

NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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Governmental Affairs

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, JULY 20, 1976

The C.I.A. Cloud Over the Press

By Daniel Schorr

ASPEN, Colo.—One of William E. Colby's less exhilarating moments as Director of Central Intelligence was having to call a news conference to demand deletion from the Senate report on assassination plots of a dozen names, including such underworld figures as Sam Giancana and John Rosselli.

However misguided the recruitment of these worthies in the C.I.A.'s designs on Fidel Castro, they had been promised eternal secrecy about their roles, and, for the agency, delivering on that promise was an article of faith as well as law.

Again, when Mr. Colby was subpoenaed by the House Intelligence Committee for the names of certain intelligence officers, he faced up to a threatened contempt citation by making it clear that he would rather go to jail than compromise intelligence sources.

This goes, as well, for the names of journalists who have served the C.I.A. And Mr. Colby's successor, George Bush, has said there will be absolutely no change in that policy because he is "dedicated to the protection of sources." The principle is that an intelligence agency that rats on its agents, past or present, won't have very many in the future.

This poses a problem to the journalistic community, which, out of concern for the compromising of the First Amendment, would like the intelligence community to expose the infiltrators.


But banging on a closed door seems a fruitless diversion, and there may be a more fruitful way of going about this. There has clearly been a pattern of cooperation between the C.I.A. and employers of journalists. Managers, with less legal restraint, should be able to provide some of the information about their employees' roles and their own.

"Where an American news organization provided cover for a C.I.A. officer," says an intelligence veteran, "the practice was to make arrangement with management."

Such an arrangement was necessary, if only to cover transfers, absences and other hard-to-explain movements. There is reason to believe that some of these arrangements may have originally been formalized in memorandums of understanding between C.I.A. directors and the employers concerned.

There have been published suggestions of management involvement with the C.I.A. For example:

Wayne Phillips, former staff member



Tom Hachtman

of The New York Times, has stated, with the support of documentary material, that the C.I.A. tried to recruit him in 1952 while he was studying at Columbia University's Russian Institute. He said an agency official told him that the C.I.A. had "a working arrangement" with Arthur Hays Sulzberger, then publisher of The Times, and that the agency could arrange to get him assigned to Moscow.

(Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, the present publisher, has said: "I never heard of The Times being approached either in my capacity as publisher or as the son of the late Mr. Sulzberger.")

Sig Mickelson, former president of CBS News, has said that in 1954 he was called to the office of William S. Paley, CBS board chairman, in whose presence two C.I.A. officials told him that Austin Goodrich, a CBS News stringer in Stockholm, was a C.I.A. agent. (Mr. Paley has denied that there was any such meeting.)

There are also unconfirmed reports, pursued by investigative reporters, of arrangements by newspapers in Florida and California to provide cover to C.I.A. officers.

Most of this goes back to the 1950's, when the C.I.A. deputy director Frank Wisner cultivated news media executives and was reputed to have boasted of playing the press like a "mighty Wurlitzer." No such formal arrange-

ment is believed to exist today. The C.I.A. says it has stopped using "accredited" correspondents of American news media, and more recently has stated that it will also phase out the use of part-time correspondents of American news organizations.

Current news executives profess to be mystified about the nature of the clandestine lines that C.I.A. ran into their organizations in past years. But there are executives and retired executives, who could help dispel the cloud hanging over the press by coming forward to tell the arrangements they made with the C.I.A.

If restoring the fair name of the free press requires exposure of reporters who served the C.I.A., often after appeals to their patriotism, then the parade could well be led by employers who made the practice possible—presumably out of equally patriotic motives.

Daniel Schorr is a CBS television investigative reporter under suspension pending Congressional resolution of its inquiry into his leak of the House Select Committee on Intelligence's report on the Central Intelligence Agency to The Village Voice.



American Cause

Editor: The American Cause, Inc. 1000 17th St. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036
The Honorable George Murphy, Director

Special Report
June 1976

On the Separation of Church and State

Some preliminary observations on the lamentable consequences of the Senior Senator from Idaho for the national intelligence services.

by James Angleton and Charles J. V. Murphy

Mr. Angleton spent 31 years with the Office of Strategic Services [OSS] and the Central Intelligence Agency, and through the last 20 years was Chief of Counterintelligence for the CIA. Mr. Murphy is a retired writer, Time-Life and Fortune magazine.

When the first revelations in Washington of the alleged misdeeds of the Central Intelligence Agency became a sensation in the European press 17 months ago, a veteran diplomat in Bonn expressed his consternation that the government of a great country should let itself be driven to disgorge vital state secrets affecting the security of the nation and its allies. "You don't have a country over there," he scolded *The New York Times* correspondent, "you have a huge church."

That subtle witticism went right over *The New York Times'* good, gray, humorless head. The friendly diplomat had shrewdly perceived at the source of the orgy of self-criticism convulsing Congress and the press alike something more primitive than witch-burning or the whiplash of Puritan conscience. What he had discerned was not so much the return of a rebuking godly institution to American politics as the emergence of a fresh evangelical phenomenon in the affairs of State—a church spelled with a capital "C." Frank Church, to be precise, the senior Senator from Idaho. Events have borne out the diplomat's appraisal. In May, Senator Church emerged as a bustling candidate for the Democratic Presidential nomination. In June, he was maneuvering on Jimmy Carter's coattails for the Vice-Presidential spot.

Church is a blown-in-the-bottle, copper-riveted, 24-carat example of the rough diamond from the frontier polished into a political celebrity within Washington's liberal left-wing Establishment. At 51, to be sure, he still slides easily when out on the hustings into the arm-waving, tub-thumping and rolling rhetoric that earned him in *Time* the accolade of "the boy orator of the Snake River Valley." But he is also master, as *The Washington Post's* senior political analyst David S. Broder recently noted, of the "cool, controlled" style that is most effective on television and over cigars and brandy in Averell Harriman's drawing rooms. And, in common with most ambitious politicians, he has kept both ears glued to the ground. Broder makes this additional observation: "He is a man who says, with a straight face, that only someone with 20 years' experience as a Washington insider has the know-how to take on the dreadful bureaucracy."

It takes more than a straight face for a man of Church's associations to carry off such a posture. It takes a strong stomach, too. Church has been a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for 19 years. During his service there he made his mark as an Establishment man. When the Johnson administration presented the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964, he voted for it. He was ranged alongside the rest as the calls came for ever bigger appropriations to carry on the Vietnam war. The sea change in his opinion about the American role in the outer world came only after the public had become disillusioned with the feckless strategy devised by President Johnson and Defense Secretary McNamara to satisfy the liberal establishment of which he is part. By Nixon's day, Church's interventionism had turned isolationist. Under the

new colors he enlisted with the turncoats and co-authored the divisive legislation trimming the President's war powers and bringing disgrace and shame to the American exit from Southeast Asia. He was all for suspending foreign aid as early as 1971. While our troops were fighting in the field, he took his family on a junket to the Soviet Union, the chief arms supplier to our enemies. His virtuosity on the negative side of foreign policy makes him the logical successor to the aging Sparkman as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—or, as Church would render it, the Little or No Foreign Relations Committee.

The Statesman as Muckraker

Church's swift rise inside the Liberal, left-wing Establishment has been sped by far more dramatic actions than these, however. In April, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, of which he was Chairman and in full control, issued a two-volume, 815-page report advocating no less than 183 measures designed to restrict the various intelligence activities conducted by the Federal Government. That work was 15 months in the making and during that interval scarcely a day passed that a bewildered nation did not see Senator Church's name on the front pages of the newspapers or his round, bejeweled presence crowding the television screen.

All that while he kept a sideshow going in an adjoining tent that was almost as destructive as the other. Four years ago, he took over the Chairmanship of a subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee that was set up to investigate the operations of American-owned multinational corporations. His progressive disclosures of certain regrettable practices adopted by famous corporations to sweeten their sales pitches in foreign lands have been hardly less destructive of our nation's reputation abroad than the shocks produced by his exposes of the CIA and the FBI. Eminent personages in Japan, the Netherlands, Italy, and Saudi Arabia have been embarrassed, possibly ruined, by the details which he and his staff leaked to the press. Governments of friendly nations have been dismayed and shaken by the evidence of scandal in their own ranks, sprung upon them without warning and certainly without the benefit of judicial process.

There is an old-fashioned word for these lurid enterprises. The word is muckraking. *The Economist* of London, a journal which follows American affairs with a perceptive eye, described Church in January as "the scourge of immorality in undercover intelligence operations, and the inquisitor of corrupt practices by American corporations abroad"—prosecutor-cum-judge-cum-jury on the dirty tricks of his countrymen in other lands.

Let us give the muckraker his due. The CIA and the FBI in their arcane and overlapping responsibilities did engage in some illegal and ill-advised operations, although these were by no means altogether reprehensible when weighed in light of the national security considerations prevailing at the time. The CIA did briefly consort with political assassins who appear to have been recruited from "the gang that couldn't shoot straight," and it did allow itself to be briefly drawn into unworthy technologies associated, among other things, with explosive cigars. And in the realm of international commerce, where saints would starve, such respectable corporations as Lockheed and Northrop did pay out large sums to foreign agents and middlemen in ways which abroad, in most cases, were within the prevailing custom

and usage for paying commissions, finder's fees, or whatever. It has all been laid out for the rest of the world to see--the crumbled skeletons rooted out of the closets of six administrations.

Now is the time to measure the benefits, if any, from the muckraking--and to take the measure of the muckraker as well. The *auto-da-fe* proceedings against the plane makers and the arms dealers remain alive, and while they last it is quite impossible to tell how many jobs of American workers they will eventually lose, how much foreign exchange will be sacrificed, and how much of the market for the world's best goods of their kind will be closed off. But the Select Committee on Intelligence has finally been disbanded, without tears, and its huge staff returned to the rear corridors of the Federal ant heap. Now the Senate in its collective wisdom must decide for itself how far it is prepared to go in fitting to the intelligence services, and most importantly to a now shaky and harassed CIA, the straitjacket Senator Church and the Committee's staff have brazenly tailored for it.

It's a good time, too, for the rest of us to start making up our minds about the real lessons to be drawn from the whole untidy experience and deciding what is to be salvaged from the mess.

A Fantasy to Match the Idaho Mountains

For these weighty deliberations, Senator Church's report isn't much of a help. He personally pays lip service to the maxim that reliable and timely intelligence is desirable in the interest of national security. He praises himself and the committee staff for the discretion he would have us believe they exercised where national secrets were concerned. The truth is, of course, that it was an open secret in Washington that just about every intelligence secret revealed in camera before the committee found its way to the press. The Committee's report had exhausted its surprises long before it ever went to the printer.

The document is disappointing in other and more serious respects. Senator John G. Tower of Texas, the Vice Chairman, refused to put his name to the report, and he was joined in his abstention by Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona. Senator Tower reproved the Chairman and the majority members for ignoring the main task laid upon them by the Congress: that was to weigh the nation's needs in intelligence, measure the performance of the various intelligence agencies in meeting those needs, and suggest how best the intelligence work could henceforth go forward without upsetting "the delicate balance between individual liberties and national security."

Instead, the document is overwhelmingly a political tract for those Senators who wish to reduce the American position in the world: a scornful sermon on the inequities that, by their lights, are inherent in the intelligence process, especially in the field of covert political action. The report, by and large, denigrates the virtue of vigilance and prudence. It takes a harpy's delight in dogging the occasional misdeeds and misdemeanors, the improprieties, the blunders. There is contemptuous reference to the CIA's implied proclivity for the "dark arts of secret intervention--bribery, blackmail, abduction, assassination"--put at "the service of reactionary and repressive regimes," a bias which the chairman and his staff has caused U.S. foreign policy to become generally identified with "the claims of the old order, instead of the aspirations of the new."

