición en Uruguay*, p. 53; and interview with former Archbishop Carlos Parteli, February 26, 1993.

31. *Latinamerican Press*, March 1, 1990, p. 2.

7 Bolivia (1952-1989)

1. For a general view of Bolivian history up until the Banzer military regime, see Herbert Klein, *Bolivia, the Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); for the process since 1952 see James M. Malloy, *Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970); James M. Malloy and Richard S. Thorn, eds., *Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia since 1952* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971); James M. Malloy and Carl Beck, *Political Elites: A Mode of Analysis* (Pittsburgh: University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 1971); and James M. Malloy and Eduardo Gamarra, *Revolution and Reaction: Bolivia, 1964-1985* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988). See also Christopher Mitchell, *The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia: From the MNR to Military Rule* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977).

2. This picture of the church is taken in part from a document written by a group of Christian intellectuals entitled *La Iglesia de Bolivia: ¿compromiso o traición? De Medellín a Puebla: Ensayo de análisis histórico* (La Paz, June, 1978). Also see Josep M. Barnadas's chapters on the church in Bolivia in the eighth volume of CEHILA's