Beyond all that, Senator Church argues airily that the CIA's covert activities, as well as those of the FBI in espionage matters, are largely stimulated by an exaggerated and now outmoded fear of Soviet intentions which he fails to define. American interests abroad, he would have us believe, would be far better served if the CIA were to become less edgy about Soviet actions and indeed if it ignored altogether the less blatant Soviet-fostered interventions in distant parts of the world. "We have gained little, and lost a great deal from our past policy of compulsive intervention," he argues, and from this conclusion he has compounded a peculiar prescription for taking the United States out of the Cold War, which was not of our making, and out of the world itself.

He urges us all to take "a longer view of history"--hardly an original piece of advice. He becomes more specific, though, when he bids the Executive Branch to rid itself of "a fantasy"--a figment of presumably overheated imaginations--that has "entrapped and enthralled our Presidents." His precise term for this deranged condition is "the illusion of American omnipotence," a polysyllabic echo of former Senator J. William Fulbright's acid phrase, "the arrogance of power," which

marked earlier American efforts from Truman through Lyndon Johnson to stay communist aggression and subversion.

Yet, on the recent evidence, it is Senator Church and his zealous supporters who have become enthralled with fantasy--the fantasy that the Russians have called off the Cold War. His long service on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee should have armored him against such a fancy. It is even more bewildering that he should still hold that notion after devoting so much time inquiring into the work of an agency whose principal business it is to contend with Soviet subversion and strategic deception.

The CIA files on the counterintelligence side of the House have been consistently clear on the point that the Kissinger diplomacy has not deflected the Kremlin from its basic objectives: Detente is a sham, a tactic; it is Soviet communism's Potemkin Village for waging Cold War.

It could be that Senator Church is only a cynic, as Mr. Broder suggests. That is no uncommon trait in a politician. Or it may be that he has decided to present himself as detente's man for all seasons. Be that as it may, the intellectual boundaries that separate him from the real world in which the CIA until recently operated so spiritedly and the one that fills his private vision are as stark as the mountains that wall off his native heath in Idaho. One has only to examine the Committee's findings on the CIA's intermittent intrusions in Chile, between 1963 and 1973, to appreciate how successful the man from Idaho has been in raising a fantasy to match his mountains.

The High Stakes in Chile

That the United States Government, starting with President Kennedy, channeled support, some of it through the CIA, to pro-American conservative and moderate political groupings in Chile is not in dispute, although one might question the wisdom of making the issue a shuttlecock in our domestic politics. The efforts of the late Salvadore Allende-Gossens to capture Chile for a communist minority in 1964 were foiled in some part by the CIA. Allende was already looking to Fidel Castro and, through him, to Moscow for the funds and managerial skills he had to have for making full-scale revolution. The American motive was to prevent Castro from spreading his influence into the Andes. The CIA's intervention in the Chilean political process consisted of little more than of providing funds for political rallies and editorial debate aimed at inducing the Christian Democrats and the moderate parties, who commanded a massive majority, to put aside their differences in the common interest of keeping Allende and his Marxist coalition from slipping into the Presidency through the gap between them.

That glancing intervention succeeded on an investment of but a few million dollars and the talents of a handful of specialists. Six years later, the contest was re-enacted, with the noncommunists again split and Allende and the radicals still controlling only 36 percent of the popular votes. This time he won because Kissinger was too much engrossed in wangling a visa to Peking, coming to terms with Hanoi, and cultivating detente with Moscow to heed the intelligence warnings from Santiago. Had the Army not risen against Allende in September 1973, he would today rank second only to Castro in the communist hierarchy outside the Soviet bloc.

The mischief in Church's handling of the CIA role in Chile issues from the crude attempt of his staff to saddle the CIA with the blame for Allende's fall. A separate report issued by the staff, which was drafted outside the Committee's cognizance but issued with the Chairman's sanction, charged the agency with having "worked through the covert process to subvert democratic processes" and having thereby brought "an end to constitutional government" in that storm-tossed country.

Such a finding is, to say the least, the shameless distortion of the facts that Senator Goldwater in his dissent said it was. To arrive at it, Senator Church's scholars had to gloze Allende's avowed schemes, in open association with platoons of Soviet and Cuban advisors, for silencing all political opposition, nationalizing industry, collectivizing the land, and firing up a revolution that would support Castro's campaign to destroy American influence, root and branch, below the Rio Grande.

"Cuba in the Caribbean," Allende proclaimed in 1970, "and a Socialist Chile...will make revolution in Latin America." Castro toured Chile before the 1970 election to rally the discontented to Allende's banner. Allende himself made no less than nine trips to Havana between 1956 and 1970. In 1968, he saw to it, as

President of the Chilean Senate, that Cuban survivors from Che Guevara's foundered guerrilla war in Bolivia were given safe passage home; and, later, as President he permitted Castro to use Cuba's diplomatic offices in Chile to run his espionage and political agents in Bolivia, the Argentine, Brazil and Uruguay. There was no doubt about Allende's ambition: it was to set the Andes aflame.

Chile escaped sinking into a communist dictatorship by the skin of its teeth. The U.S. had little influence in the outcome. As for the liberal, left-wing panjandrums in the Congress and the press, it is depressingly plain that they still would have us believe that the overthrow of Allende was a crime against the constitutional order. They seem to have learned nothing from the test: Castro and the Soviet revolution-makers did. Allende's initial success in 1970, for which they orchestrated the strategy, encouraged them in the belief that Chile would provide communists in other societies with a model of how an electoral minority could achieve mastery inside parliamentary societies through skillful manipulation of the democratic process—a strategy presently being pursued with delicacy in Italy, France and Portugal. Allende's failure drove home the lesson that where the margins are thin the power cannot be held unless the armed forces have been brought under communist control.

When, therefore, Moscow's man in Portugal, Alvaro Cunhal, made his move in Portugal in 1974, just about a year later, he did so from what appeared to be a solid base of support within the armed forces themselves. Fortunately for Europe, the base was not as solid as at first it seemed. Once it started to crumble, as it finally did last winter, Cunhal prudently yielded the field with scarcely a shot. Then in Angola, a textbook application of Cuban military force behind a locally contrived "Popular Front" finally produced a decisive result—another fallen domino.

We would do well to ponder two inescapable questions: What weight would American counsel carry throughout Latin America, now that Castro has conquered an immensely promising strategic base for communist expansion in southern Africa, if Allende, his grateful ally, stood astride the Andes today?

What if anything can we expect from a Senate Foreign Relations Committee dominated by a man as befuddled as Frank Church is by the fantasies of detente, when Castro returns his attentions to Latin America, as in due course he will and must, to knock down for good the Chilean domino Allende all but toppled?

The Missed Opportunity

The missed meaning of the struggle for Chile is central to an understanding of the Church Committee's failure in what could and should have been a landmark inquiry into the methods and worth of intelligence. Quite above and beyond the question of whether the CIA was a "rogue elephant" running amok inside a constitutional society—the Committee to its credit ruled otherwise—there was the larger continuing question of whether it is up to the job. To understand what the job is, one has to take stock of the threat that the communist bloc presents to national security. On this crucial subject the report is all but silent.

Nowhere in its wordy, censorious document is there to be found a reasonable appraisal of the threat which the CIA was created to meet and fend off; nor of the changing disguises which that threat wears; nor of the changing targets at which it is aimed. There is no helpful information for American citizens about the character and resources of the KGB and the 27 other clandestine intelligence and espionage organizations which the Soviet bloc has mounted against the West. One looks in vain for a judicious assessment of the competence of the CIA to cope with these adversary services. And as for judging the performance of our own agency in appraising the Soviet Union's true capabilities and exposing its intentions, the pages are disgracefully blank.

American intelligence, along with its brilliant successes in the reconnaissance technologies, has suffered at least three serious failures over the last eight years. It was surprised by the Soviet bloc invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. It failed to call the Tet offensive in Vietnam earlier that same year. And it missed the Arab strike prepared for Yom Kippur. What is even more embarrassing, the communist war memoirs that have lately appeared in Hanoi convey a sinister hint that the highest Ameri-

can and South Vietnamese war councils were thoroughly penetrated by the enemy.

Finally, on the analytical side, the CIA has lately concluded that it has been underestimating the annual Soviet investment in weapons, forces, and military research and development by as much as 100 percent.

These are matters that Senator Church might profitably have addressed. Last fall, the House of Representatives own parallel Select Committee on Intelligence under Representative Otis Pike of New York made a promising start toward identifying the reasons for these failures. Unfortunately, that high purpose was quickly knocked aside by a left-wing majority bent on surpassing the rival committee in the volume of its leakage. Its final and still classified report, passed to a radical newspaper in New York, was consigned to the dust bin by an embarrassed House.

Unfortunately, the mischief has by no means ended. In May, the Senate responded to the Church Committee's report by creating a permanent 15-member select committee to oversee the operations not only of the CIA but also those of all the other intelligence agencies—the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency as well. The Armed Services Committees and the Appropriations Committees in both Houses will, as in the past, retain a jurisdiction in intelligence operations. The range of oversight had earlier been greatly widened by the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of October 1974 requiring that six committees in Congress—with half the Senate and 20 Representatives on their rosters—be apprised in advance of any covert action by the CIA under consideration by the President.

In emptying the CIA's "bag of dirty tricks," in Church's melodramatic phrase, the Congress had thus ended up by unclothing and all but disarming that agency at the same time. The vulnerability of the new committee to the vagaries of political self-interest can be ascertained from a cursory examination of the stands taken in the Senate on defense and foreign policy issues by the majority of its members. A sobering benchmark is the National Security Voting Index published in April by the American Security Council. This index rates the members of both Houses of Congress, on a scale ranging from zero to 100, by their votes on ten critical national security defense issues which a poll taken by the Opinion Research Corporation has established are favored by most Americans. On that index and in terms of the relative weights of their support of legislation most Americans consider critical to the nation's security, the eight most liberal members of the new intelligence oversight committee rank as follows:

Hart, Colorado	0%
Bayh, Indiana	17%
Stevenson, Illinois	0%
Biden, Delaware	0%
Case, New Jersey	11%
Hatfield, Oregon	0%
Huddleston, Kentucky	25%
Inouye, Hawaii	43%

It comes as a shock to realize that the paramount authority over the CIA and the associated military intelligence agencies will henceforth be exercised for the Senate by a body the majority of whose members are convinced, with Church, that the Soviet threat has waned. They will be supported, as he was, by a staff drawn from specialists of congenial outlook. Senator Mansfield has assured us that the traditional rules of self-discipline binding these bodies to reticence can be depended upon to protect the nation's intelligence secrets from disclosure. Alas, the feeble gestures the House of Representatives has so far made toward uncovering the source of the leak of the Pike Committee report to Daniel Schorr of the Columbia Broadcasting System hardly makes for confidence on that score.

Intelligence is the nation's first line of defense. In weighing the numerous other proposals put before it by the Member from Idaho, for further crippling and truncating the intelligence function, the Senate would be well advised in the Bicentennial year to give heed to the wisdom of the Founding Fathers: to keep Church (Frank) and State (affairs of) separate, at least where these life-and-death matters are concerned.

The Washington Star

Tuesday, July 20, 1976

Spy Report Leak Called a Bonanza to Agents

By Walter Taylor
Washington Star Staff Writer

The only Democrat on the now-defunct House intelligence committee testified today that the leak of the panel's final report provided a "bonanza" of secret information to enemy intelligence agents.

In testimony before the House Ethics Committee, Rep. Dale Milford, D-Texas, said the report, which was published in February by a New York newspaper, contained "bits and pieces" of classified information the disclosure of which "seriously jeopardized on-going intelligence operations."

Milford told the ethics committee, which is investigating the leak of the report, that it must obtain testimony from CBS reporter Daniel Schorr as to how he obtained the confidential document.

SCHORR HAS acknowledged that he received the report and passed it on to the Village Voice, a weekly New York newspaper which published the document.

The ethics committee has been investigating the leak of the report since February, but, testimony during two days of public hearings has indicated, it has not uncovered the source of the leak to Schorr.

However, beyond an informal invitation to voluntarily discuss the case with its investigators, the committee has not sought to compel Schorr to disclose his source. Committee sources have indicated that the panel hopes to avoid a First Amendment clash with Schorr on the question of a reporter's confidential sources.

IN A 54-PAGE statement, chief leak investigator and former FBI agent David Bowers detailed an extensive investigation of the intelligence committee's security procedures in general and the steps taken to safeguard its final report in particular — testimony that painted a picture of only the loosest type of protection for the 77,000 pages of classified material that passed through the hands of the panel.

For example, Bowers gave this description of circumstances surrounding the dissemination of a draft copy of the report, a document which other testimony

indicated contained more classified material than the version later adopted by the committee but which was suppressed by the full House.

"There was no specific control system," Bowers testified. "Copies of the draft contained no identification whatever. They were not numbered, nor were they charged out so they could be accounted for."

Copies of both the draft report and the more sanitized final version apparently received wide dissemination within executive agencies, including the CIA, the FBI, the White House and State, Justice and Defense departments, according to the Ethics Committee investigator.

BOWERS REPORTED that his investigation had revealed a number of other leaks of supposedly secret information — including one that might be a key to uncovering the original source of the document that Schorr had admitted giving to the Voice.

Ironically, that leak was to the CIA, itself the prime target of the committee's investigation.

Bowers testified that the intelligence committee chairman, Rep. Otis G. Pike, D-N.Y., had refused to make a copy of his panel's final report available to the CIA, but that an unidentified member of the committee had secreted one of the documents to the agency.

It later was learned that Bowers, during a closed-door session of the Ethics Committee early yesterday afternoon, had identified Rep. Les Aspin, D-Wis., as the source of the leak to the CIA.

Aspin, who was to appear as a witness before the Ethics Committee today, later confirmed that he had loaned a copy of the report to the CIA. He told the Associated Press that he did so in negotiating with the agency to get as much information as possible declassified and into the final report.

The report turned over to the CIA on Jan. 24 essentially was the same version of the document obtained by Schorr and passed on to the Village Voice.

THE BOTTOM LINE in Bowers' report to the Ethics Committee, how-

ever, was that there still was no hard evidence of who actually slipped the document to Schorr.

He said he and other investigators have recovered or examined most of the copies of the report known still to be in existence and that the wording of none of them precisely matches the document published by the newspaper.

For example, Bowers said, the copy reportedly given to the CIA — and subsequently duplicated and circulated within several executive branch agencies, including the White House — "had one page the Village Voice did not have, was missing two pages which the Village Voice did have and contained significant differences in text on two other pages."

FACED WITH the continuing mystery, the Ethics

WASHINGTON POST
22 JUL 1976

Ford Orders CIA Briefing For Carter

By Cynthia Kadonaga
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Ford yesterday instructed the Central Intelligence Agency to give Democratic presidential nominee Jimmy Carter an intelligence briefing.

Presidential spokesman Ron Nessen said CIA Director George Bush, and possibly other agency officials, would go to Carter's home in Plains, Ga., for the briefing next week.

Bush would provide the same information to Democratic vice presidential nominee Walter F. Mondale "if

Committee has begun hauling in members of the Intelligence Committee and its staff for public interrogation on the leaked material — after conducting some 420 private interviews already with no success in pinpointing the source of the leak.

There also is the possibility that the committee will subpoena Schorr and other reporters who received information about the Intelligence Committee's investigation. Thus far, all of the newsmen involved have refused to talk to committee investigators about their stories.

A spokesman for the panel said that public hearings on the matter could go on for up to two weeks. He declined to say who would be called to testify or whether witnesses would be asked to testify voluntarily or would be subpoenaed.

he wants it," Nessen said.

Such briefings are traditional, but usually are provided by the Secretary of State. Carter, however, has said he would prefer the CIA to brief him rather than Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, whose policies Carter has criticized.

Nessen said there are no plans for Kissinger to brief Carter.

The way such briefings are handled has varied under each administration. President Johnson, for example, personally briefed the 1968 Republican nominee, Richard M. Nixon. Nessen said. Democratic nominee George McGovern declined such a briefing in 1972. McGovern sharply criticized U.S. foreign policy, particularly in Vietnam, during that time.

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
12 JULY 1976

Nelson Rockefeller's choice to replace him as No. 2 on a Ford ticket: George Bush, one-time Republican National Chairman and now head of the CIA.

WASHINGTON STAR
20 JULY 1976

Mary McGroarty

Congress Bares Its Shortcoming

What the House of Representatives needs least right now is a further demonstration of its infinite capacity for low comedy.

It is, nevertheless, grinding ahead with two weeks of activity on that front, putting to itself a question that never should have been asked: Who gave the CIA report to Dan Schorr?

If the Ethics Committee knew the answer, it might be one thing. But although the staff has been hard at it since April 1, it has been unable to crack the case.

Oh Kojak, where are you when we need you most?

The House sleuths have tried, but in 470 interviews they have not even found a good lead. The members of the Ethics Committee are not self-conscious about their failure; for reasons beyond comprehension, they insist on airing it.

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THE POINT ABOUT the Pike Committee report on the CIA was not that it got out, as Chairman Otis Pike, D-N.Y., kept telling the Ethics Committee, but what was in it. But the members of the Ethics Committee, like the members of the House

NEW YORK TIMES
22 JUL 1976

Ex-Counsel Asserts Security Was Lax In Intelligence Unit

WASHINGTON, July 21 (UPI)—Security in the House intelligence committee was so lax that staff members kept top secret papers in their desks and copied material for their own files, a former committee counsel testified today.

The description of sieve-like security at the now-defunct panel came during hearings by the House ethics committee on the matter of who gave a secret Congressional intelligence report to Daniel Schorr, a CBS reporter.

The ethics panel went into closed session as soon as the security details came to light, presumably for fear that sensi-

itself, cannot see it that way.

They quail at the thought of Wayne Hayes and company, and the terrible repercussions at the polis. But the reminder that they spent a million dollars of the taxpayers' money for an investigation and then refused to look at the results strikes them as the height of patriotic virtue. They still do not want to know about CIA blunders in places like what one of the members called "Angolia."

As Rep. James Quillen, R-Tenn., round face contorted with worry, said, "The House voted 246 to 129 not to read the report."

Pike, who was a much better witness than he was a chairman, replied sharply, "The House voted not to release a document which it had not seen — our committee voted to release a document it had seen."

How, Pike asked the members, could a committee of Congress investigate a secret agency without publishing classified information?

If he had acceded to the deletions requested by the CIA, the report would have been cut in half. The House hates to get into controversies like that. They decided that they did not want to know anything about the CIA that the President, the agency's shield and defender, didn't want them to know.

"Our basic problem," said Pike, after he had reviewed for the Ethics Committee the security procedures of his own group, "is that almost nobody in Congress has read the report."

HIS BASIC PROBLEM was illustrated by the fact that one of the members of his own committee, Rep. Les Aspin, is said to have taken it upon himself to give an early draft to the CIA, without Pike's authorization. This was an exercise in unilateral declassification that invites comparison with Dan Schorr's, but so far Aspin's action has escaped censure.

itive or embarrassing details might be made public.

During the open session in the morning, James Oliphant, counsel to the intelligence panel, said proper security rules "were not followed" by the panel during its long investigation late last year and early this year of covert operations by the Central Intelligence Agency.

"Security was very, very lax" Mr. Oliphant said. "People in charge of files did not have any library or any security background. People kept materials in their own desks, including classified material — top secret."

He said some staff members even copied confidential materials on office duplicating machines and put the copies in their own files.

The ethics panel is in the final phases of a \$150,000 investigation into who gave Mr. Schorr

a copy of the intelligence committee's final report, a document laced with confidential material and highly critical of C.I.A. operations.

The House voted to keep that report secret until President Ford could censor it. Mr. Schorr admitted he got a copy from a source he refused to name and gave it to The Village Voice

newspaper of New York, which published much of it.

Ethics panel investigators have testified they have only been able to narrow the field of suspects to a broad range of individuals in government, because so many copies of the report were distributed around Washington.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
8 JULY 1976

Belli comes to Ruby's defense

SAN FRANCISCO—Attorney Melvin Belli says it is not true that Jack Ruby met secretly with Fidel Castro in 1963 to plot the assassination of President John Kennedy. Belli, who knew Ruby as a friend and client, says Ruby was "an intensely loyal American who worshiped Jack Kennedy." Ruby, a Dallas nightclub owner, killed Lee Harvey Oswald, the man believed to have assassinated Kennedy, in Dallas on Nov. 24, 1963. A former CIA agent has charged that Ruby met Castro while in Cuba trying to make a drug deal. But Belli said Ruby never saw Castro and called the allegations "CIA bull."

WASHINGTON POST
22 JUL 1976

Joseph Kraft

Dropping the Schorr Case

An underlying condition of Anglo-Saxon democracy is that sensible people do not press to the limit questions to which there are no good answers. That rule of thumb applies with a vengeance to the current investigation by the House ethics committee of the intelligence committee report given by Dan Schorr of CBS News to the Village Voice.

The investigation touches an unsettled area of constitutional law. The interest of all parties—including both the Congress and especially the press—is that the unsettled area be kept unsettled, that the moment of constitutional truth be avoided.

The elementary facts of the case are simple. A House committee under Congressman Otis Pike prepared a report on activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. Copies of the report were acquired by Mr. Schorr of CBS and John Crewdson of the New York Times. Both men made known the contents of the report through their respective news agencies.

The full Congress then voted to make the report secret. Whereupon, Mr. Schorr, after some complex maneuvers, passed his copy off to the Village Voice, a weekly put out in New York, which it claimed, possibly wrongly, was the full text of the report.

That sequence of events set up a potential conflict between two traditional rights rooted in the Constitution. One is the freedom of the press, as guaranteed by the First Amendment. The other is the right of the Congress to discipline its members, and to punish by contempt proceedings persons refusing to cooperate with legitimate congressional investigations.

The freedom of the press and the First Amendment need no endorsement in this quarter. Democracy means government by the people which implies open discussion and the circulation of information as distinct from enforced orthodoxy. The right to a free press is thus a peculiarly cherished feature of our system, rightly enshrined in the Constitution.

The exercise of that right was central to revelation and prosecution of the Watergate scandal, and to the public awareness of the true nature of the Vietnam war. The right deserves to be guarded jealously, as it was by those who successfully fought in the Supreme Court the attempt of a Nebraska judge to apply a gag rule to coverage of a murder trial.

By extension, moreover, the First Amendment confers certain rights and privileges. The courts have given almost blanket immunity to news agencies against civil suits for libel. But the privileges and rights growing out of the

First Amendment are not unlimited—especially in the eyes of the present Supreme Court. Thus in 1972 the Supreme Court, in the Branzburg case, held that the right of a grand jury to investigate crimes took precedence over the First Amendment privilege. In consequence, reporters are now obliged to divulge sources to grand juries in criminal cases.

The same issue is potentially posed by the Schorr case, with the congressional committee in the place of the grand jury. The ethics committee clearly has the right to investigate the leak of the secret report.

It can discipline congressmen and staff members responsible for the leak. It can certainly subpoena Mr. Schorr and, if he refused to answer questions, hold him in contempt.

So far the committee has refused such an approach. Wisely, I think, from its point of view. Politically, the Congress would suffer by pressing to the ultimate a case in which the breaking of the secrecy seal caused no discernible harm.

But those of us in the press should not be gloating over the committee's behavior. We should be applauding its restraint. For we have nothing to gain from a constitutional test of First Amendment rights against the congressional right to discipline and investigate. On the contrary, the circumstances of the Schorr case suggest that it affords the weakest possible ground for such a test.

Mr. Schorr, though a veteran reporter with a fine record, seems recently to have been prompted as much by entrepreneurial and self-glorification interests as by civil liberties considerations. At one point he offered to write up the material in a series of newspaper articles. At another he made it a condition of publication that he write the introduction to the text.

In the end, after having refused bona fide offers from responsible press organs to print parts of the text they thought were newsworthy, he let it go to a paper with poor credibility which used the document, as Laurence Stern pointed out in the Columbia Journalism Review, for heavily promotional purposes. It is even asserted by Mr. Stern and Nora Ephron in Esquire Magazine, though denied by Schorr, that when the going got rough inside CBS, he had a brief filing at trying to put the blame on a colleague, Leslie Stahl.

What is at stake here, is professional behavior, not constitutional liberty. We will all be better off if the affair is allowed to fade away without being made a federal case.

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BALTIMORE SUN
23 July 1976

Staff leak to Schorr is denied

By JIM MANN

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—A. Searle

Field, the former staff director of the House Intelligence Committee, denied under oath yesterday that he played any role in leaking a copy of the committee's report to a CBS reporter, Daniel Schorr, or to the New York weekly Village Voice.

"I did not provide a copy of the report to anyone outside the committee, at any place, at any time," Mr. Field told the House ethics committee. When he discovered that the report had been leaked, Mr. Field said, "I was extremely disturbed . . . This was the one thing that could destroy our committee and discredit it."

Mr. Field said he felt certain no one on his Intelligence Committee staff had leaked the report, which the House voted not to publish. But, he added, "I'm not going to speculate about committee members" that is, the 13 congressmen on the committee. He said Mr. Schorr also might have obtained the report from the Central Intelligence Agency or other agencies within the executive branch.

Under questioning, Mr. Field conceded that at one point, less than a month before the report was leaked, he telephoned Mr. Schorr for help in trying to decide whether to hold a news briefing. Mr. Field explained that he merely wanted to find out whether CBS had news programs on New Year's Eve.

Mr. Field, 31, a Connecticut lawyer, came to the Intelligence Committee after serving as legislative assistant to Senator Lowell P. Weicker, Jr. (R., Conn.).

Both Mr. Weicker and Representative Otis G. Pike (D., N.Y.), former chairman of the Intelligence Committee, sat behind Mr. Field for most of the three hours in which he was questioned by the ethics committee.

Mr. Weicker also took the witness chair himself to tell the ethics committee, "What this town needs is more Searle Fields." The senator said his former employee, like himself, was willing to "stand up against the establishment and be counted."

The ethics committee, officially called the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, is holding hearings to determine how Mr. Schorr obtained the Pike committee report. Mr. Schorr himself has acknowledged supplying the copy that was published in the Village Voice after the House vot-

WASHINGTON STAR
21 JUL 1976

A copy for everyone

The House Ethics Committee has spent — some might say wasted — \$150,000 and four months time trying to find out who leaked a House Intelligence Committee report on the Central Intelligence Agency to Daniel Schorr, the CBS investigative reporter.

The investigators don't appear to be much closer to the leaker than they were when they started, despite having interviewed 420 persons and reinterviewed 385. Now the Ethics Committee has begun hearings to see if it can find out in public what its gumshoes couldn't find out in private.

Significantly, the investigators never questioned Mr. Schorr, who peddled the leaked document to the *Village Voice* in New York, which printed the report for anyone to see who had the price of the paper. They haven't questioned Mr. Schorr apparently because the committee, having been told that Mr. Schorr would not tell it where he got the report, is leery of getting into a constitutional confrontation over freedom of the press.

It has never been clear exactly what the House intended to prove when it authorized the probe of the leak. Surely it did not intend to set Mr. Schorr up for a contempt citation and throw him into the hoosegow when he refused to name the person who gave him the report. It might not get away with it, and in any event such a specta-

cle probably would heap more discredit on the House than on the press.

If the leaker turned out to be a congressman, that certainly would be an embarrassment that the House had not counted on. And if the leaker were an employe of the House, the House probably couldn't do much more than fire him.

There may be something of value in the probe, though. The investigators reported that the House Intelligence Committee maintained an almost total lack of security over reports and secret material. Copies of the report, at various stages of drafting, were distributed widely through the legislative and executive branches and these were multiplied by copying machines all over town. Three copies of one draft even wound up overseas within a few hours of being distributed.

Classified material reportedly was sometimes left lying around committee offices and disclosures to reporters were almost commonplace, according to the Ethics Committee's chief investigator; Mr. Schorr was among three reporters given a New Year's Eve 1975 briefing on one aspect of the investigation.

But it doesn't take an expensive investigation to discover the laxness of Congress in handling confidential material. Everyone already knew that Congress can't keep a secret. Maybe it will be worth the \$150,000 if the investigation causes Congress to tighten its lip.

TIMES, Roanoke
26 June 1976

CIA: Power Corrupted

Anyone inclined to pooh-poo the dangers and arrogance of the old Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) should take note of the findings of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

A President of the United States had been assassinated (John F. Kennedy, Nov. 22, 1963). The nation was in a state of shock and anger. A commission of most trusted citizens was put together to get to the bottom of the affair (the Warren Commission). Few things could have been more important than finding the truth of the Kennedy murder.

But nobody in the CIA came forward to tell its piece of the truth: that the CIA had an operation going on to kill Premier Castro of Cuba. Nobody from the FBI, which included agents with knowledge of the CIA plot, revealed the truth even though the FBI was charged with the investigation.

Neither intelligence, nor goodwill, nor patriotism, nor sense of duty, nor ethics, nor concern for the national security, nor any other good impelled these Great Protectors of the Nation to come forward with a piece of informa-

tion that might have made a difference.

The whole affair confirms a conclusion we reached long ago: The covert action (dirty tricks) division of the CIA should be rooted out and the soil for it permanently sanitized. The degree of control now established over the J. Edgar Hoover-less FBI should be made permanent.

Perhaps the CIA's anti-Castro affair had nothing to do with Lee Oswald's assault on President Kennedy. But the Warren Commission had a right to know of it; the nation had a right to assume that all the pertinent facts were revealed to the commission. The right of the commission and of the nation was denied because trusted Americans in the top echelons of the CIA and the FBI lacked the simple courage to come forward and do their simple duty.

Never was more vivid the proof of Lord Acton's axiom: Power Corrupts and Absolute Power Corrupts Absolutely.

ed not to release the report.

Mr. Field sought to counter allegations that his committee staff had been lax in its handling of classified and sensitive intelligence materials.

"I don't think the CIA possesses any God-given ability to organize and maintain information," he asserted. "They lost records. They lost receipts, the receipts they kept on the back of envelopes. We found records for them." He said the intelligence agencies were "sloppy" in their handling of materials.

The former staff director made it clear he considered the press an ally of the Intelligence Committee in its frequent battles with the agencies it was investigating.

Last New Year's Eve, for example, he said, the committee was told that a witness testifying about a kickback scandal within the FBI had partially recanted his testimony as a result of threats by the FBI.

"I was quite concerned that the FBI was going to unleash a publicity wash on us, saying a witness had recanted his testimony," Mr. Field said. He said he called Mr. Schorr to find out if CBS had a news show and later held a New Year's Eve press briefing to counteract such a "publicity wash."

BALTIMORE SUN
23 July 1976

Mary McGrory

House Hears, Reads No Evil about CIA

Washington

What the House of Representatives needs least right now is a further demonstration of its infinite capacity for low comedy.

It is, nevertheless, grinding ahead with two weeks of activity on that front, putting to itself a question that never should have been asked: Who gave the CIA report to Daniel Schorr?

If the Ethics Committee knew the answer, it might be one thing. But although the staff has been hard at it since April 1, it has been unable to crack the case.

Oh Kojak, where are you when we need you most?

The House sleuths have tried, but in 470 interviews they have not even found a good lead. The members of the Ethics Committee are not self-conscious about their failure; for reasons beyond comprehension, they insist on airing it.

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They quail at the thought of Wayne Hays and company, and the terrible repercussions at the polls. But the reminder that they spent a million dollars of the taxpayers' money for an investigation and then refused to look at the results strikes them as the height of patriotic virtue. They still do not want to know about CIA blunders in places like what one of the members called "Angolia."

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Mr. Pike, who was a much better witness than he was a chairman, replied sharply, "The House voted not to release a document which it had not seen; our committee voted

to release a document it had seen." How, Mr. Pike asked the members, could a committee of Congress investigate a secret agency without publishing classified information?

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"Our basic problem," said Mr. Pike, after he had reviewed for the Ethics Committee the security procedures of his own group, "is that almost nobody in Congress has read the report."

His basic problem was illustrated by the fact that one of the members of his own committee, Representative Les Aspin, is said to have taken it upon himself to give an early draft to the CIA, without Mr. Pike's authorization. This was an exercise in unilateral declassification that invites comparison with Mr. Schorr's, but so far Mr. Aspin's action has escaped censure.

The Pike Committee fiasco was the CIA's most successful operation. Nothing known in its long history of infiltration and subversion quite matches its record in turning the tables on its investigators.

The chairman could never keep his troops intact when he hurled his contempt threats at the White House. He could not keep the members from telling secrets. He could not convince the House that the report did not endanger either the agency or its agents.

By the time the *Village Voice* printed the committee's findings, his colleagues were so impatient with his performance that they would have refused to read the report if it had been published by the Book of the Month Club.

Mr. Pike tried without any success to tell the members that Congress is really as good as the executive branch, and in fact co-equal, quite as able to declassify material as the executive branch is to classify it.

Congress had a brief spell of thinking it was as smart as the president during the Watergate business, but it went back as soon as it decently could to the old habit of deferring to him on foreign policy,

and Mr. Pike was as much a victim of that syndrome as of his own haplessness.

His colleagues chose him for his judgment and his ability to control difficult situations. But when they sent him in against the CIA, they asked too much of him. The CIA tried to pre-empt him, which was out of the question. When that failed, they went to war with him. There is no question of who won.

He says, as pointedly as he dares to, that the only beneficiary of the Schorr leak has been the CIA, but the Ethics Committee does not take the hint.

By giving the report to the *Village Voice*, Mr. Schorr unwittingly assured the agency of a new lease on life, and gave Congress the chance to play detective, a role in which it is as miscast as it was to be investigator of the CIA.

ST. LOUIS POST - DISPATCH
29 JUNE 1976

Bungling Hidden

At the time of the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963, both the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation seem to have been more interested in pursuing their own ways and protecting their images than in helping make possible a thorough investigation of the Kennedy murder. These are the obvious conclusions to be drawn from a report by a Senate panel on the intelligence agencies' involvement in the assassination inquiry.

In its final report, produced by a subcommittee, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence said the intelligence agencies did not follow up significant leads relating to the assassination and that Richard Helms, a senior CIA official, and J. Edgar Hoover, director of the FBI, kept important information from the Warren Commission, which was investigating Kennedy's death. The "unpursued leads" concerned travel between the United States and Cuba by two persons who might have had some connection with the assassination. Not only did the agencies fail to investigate fully these persons' movements right after the Kennedy murder but they also apparently neglected to tell the presidentially-appointed Warren Commission about the subjects.

Moreover, the CIA, represented by Mr. Helms, failed to tell the commission that on the very day Kennedy was shot a CIA agent met with a Cuban official to advance a plot to murder Cuban Premier Castro. For its part, the FBI, represented by Hoover, failed to inform the commission about a threatening letter written by Lee Harvey Oswald, the reputed assassin, and about the disciplining of 17 FBI agents for not recognizing Oswald as a security threat.

Although the Senate panel emphasized that it had no evidence that Premier Castro or other Cubans had plotted Kennedy's death in retaliation for CIA-backed plots against Castro, it did say its inquiry should be followed up by the permanent Senate Intelligence Committee. With the trail now more than 12 years old, such an inquiry may not produce much, and surely not enough to satisfy numerous doubters of the Warren Commission. But one clear lesson that emerges from the latest Senate report is that bungling and cover-ups by the CIA and FBI show more than ever that these agencies must be brought under stronger legal control and supervision.

THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY
JULY/AUGUST 1976

Making Enemies: The Pike Committee's Struggle to Get the Facts

by Gregory G. Rushford

Woodrow Wilson observed that "Congress stands almost helplessly outside of the departments. Even the special, irksome, ungracious investigations which it from time to time institutes... do not afford it more than a glimpse of the inside of a small province of federal administration. . . . It can violently disturb, but it cannot often fathom, the waters of the sea in which the bigger fish of the civil service swim and feed. Its dragnet stirs without cleansing the bottom."

This elegant statement summarizes what I learned during the irksome, ungracious, congressional investigation of the CIA.

As a staff member of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, I was charged with investigating how well the intelligence agencies had been doing their job. It was a simple and reasonable question, but in trying to get an answer, I encountered the bureaucratic obstacles that hide the truth about government performance.

The story of those obstacles, and our attempts to surmount them, sheds light on the present balance of power between the executive and legislative branches. Despite recent press stories that Congress is reasserting itself, the CIA—exceptional in many ways but in this one quite typical—used every executive branch tactic to frustrate our investigation.

The CIA's idea of a perfect investigation was roughly as follows: The committee's staff members would be investigated by the FBI, and if we passed, we would receive Top Secret security clearances. We would sign CIA employee secrecy oaths and would be denied access to the compartments of information beyond Top Secret—that is, to most of the files. CIA censors would read every document we requested. Those censors would have authority to delete words, paragraphs, even entire pages. If we took notes from documents at agency headquarters, the notes would be cen-

sored. Monitors would be present every time we interviewed agency employees.

Moreover, the committee would sign agreements limiting the areas of investigation and agree to disclosure restrictions. The chairman of our committee, so the CIA intended, would keep much of his information from other committee members. The committee, in turn, would keep information from the rest of Congress.

Whenever I requested documents from the CIA (or the State Department, or the Pentagon, or whatever agency we were studying) the liaison officer would ask why I needed them. Did I realize how sensitive they were? Wasn't I worried about showing such secrets to congressmen?

We started off with a series of hearings on the intelligence budget. Senior officials came from all over the intelligence community to brief us. But the briefings were canned affairs in which the officials took hours to read from tables and charts and to initiate us into the nuances of bureaucratese. We saw the same budget books they present to the appropriations committees and learned how vague they were. After repeated telephone calls, we managed to get a few documents delivered right to our offices, but when we looked at them, we found entire pages missing—only the "Top Secret" stamp remained. Staff investigators who asked for further details could not get them. With only a week left before the scheduled opening of our hearings, Rep. Otis Pike had to call the Pentagon and threaten to hold a press conference before we received any information from them. The National Security Agency (which monitors foreign communications) would not give us even the basic document which controls its operations.

Despite all this, we had, by July 31, assembled at least as much information as the standing appropriations committees traditionally have, a reflection less of our diligence than of

Gregory G. Rushford was on the staff of the House Select Committee on Intelligence.

the other committees' timidity. During the next eight days we held our first seven hearings.

Deaf and Dumb

The Comptroller General of the United States, Elmer Staats, was the first witness. He testified that he knew very little about where the intelligence agencies put their money because he had to depend on them for all the information about their programs. The General Accounting Office, which Staats directs, had written to the CIA in January 1975, for instance, but never received a reply. Even when the CIA came up with the information Staats wanted, he had no way to verify it independently.

Next came James Lynn, director of the Office of Management and Budget. Lynn repeatedly refused to discuss anything of substance as long as the committee sat in open session. If we would only lock the doors and go into closed session, Lynn said, he was ready to answer all questions. The committee closed the doors.

After waiting for nearly a half hour, while experts "debugged" the hearing room, we discovered another problem. Lynn said he would not discuss certain subjects because the stenographer was cleared only for Top Secret. When the committee finally got to question Lynn, he was not much more specific than he had been in the public session. Pike later called the experience "miserable and worthless." Lynn certainly could not demonstrate that his organization had any sort of grasp on the CIA's budget.

The Lynn experience was repeated time and again that week with other witnesses. In public, we were promised full cooperation; in private we did not get it. William Colby, then the director of the CIA, gave us little lectures on the evils of communism, illustrated with a "Freedom of Information" chart. "We live in a free society," he said, pointing to a series of X's on the American side of the chart. The X's marked off such institutions as newspapers, television, government publications, and, naturally, congressional hearings. That was how the Russians gathered intelligence on us. But on the Russian side—aha!—the X's were controlled. Such gimmickry prompted Rep. Philip Hayes to tell Colby he was tired of hearing "appeals to a very low level of political sophistication."

The testimony of Colby and Gen. Lew Allen of the National Security Agency illustrated one other way the intelligence agencies have traditionally thwarted congressional oversight. Over the years both the CIA and the NSA have answered hundreds of questions

from congressional committees by providing *summaries* of internal documents, almost always self-serving, and not the documents themselves. What is the difference? Colby had said, in one of our closed sessions, that "certain differences had arisen between a certain ambassador and the CIA personnel" over the wisdom of one covert operation. We finally got hold of the original document, which put the matter in somewhat different terms. The ambassador had actually said to the CIA station chief, "To hell with your headquarters. If you don't go along with this, I will instruct the Marine guards to take you and place you on the airplane and ship you out of here."

In August, we questioned the Pentagon's top civilian intelligence official, Albert Hall. He explained, helpfully, that his organization worked very well. When asked if the system had broken down at any time in recent crises, Hall responded, "Well, if you are talking about the 1973 Middle East war, in fact, the outbreak of war was foreseen, and this information was handled correctly and was provided to the people who should have had it." Here too the documents told a different story. Weeks later we received the basic CIA post-mortem on that war, which began: "There was an intelligence failure in the weeks preceding the outbreak of war in the Middle East on October 6. Those elements of the intelligence community responsible for the production of finished intelligence did not perceive the growing possibility of an Arab attack and thus did not warn of its imminence."

Hall also demonstrated some of the more incongruous aspects of the classification system. Published information put out by the Defense Department revealed that military attaches were stationed in 86 different countries, including two recent additions, Algeria and Bangladesh. But the Defense Department said that the numbers and locations of the attaches were classified as "secret." Hall, looking embarrassed, could not explain the disparity. Rep. Aspin termed such practices "bizarre" and pointed out the weaknesses of a classification system which permitted executive branch officials to decide, apparently on whim, what to keep secret. Repeated experiences with this sort of capriciousness fostered the committee's subsequent decisions to publish information despite the executive branch's unwillingness to do so.

Many frustrations lingered after the August hearings were over. On June 10, before the hearings had begun, President Ford said publicly that he would give the committee

material from the Rockefeller Commission's investigation of intelligence abuses, "plus any other material that is available in the executive branch." Yet we did not receive an uncensored version of the "family jewels," the in-house CIA study of abuses, until mid-October, 15 minutes before Pike held a press conference to charge that there had been a coverup and more than four months after Ford had promised to supply the material.

On September 11, the committee held a hearing on one of the most widely suspected instances of incompetent intelligence—that associated with the 1973 Middle East war. We knew of several instances in the past when the intelligence system had failed—the 1968 Tet offensive, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the 1974 coups in Portugal and Cyprus, and India's nuclear explosion in 1974. The Mideast hearing was designed to explore why the intelligence agencies had failed at the job they were supposed to carry out—namely, to provide accurate information on international developments.

Just one day after we held that hearing, President Ford announced that we would be denied any further classified information. He asked us to return our files and later compared us to common criminals. What the committee had done the previous afternoon was to vote in closed session to publish a portion of an official CIA post-mortem of the Mideast failure.

Under the resolution which set up the committee, we were supposedly authorized to disclose information which related to the intelligence agencies' activities. In public session the CIA had read us two of the seven paragraphs of the post-mortem, both moderately favorable to the agency. But it had refused to declassify the other five. That afternoon the committee spent hours on those five paragraphs and realized the CIA had no reasonable grounds for keeping them secret. They did not reveal any intelligence sources and methods—the two items the CIA might legitimately want to protect—but they did demonstrate just how badly U.S. intelligence had performed prior to the Middle East war. There was no "national security" at stake, only bureaucratic self-protection.

For example, the CIA wanted to suppress one sentence which revealed only a misjudgment: "The movement of Syrian troops and Egyptian military readiness are considered to be coincidental and not designed to lead to major hostilities." Another paragraph the CIA wanted to censor noted that a "Watch Committee," which was supposed to judge the imminence of hostilities, failed to do so even after the war had begun.

So the committee decided to publish. The CIA's reaction was predictable; among other things, it called a press conference and told reporters that the release of four words ("and greater communications security") endangered national security.

President Ford finally agreed to deliver more classified information, promising we would get everything we needed—but only after a full month of negotiation and on the condition that he could veto any material the committee chose to publish.

But we still faced repeated delays. On October 20, for example, Pike wrote to the President, asking permission for me to visit the National Security Council. There I was to obtain a list of all CIA covert operations authorized by the top-level "40 Committee" since 1965 and to find out the committee's procedures for approving the operations. We needed this information in order to confirm or refute other indications that the procedures had often been haphazard. After repeated calls I did get the list. On it I found each CIA operation described as follows: "On [date given] the 40 Committee approved a covert operation in ———." Or, "A media project was authorized for ———." Not one actual operation was disclosed.

CIA Monitors

In one way, however, even this document contained a major revelation. Beside each blank from May 1972 until the end of 1974, the word "telephonic" appeared. I asked Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Ford's National Security advisor, what that meant. He said that the approval had been given over the telephone, without formal meeting. In other words, the 40 Committee, the most sensitive committee in government, had not met in more than two years. Nearly 40 CIA operations had been approved without the opportunity for debate, or a consideration of risks and alternatives by anyone outside the CIA. (We held a public hearing on that point the following week. Since then, President Ford has taken steps to insure that meetings are held and accurate records maintained.)

As the investigation progressed, the CIA dropped even the pretense of cooperation. All of the intelligence agencies went to great lengths to keep us from informal contact or interviews with their employees. They were also adamant about having monitors present. A monitor came along from the National Security Agency when I interviewed an NSA Middle East analyst. The poor monitor panicked when I left him behind in the front office. After a quick phone call to NSA

headquarters, he broke past our Capitol Hill police guard and ran through the committee room yelling that the witness should not say anything to "those people." Genuinely afraid that the scene would lead to violence, committee staff director Searle Field agreed that the monitor could sit in on just this one interview.

Kissinger Balks

The NSA had reason for its fears. The analyst I interviewed was one who had accurately forecast war in the Middle East before it broke out on October 6, 1973. The NSA leadership had discounted her courageous predictions. Truly excellent technical intelligence had gone unheeded.

Henry Kissinger, of course, threw up the most obstacles. We had to request information from him; he chaired three crucial panels—the 40 Committee, the NSC's Intelligence Committee, and the Verification Panel, which handled intelligence related to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT).

But Kissinger refused to give up a single piece of paper without a fight. He termed one of our subpoenas merely a "request" and refused to honor it. It took a contempt of Congress resolution approved by the committee to get him to honor several subpoenas. He silenced witnesses and at one point issued instructions that nobody in the State Department was to talk to anyone from the Pike Committee unless an official State Department monitor was present.

We wanted, for example, to ask one of Kissinger's subordinates to explain a mysterious contradiction in our policy toward Greece. We had heard that, when tensions were rising on Cyprus, the State Department had warned that Greek dictator Dimitrios Ioannidis was moving to overthrow Archbishop Makarios. But the CIA, at just that time, was conducting diplomatic talks with Ioannidis in Athens. We learned that Thomas Boyatt, a foreign service officer, might be able to explain what the CIA station had been up to. But Kissinger refused to let us talk to Boyatt without a State Department monitor present, and the monitor forbade the man to tell us even the most basic details. Later I interviewed another foreign service officer on the same subject, with the same result. We called one of Kissinger's deputies to ask for cooperation. He asked us to put the FSO on the phone and then told him again *not* to give us any help.

The committee was getting angry about treatment like this, especially because we had received almost no documents on the Cyprus affair. So

the committee voted to subpoena a memo which Boyatt had written to Kissinger after the Cyprus affair. Once more we found ourselves in trouble.

Among the other accusations that rained down upon us was a comparison to Joe McCarthy. The State Department said we were "interfering" with advice given on policy by a subordinate. But Boyatt, the subordinate in question, had said that he was willing to give us the information. Under existing law, there was no way the State Department could prevent its employees from giving information to Congress.

The State Department's claim that it was protecting Boyatt from "interference" like ours was somewhat disingenuous. Boyatt had been denied normal reassignment by two ambassadors and one assistant secretary, both for his Cyprus dissent and for his activities on behalf of the Foreign Service Association, which lobbies for employee rights. We eventually pressured the State Department to reassign him.

A human victory, only we never learned what the intelligence network had told Henry Kissinger before the Cyprus coup, nor did we receive all the documents we sought.

Bureaucratic Lessons

Despite all these obstacles, by December we had acquired a great deal of information the CIA did not want us to have, thereby meeting one of the tests of a good investigation. We had data about the intelligence budget which Congress had never obtained before. We had learned about every CIA operation the National Security Council had approved since 1965. We also had original documents on an especially vital issue—Soviet compliance with SALT agreements—thanks to committee votes to cite Henry Kissinger for contempt of Congress when he first refused to honor our subpoenas.

These were our successes. To a large extent they were achieved because of our reaction to the dismal failure of those first eight days of hearings, when the administration officials just refused to cooperate. This inspired us to grit our teeth. Pike and Field set a basic rule for the investigators: be so aggressive you get complained about. There were complaints every week. When the CIA tried to distract us with proposals that we investigate sexy trivia, such as a minor official's indiscretions with shellfish toxins and other poisons, we refused.

We learned one of the timeless lessons of bureaucratic life—that it is necessary to talk to people at the "working levels" of the bureaucracy

and not just the leadership. Leaders of huge agencies, responsible for any mismanagement, will always resist giving evidence of their own corruption or incompetence. One senior official close to the CIA's hierarchy told me privately that he considered the CIA's analytic system "rotten," and that Colby's management was ruining the agency. "But why should I risk all and tell these things to the Pike Committee?" he asked. "Where were those congressmen when the CIA was not on the front pages, and where will they be when the Pike Committee's jurisdiction expires?" It was an argument I heard often and could not really refute.

It was different one step down. The majority of mid-level officials, contrary to the conventional wisdom, are competent and hard working. Above all, they are concerned with poor management and will talk about it to anyone who seems interested in improving their condition. And even when these officials don't give you any valuable information, the simple knowledge that you've talked with them makes their superiors more candid.

These interviews helped us pick out some of the weak points in the intelligence bureaucracy. Pentagon analysts would tell us what they thought of their counterparts in the CIA. Asking one agency about another, or one office in the same agency about another, is a simple but effective device. Everyone wants to tell his side of the story, and the rivalries among the intelligence agencies are as fierce as those anywhere in government.

From analysts in the Defense Intelligence Agency, CIA, and State Department, I learned that the intelligence studies made on the Soviet Backfire bomber might have been dishonest. The most important question was whether the Backfire could (or would) be deployed against targets in the United States. Answering this question correctly obviously was important for SALT.

The accusations about the Backfire ranged all through the intelligence community. The Air Force was alleged to have put pressure on a defense contractor, simply because the Air Force disagreed with a study the contractor had done for the CIA. One office of the CIA accused another of deliberately hiring a consultant who was known as a "downgrader" of Soviet aircraft in order to influence the Backfire study results. Another CIA office was accused of misrepresenting the plane's performance characteristics, because that office had its own policy line to peddle to our negotiators.

The CIA takes great pride in its

intellectual integrity, so these accusations could hurt. The SALT negotiations were under way even as we carried out our investigation, and Pike did not want to risk complicating them by having a public hearing on the Backfire. But the CIA did not know that. I was able to imply several times, when dealing with the CIA censor, that this issue could be very, very unpleasant if it were publicized. When I got far enough into the story to present a threat, the CIA censor decided to call. The agency had found some documents I might want to look at, he said. Those documents—which were "secret," but which served the agency's ends—revealed, among many other things, that the director of the DIA and a high CIA official once thought that Henry Kissinger might be suppressing vital information about SALT. Upset, they had gone to the acting CIA director, Vernon Walters, and asked him to approach President Nixon about the problem. Those documents, which told us a great deal about the bureaucratic politics of SALT, were essentially a damage-limitation exercise by the CIA, which was concerned about its own reputation. Otherwise, we would never have obtained them.

A Sorry Picture

The intelligence administrators had shown us neat organization charts outlining their functions. What we actually found, however, was a very poorly administered intelligence system. The NSC's Intelligence Committee, for example, which looked impressive on the charts, had had only two meetings—one of them to organize itself.

Perhaps our more important finding was that Congress cannot oversee the intelligence agencies without making a determined effort to separate the truth from lies. Other less aggressive committees had been over the same ground before. The House Armed Services Intelligence subcommittee, for example, had been told about the official CIA post-mortem study of the intelligence failure before the Middle East war. But that subcommittee never saw the actual document; its briefing consisted of reading selected material from the study displayed on a slide projector. And it was not told there was a second Middle East post-mortem, which documented a shocking intelligence performance at the time of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation in late October 1973. Nor did the subcommittee know the official post-mortem covered up key weaknesses in the intelligence bureaucracy. Other official briefings I saw, including those related to nuclear arms matters, were

always vague, always incomplete.

We also found evidence that the true intelligence budget is several times larger than that which the Congress annually approves. The six foreign episodes we selected for closer study revealed mismanaged intelligence on a large scale. The CIA could offer no major analytical success. "Current intelligence" reports suffered because the leadership kept the analysts busy with meetings, phony deadlines, and "coordinating" policy differences between offices. There was precious little time left to think and write. The CIA's longer-term intelligence estimates were also weak, and the bureaucratic structure promised little improvement. We found an alarming number of cases in which crucial information had been collected in time, but had not been disseminated until after the war had begun—just like the classic Pearl Harbor failure. We found that Henry Kissinger kept valuable information away from the CIA. We had only to go beyond the official explanations to realize that reform of the analytical side of U. S. intelligence is long overdue and sorely needed.

We also found pressures which distorted honest intelligence during the entire Vietnam war. The pressures came from the military, the State Department, and the White House, and had one purpose: to force the CIA to report "facts" about Vietnam which would support the war policy, regardless of truth. Many officials who resisted such pressures found their careers finished; those who kept quiet were promoted.

Fight Like Hell

But it was the question of how well we monitor Soviet adherence to the SALT agreements which I found most troublesome. It showed how dangerous bureaucratic rivalry can become for the whole country when the bureaucrats operate in secret.

On October 17, 1972, when the agencies established a steering mechanism to monitor Soviet SALT compliance with the agreements

NEWSWEEK

26 JULY 1976

'I AM NOT AN IDEOLOGUE'

A day after Jimmy Carter selected him as the Democrats' Vice Presidential nominee, Fritz Mondale headed home to Washington. Aboard a storm-tossed plane, Mondale granted his first interview about himself and the fall campaign to NEWSWEEK's John J. Lindsay. Excerpts from the interview:

signed the previous May, a colonel on Kissinger's NSC staff called the CIA's Director of Strategic Research to say: "Dr. Kissinger wanted to avoid any written judgments to the effect that the Soviets have violated any of the SALT agreements. If the Director believes that the Soviets may be in violation, this should be the subject of a memorandum from him to Dr. Kissinger. The judgment that a violation is considered to have occurred is one that will be made at the highest level."

What this meant, in effect, was that the intelligence service had been deprived of its basic rationale. Henry Kissinger, the official most responsible for making SALT policy, also controlled information about how well the policy was working—an affront not only to the purpose of the CIA but to every prudent notion about avoiding administrative disasters.

To be sure, Kissinger had his problem with some elements of the intelligence community who were leaking to the press inaccurate information about Soviet violations, but the way to handle that problem was with a rifle aimed at the sinners not a shotgun blasting away at the entire area of factual reporting of SALT violations.

Even more disturbing than what Kissinger was doing was his passion for concealing it from Congress. And even more disturbing than that is the fact that Kissinger and the intelligence chiefs are typical of the executive branch leadership in their determination to protect Congress from knowledge of their affairs; in their tendency to ignore the fact that, after all, the executive and legislative branches work for the same employer.

I am convinced that Wilson was wrong in thinking Congress cannot overcome this tendency. Congressional committees can probe the depths of the federal bureaucracy, and provide the information that we all need to know. But pending the day when irrational adversary attitudes between the branches are replaced by a cooperative spirit of service, they had better be prepared to fight like hell.

EXCERPTED:

Q. Haven't you gone too far with that in the area of the investigative agencies?

A. Take the CIA. I never joined those who wanted to prohibit covert activities. I did say they should be much more limited, put under responsible control and used only in those rare instances where it is essential. And I think that is the proper line to draw. I never attacked the need for the best intelligence apparatus in the world. I never attacked the need for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I attacked the abuse of power.

WASHINGTON POST
10 JUL 1976

Castro Is Linked To Ruby, Oswald

MIAMI, July 9 (UPI)—Cuban Premier Fidel Castro and Jack Ruby discussed "removal of the President" at a 1963 meeting 10 weeks prior to President Kennedy's assassination, according to Watergate burglar and one-time Central Intelligence Agency agent Frank Sturgis.

Sturgis claimed in a telephone interview Thursday he had been assigned to investigate possible involvement of Cuban exiles in the Kennedy assassination. He would not say what agency had ordered the probe.

The investigation failed to show any Cuban exile links to Kennedy's death, but produced evidence that Kennedy assassin Lee Harvey Oswald and Ruby, who shot Oswald in Dallas, were "involved in the same conspiracy, along with other people," Sturgis said. He said he and "other agents" gave information of the meeting to several government agencies in 1964.

SCIENCE

25 June 1976

Glomar Explorer: CIA's Salvage Ship a Giant Leap in Ocean Engineering

New information about the CIA's deep sea recovery vessel, the *Glomar Explorer*, makes it possible for the first time to envisage roughly how the ship and its associated systems were designed to operate in their technologically unprecedented mission. According to accounts that appeared in March and April last year, the recovery system was designed to salvage a Russian submarine that sank in 17,000 feet of water some 750 miles northwest of Oahu, Hawaii.

The new facts, made available as part of the government's effort to lease the ship, are at variance with many details of the descriptions reported in the national press last year. They also are hard to reconcile with the leading version of what the mission accomplished, according to which the submarine was raised in one piece, but during the ascent two thirds of it broke away and plunged back to the ocean floor, never to be recovered. Yet neither the *Glomar Explorer's* interior well, nor its associated barge, the HMB-I, were designed to accommodate a full length submarine.

The CIA's deep sea recovery system, despite its unique capabilities, has now been broken up. The submersible barge has been given to the Energy Research and Development Administration for an ocean heat experiment. ERDA also has custody of the "strongback," which was the main frame of a crucial and still secret component of the system, the grappling machine that enveloped the submarine wreckage. The strongback, reputedly the largest single piece of steel ever made, was recently saved from the cutter's torch at 24 hours' notice.

The *Glomar Explorer* itself is moored at Long Beach, California. No government agency has an immediate use for it. Unless a civilian user can be found in the next few months the ship, which cost about \$250 million to build, will probably go to the scrapyard.

Yet the National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere described the vessel in a recent letter to the White House as a "great national asset." William A. Nierenberg, director of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography and a consultant to the National Security Agency, has compared the achievement of constructing the *Glomar Explorer* with that of the Manhattan project. And Admiral J. Edward Snyder, until recently the Oceanographer of the Navy, told *Science* that the system "is probably the greatest technical achievement in ocean engineering in my lifetime."

The chief reason for these plaudits is the considerable leap by which the *Glomar Explorer* exceeds the best existing

technology. Hitherto the deep sea weight-lifting record has been held by the *Alcon Seaprobe*, which can raise 50 tons from 18,000 feet. According to a Global Marine Corporation brochure, the *Glomar Explorer* can handle "payloads in excess of 1500 tons" to about 17,000 feet, an increase of more than 30-fold.

The advantage seems to have been gained by skillful use of existing techniques rather than any dramatic breakthrough. The ship was built with impressive speed. The design contract was let in May 1971, the hull delivered in July 1973, and the system completed by May 1974. Designed specifically for salvaging the Russian submarine, the *Glomar Explorer* could also raise manganese nodules in accordance with the CIA's cover story that the ship was a mining vessel in the employ of Howard Hughes.

Three sources of information about the system are now available. The General Services Administration, the government's housekeeping agency, has put the *Glomar Explorer's* operating manual on public view as part of its effort to lease the ship. The GSA has also released a Global Marine brochure which gives a brief description of the strongback, and ERDA has released details of the barge. None of these sources describes how the three components operated together as a system, which remains a matter of conjecture.

The key operation of the system was to raise and lower the grappling machine. With a weight in air of 2130 tons, the device was almost as massive as the entire submarine it was to salvage. The machine was equipped with a seawater hydraulic system, presumably to power the attachments that secured the wreckage, and with thrusters for fine positioning.

A principal purpose of the submersible barge was to transfer the grappling machine into the central well, or "moon pool," of the *Glomar Explorer*. The machine was too big and heavy to come on board from above, so it had to be introduced from below water. The barge, which could dive to and return from a depth of 165 feet with a load of 2500 tons, was the solution to this problem. Presumably the barge carrying the grappling machine was towed out to the rendezvous point, whereupon it sank to the bottom and rolled back its roof.

The *Glomar Explorer* would then have maneuvered overhead, flooded its moon pool, and slid back the gates on its bottom to open the moon pool to the sea. Visible on either side of the main derrick (see figure) are two tall towers, whose purpose, according to one account last

year, was "to deceive observers (including Soviet fishing ships) into believing that the *Explorer* was deep sea mining." In fact the towers are steerable docking legs. Placed at either end of the moon pool, their purpose is to slide down until they penetrate the barge below and mate with docking pins on the grappling machine. The machine is then drawn up, probably by the docking legs alone, the gates are closed, and the moon pool dewatered. By the reverse of the same operation, the barge could have been used to transfer the grappling machine or large pieces of submarine from ship to shore.

According to bargemaster Harvey Smith, the only voyage the barge has ever made is to Santa Catalina Island, a few miles off Long Beach. It was presumably here that the transfer to and from the ship took place.

With the grappling machine on board, its weight still supported by the docking legs, the *Glomar Explorer* would have journeyed alone to the mid-Pacific site of the sunken submarine. Equipping the ship for its task were a number of unusual features. A dynamic positioning system kept the ship hovering to within an average of 10 feet from its target site. To insulate the pipelining from strains caused by the buffeting of winds and waves, the derrick was mounted on gimbals which allowed the ship to pitch around while the derrick and its pipelining kept steady.

Transfer of the grappling machine from docking legs to pipelining would have been a maneuver of some delicacy, since the two would be responding differently to the movements of the sea.

The pipelining was formed of segments 60 feet long and weighing about 18 tons apiece. An automatic system of cranes and elevators selected the pipes from their storage racks and delivered them to the derrick at the rate of one every 10 minutes. Each segment was screwed into the growing string. The string was lowered or raised by a heavy lift system consisting of two yokes, each powered by a pair of hydraulic cylinders, which grasped the pipe alternately in a hand over hand motion.

The 17,000 foot string, which had extraordinary stresses placed upon it, was no everyday piece of pipe. It was made of enriched gun tube steel, and tapered in six stages from pipe segments a massive 15½ inches in diameter through to segments 12¾ inches across. The inner diameter of all segments was 6 inches.

To the bottom of the pipelining was attached a strengthening device known as a dutchman, and an apex block with a three-legged bridle which attached to the grappling machine.

Divers fastened an electromechanical cable to the outside of the pipe as the string was let down. According to the Global Marine brochure, the seawater hydraulic devices on the strongback

can be operated by pumping water down the bore of the string. The ship's operating manual also states that the pipe has the capacity for air injection when raising materials. If both statements are true, possibly seawater was first pumped down to power the grapples, followed by air injected into chambers in the grappling machine, perhaps, so as to offset some of its weight.

The possibility of air injection into the grappling machine makes it hard to assess the *Glomar Explorer's* lifting capacity. According to the operating manual, the heavy lift system "is not intended to operate above 14.8 million pounds [6607 long tons] static load," although higher loads can be tolerated for short periods. Much of this capacity would have gone into lifting the pipestring and grappling machine. Figures given in the operating manual for the weight of the various pipe segments indicate that the full string would have weighed about 9 million pounds in air, giving a wet weight of 3525 tons. The operating manual also gives the wet weight of the "mining machine" (presumably the grappling machine—the manual is written to accord with the mining vessel cover story) as 1830 tons.

Subtraction of these two figures from that for the capacity of the lift system gives 1252 tons, which, with the 1½ safety factor that salvors like to allow for, would suggest a payload of 835 tons. (Curiously enough, the figure of 800 tons turned up in last year's accounts, being quoted by the *Washington Post* as the lifting capacity of the barge and by the *New York Times* as that of the derrick. These quantities are as far out as *Time's* figure for the weight of the pipestring, 400,000 pounds, and *Newsweek's* estimate of the lift system's capacity as 12,000 pounds.)

The Global Marine brochure, however, states that payloads in excess of 1500 tons can be deployed, the difference perhaps being due to the capacity for offsetting the weight of the strong-back by air injection. And a figure quoted by R. Curtis Croke, president of the Global Marine Development Corporation, to a recent meeting of the National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere, implies a payload of just under 2000 tons.

The *Glomar Explorer's* exact payload is a figure of some interest because of its bearing on whether the Russian submarine could have been salvaged in one piece. The first press accounts, including that of the *Los Angeles Times*, which broke the story, had the submarine being picked up in pieces. But the *Los Angeles Times* in a later story specifically denied earlier information that "the submarine was found in three separate sections" in favor of a version that the vessel, "intact but badly damaged, was raised about 5,000 feet . . . before two thirds of it broke away."

The significance, perhaps, of the latter version is that it provides a neat explana-

tion for the one piece of information on which all press accounts were agreed—that the CIA recovered only one third of the submarine. Yet this version of the *Glomar Explorer's* mission, though possible, seems unlikely for several reasons. First, submarines implode on sinking below their design depth, and the crumpled wreck may then smash into the bottom at high speed, an experience which the submarine is unlikely to survive in one piece. Of the two American nuclear submarines that have sunk, the *Scorpion* lies with its bow and stern broken off from the midship section, and the *Thresher* disintegrated into a larger number of pieces surrounded by a debris field half a mile in radius.

Second, even if the *Glomar Explorer* had lifted the Russian submarine off the bottom in one piece, it is hard to see what would have happened next. The obvious way for the ship to recover objects is to bring them into its flooded moon pool, then close the gates and de-water the pool. According to *Jane's Fighting Ships*, however, the length of a Golf class submarine is 320 feet, too long by far to fit into the 199 foot moon pool. Alternatively, the *Glomar Explorer* might have kept the submarine suspended just beneath her, sailed for the nearest shallow water, and dumped the submarine there within easy reach of divers. But if this were the approach, it would make more sense to dump the submarine into the barge. Yet though the barge is 324 feet long, its interior envelope is only 256 feet in length. Since the whole system was designed, with no expense spared, for the specific purpose of salvaging the submarine, it would seem reasonable to infer that the largest piece the CIA expected to retrieve was no longer than the moon pool.

Grappling Machine Sloppily Designed?

As for the submarine breaking free from the grappling machine, it seems surprising that the designers of the recovery system should have been caught out by so obvious a contingency. Since the wreck would clearly have been in fragile condition, it would make sense to design the grappling machine so that it could wrap securely around the entire object being recovered.

Another reason for doubting that the submarine was raised in one piece is that such a task may have been a little bit beyond even the *Glomar Explorer's* capacity. The displacement weight of a Golf class submarine is given by *Jane's* as 2350 tons. Soviet publications on submarine design suggest that about 80 percent of such a vessel would consist of metallic objects. With a factor of 0.87 to offset the weight of steel in water, the wet weight of the flooded out submarine might be estimated as 1640 tons. Payload capacity to lift such an object, with a prudent 50 percent safety factor, would be some 2500 tons, which seems

more than the *Glomar Explorer* probably had.

Assuming for the moment that the submarine was not in fact raised in one piece, why should such a cock-and-bull story have worked its way into several circumstantial accounts of the *Glomar Explorer's* mission? Speculation can go only so far, but it seems reasonable to expect that the CIA, which had kept the project secret for so long, was in control of most of the information that appeared last year. Intelligence agencies are not on oath in their communications with the press. Remembering the affair of the U-2 spy plane, which the Soviet Union tolerated until the first official confirmation by the U.S. government, the CIA would presumably have sought to avoid humiliating the Russians by admitting that anything of much interest had been recovered from the submarine. Yet the agency might not have wished to pretend that the *Glomar Explorer's* mission was a complete failure at a time when it was under heavy public criticism for activities nearer home.

As it happens, the story that emerged last year seems almost tailor-made, as it were, to justify the *Glomar Explorer's* operation without embarrassing the Soviet Union. A third of the submarine was recovered, according to most of the newspapers briefed by the CIA, but it contained no missiles, no code room, and only the indication of two nuclear tippable torpedoes. The CIA specifically denied reports that the whole submarine, or two of its nuclear torpedo warheads, had been recovered.

Yet most accounts, while agreeing on that, differed with each other and the probable truth in many technical details of the *Glomar Explorer's* operation and in most estimates of the system's characteristics. That might reflect simply the difficulty of acquiring hard to come by information against tight deadlines. It might also reflect a pattern of manipulation by the chief source of information.

If the latter is the case, the actual results of the *Glomar Explorer's* mission can only be guessed at. The expedition may have been a total failure. On the other hand, the ship bears the stamp of such powerful design and superior capabilities that a technical failure through lack of foresight would be more surprising than not. It seems quite possible that the Russian submarine was broken into several pieces. For what it is worth, the *Glomar Explorer* is reported to have spent a month at the recovery site in 1974. From the information now available this would seem to be time enough for the grappling machine to have made perhaps as many as five journeys to the ocean floor and back, retrieving a piece of submarine on each occasion. Just conceivably, the *Glomar Explorer* has been declared surplus because she scooped up almost everything her designers intended her to garner.—NICHOLAS WADE

Los Angeles Times

Sat., July 17, 1976

CIA Committed Burglaries Abroad, Director Admits

BY NORMAN KEMPSTER

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—The CIA has committed burglaries to obtain information about Americans living or traveling abroad, Director George Bush admitted in court papers made public Friday.

In a sworn affidavit, Bush also said that the CIA had overheard with hidden microphones or wiretaps the conversations of Americans in foreign countries.

Bush submitted the statement in response to written questions from lawyers for the Socialist Workers Party, which has filed a \$37 million damage suit against the FBI, CIA and other government agencies charging violation of the rights of party members.

A CIA spokesman said that the agency had never rejected the use of surreptitious entry as a technique for gathering information abroad. But he refused to say whether the CIA still conducted burglaries against American citizens overseas.

Herbert Jordan, a New York attorney representing the Socialist Workers, said the party would argue that CIA-sponsored break-ins were illegal if they were directed against Americans.

The case apparently will be the first in which a court is asked to decide the legality of such overseas activities of U.S. intelligence agencies.

"It is our position that surreptitious entries and warrantless surveillance of American citizens violates the Constitution regardless of whether it is done in the United States or abroad," Jordan said.

No date has been set for oral arguments in the case, which is being heard in U.S. District Court in New York.

In written interrogatories, lawyers of the party asked the CIA if the Socialist Workers or members of its youth affiliate, the Young Socialist Alliance, had been targets of burglaries, wiretaps or bugs during the last 13 years. The lawyers also demanded

full details and documents from the agency's files.

Bush responded with a detailed affidavit that was classified "top secret" by the CIA. The paper was turned over to the U.S. attorney's office in New York under conditions that make it available to the judge but not to the Socialist Workers or to the public.

A three-page summary, couched in general terms, was made public.

"Information . . . was acquired and a result of several surreptitious entries that were made into premises abroad as to which certain of the named plaintiffs . . . had regular access or may have had proprietary interest," Bush said in the public affidavit.

The intentionally vague language apparently covers break-ins at apartments, hotel rooms and offices.

The Socialist Workers Party is a tiny left-wing organization that was the target of FBI burglaries as part of the FBI's since-discontinued COINTELPRO (counterintelligence program) effort. Although the party's rhetoric is often inflammatory, its members have never been convicted of political violence.

Bush's affidavit referred only to burglaries, bugging and wiretapping against members and officers of the party and its youth affiliate. But in a 29-page brief filed along with the affidavit, the government implied that similar techniques were used against other targets.

"It is apparent that disclosure of the documents (providing the details demanded by the party) would reveal CIA sources and methods," U.S. attorney Robert B. Fiske Jr. said in the accompanying brief.

In court papers filed Friday, the Socialist Workers urged the court to reject the CIA's secrecy plea and make public the documents and Bush's detailed response to the written questions.

In addition to pressing the case in court, the party sent copies of Bush's affidavit to the Senate's new permanent Committee on Intelligence headed by Sen. Daniel K. Inouye (D-Hawaii). The party urged the committee, created earlier this year as a successor to the temporary committee headed by Sen. Frank Church (D-Ida.), to investigate the extent of CIA burglaries.

The Church committee disclosed earlier that the CIA and the National Security Agency had intercepted telephone, cable and telex communications of Americans when at least one party to the communication was located in a foreign country.

The committee did not specifically refer to overseas burglaries by the CIA.

Bush said. "The only problem has been with regard to leaks of information the committees agreed should be withheld for security reasons."

He conceded the difficulty of sealing the lips of all those privy to testimony before various committees but insisted that every possible safeguard be erected and policed.

At today's Forum special recognition was given to 17 members who joined the club 50 or more years ago. Five of these, H.F. Schneider, Arthur J. Reinthal, Robert L. Snajdr, Suggs Garber and A.H. Zychick, have maintained membership continuously during that time."

THE CLEVELAND PRESS

25 June 1976

CIA boss here, asks lid on leaks

By JULIAN KRAWCHECK

George W. Bush, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, today said again that he is willing to testify before congressional probers on "sensitive information" but insisted anew that adequate safeguards be erected against leaks to the news media.



BUSH

In remarks prepared for delivery before the City Club Forum, Bush pledged that the CIA would not employ full-time journalists for intelligence purposes but said he reserved the right to make use of data voluntarily furnished by newsmen.

He indicated that all ground rules on these and other CIA procedures are subject to variances based on special conditions involving national security.

Bush's remarks were in response to criticism of the CIA from various sources for alleged non-cooperation with congressional probers and for the reputed use of journalists based in foreign countries for espionage purposes.

He said he had appeared 28 times before congressional committees and subcommittees, and pledged his readiness to testify further "with proper regards for safeguards against leaks of sensitive information."

Bush welcomed the creation of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, headed by Sen. Daniel Inouye, of Hawaii, as a sort of clearinghouse for giving CIA data to Congress. However, he said he would continue to cooperate with the six other Senate committees interested in the intelligence field.

"There has been no problem on the CIA's furnishing of sensitive data to the appropriate committees,"

THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio)
26 June 1976

CIA chief cites danger in congressional leaks

By Douglas Y. Peters

CIA Director George W. Bush yesterday blamed congressional committees with CIA oversight privileges for the "unprecedented number of leaks in the last year."

Bush told the City Club Forum, "Leaks can hurt American intelligence activities far into the future. The United States must have an intelligence agency second to none."

He said a consolidation of congressional investigations would minimize leaks and the CIA is willing to cooperate with Congress in the future.

"I personally appeared 28 times before congressional committees since becoming director. The CIA has disclosed its budget in minute detail to several congressional committees."

Bush is opposed to the publication of any part of the CIA budget because "subsequent comparisons of the total figure changes" could reveal new intelligence activities.

Bush said covert activities, which formerly accounted for about 50% of the CIA budget, have been reduced to 2%.

"I believe no president should be denied

covert capabilities," Bush said.

Bush conceded the CIA has used news correspondents as agents in the past, but said, "as soon as possible" existing relationships with journalists will be ended and no more newsmen would be employed as agents.

However, Bush defended the practice of accepting information from news correspondents "who voluntarily contact the agency for the purpose of exchanging information with no expectation of monetary gain."

Declining to reveal the names of any journalists who have worked for the CIA, Bush said, "I hope that members of a profession willing to go to jail rather than reveal their sources will understand this."

Despite recent attacks on the CIA, Bush said morale is high and enrollment has increased. He said he believes time will restore the public's confidence in the CIA.

He admonished the audience not to believe all disclosures about CIA activities merely because they are printed.

"We have been accused," he said, "of stealing relics from Noah's Ark."

PUBLISHERS WEEKLY

28 JUNE 1976

CIA NOT ACTIVE IN THIS "BOOKS ABROAD"

EDITORS, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY:

We were amused to find in *Publishers Weekly* for May 17 a headline, "Senate Group Finds CIA Now Active Only in Books Abroad." Our quarterly review of contemporary world literature does in fact have several thousand readers and over 800 contributors scattered across the globe, and while most of these individuals doubtless possess the artist's and intellectual's usual irascibility toward matters political, their activity as far as our journal is concerned is limited to short comments of a primarily literary-critical nature. As for our modest staff—well, we're eyeing each other suspiciously now but have not as yet uncovered any connections more nefarious than the MLA.

WILLIAM RIGGAN
Assistant Editor
Books Abroad
Norman, Okla.

CIA AGAIN: QUIS CUSTODIET IPSOS CUSTODES?

EDITORS, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY:

Upon reading the report (*PW*, May 17) on Senator Church's committee investigating the CIA's "book publishing program" abroad, one reacts with amazement to the "Question: Did you take some sort of steps to make sure that things that were published in English were kept away from American read-

EDITOR & PUBLISHER

17 July 1976

CIA says it will not hire news people

In a meeting at Central Intelligence Agency headquarters at McLean, Va. (June 24), CIA director George Bush and three of his assistants told representatives of the National News Council no newsmen affiliated in any way with an American news organization would be hired for any purpose by the agency.

Clarifying Bush's February 11 policy statement on CIA employment of journalists, the CIA representatives said the agency would, in the future, no longer employ news executives, stringers for American news organizations, foreign nationals working as newsmen for American news organizations and freelance writers who could be interpreted in any manner as being journalists. Any affiliate now falling into these categories, they added, has been or would be terminated as a CIA employee.

The CIA, they also affirmed, will not use news organization "cover" for its employees' "cover" in this case, refer-

ers?" Indeed, who will protect us from the Senate protectors as they go about protecting us from the CIA protectors?

ALVIN SKIPSNA
Librarian
Skidmore College
Saratoga Springs, N.Y.

ring to the controversial issue of press credentials, as discussed in the U.S. Senate's recent Select Committee on Intelligence Activities report. (E&P, May 8)

Bush, who attended only part of the meeting, declared, as he has in the past, that he would not release the names of any journalists who have been employed by the CIA.

In reference to requests for such names from various news organizations, he said, "We're not going to do any more. We can't do any more."

In addition, the CIA representatives refused to specify which foreign information services might be presently affiliated with the intelligence organization. Minimizing the "domestic fallout" from stories placed by the CIA in foreign publications, they indicated that this practice would continue.

The meeting, attended by News Council member William Rusher, publisher of the *National Review*, and Ned Schnurman, NNC associate director, was the result of a May 3 letter from the Council to Bush requesting clarification of his February 11 policy statement.

NEW REPUBLIC
24 JULY 1976

The Ascendant Pentagon Freezing Out the CIA

by Tad Szulc

The Pentagon is emerging as the principal force in the management of US foreign intelligence, gradually displacing the Central Intelligence Agency from its traditional preeminent position, as a result of the implementation of President Ford's plan to reorganize the intelligence community. This little-noticed power shift may, in the opinion of numerous specialists, have an adverse effect on the quality of US intelligence.

Under Ford's reorganization, based on the Presidential Executive Order of February 18, the Director of the CIA (currently George Bush) remains in name the chief intelligence adviser to the President. The law provides that the CIA director act simultaneously as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), heading the entire civilian and military intelligence community. In practice, however, there are growing indications that Bush, as DCI, is being forced to share his authority with the Pentagon's top intelligence official, the new Deputy Secretary of Defense, Robert Ellsworth.

In part this is so because Ford, wishing to centralize the control of intelligence in the President's office and the National Security Council after all the abuses of the

past, has effectively diminished the DCI's influence in the allocation of resources to the various arms of the intelligence community. It is the power of the purse that counts in operational policy-making, and the Pentagon—running the huge National Security Agency (NSA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) among other military intelligence operations—holds the lion's share of the total multibillion-dollar intelligence budget.

The other reason is that the Defense Department, interpreting in its own way the presidential Executive Order, has recently streamlined, expanded and strengthened its intelligence apparatus in a way that many intelligence community officials see as an "end run" by the military, designed ultimately to lessen the CIA's position in policy-making and its impact on the elaboration of fundamental intelligence estimates. New lines of authority were drawn in a manner likely to reduce the DCI's direct control over such agencies as the NSA and the DIA. The Pentagon's internal intelligence reorganization was completed on July 6, when a new organizational chart was circulated internally; there was no publicity about it.

In the developing controversy over Ford's reorganization plan—and, especially, the Pentagon's role in it—at stake is whether civilian control of the US intelligence process, as represented by the CIA, can be maintained or supplanted in practice by the military viewpoint. The picture is still quite blurred; the new system is not yet fully understood in the intelligence community, and it is too early to offer final conclusions.

Aside from the CIA's monumental wrongdoing in the past—in covert operations abroad and illegal domestic intelligence activities—the agency has a superior track record to the military in analyzing and interpreting foreign intelligence. US foreign policy decisions are often based on intelligence assessments.

To take two major recent examples, the CIA was basically right and the military agencies wrong in the 1969 controversy over the timing of Soviet MIRVing of its missiles; likewise the CIA estimates during the Vietnam war, both about conditions in South Vietnam and the impact of US bombings of North Vietnam, were more realistic than the DIA's gung-ho judgments. Unfortunately neither Johnson nor Nixon listened to the CIA. During the preparations for the 1970 Cambodian invasion, the CIA was hardly consulted (though Richard Helms, then CIA director, made an ambiguous presentation at the crucial National Security Council meeting) and the intelligence community as a whole was not asked to prepare a National Intelligence Estimate on the subject. Instead, Nixon and Henry Kissinger depended entirely on the opinions of the DIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the US command in Saigon.

The present concern is that the Pentagon's ascendancy in the intelligence process may tend to further shut out the CIA's analytical voice and to complicate, rather than improve, the method of allocating money for intelligence.

Ironically, Ford started out intending to reinforce the DCI's position, which had become considerably eroded when Allen W. Dulles left the agency in 1962. He was the last strong CIA Director. On the one hand, the growth of intelligence technology, such as the use of "spy-in-the-sky" satellites for observation over the Soviet Union, China and elsewhere, inevitably threw more resources—and influence—to the Pentagon and its specialized agencies like the NSA and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) although the CIA retained an intelligence coordinating role. At the same time the DCI's working relationship with the rest of the intelligence community was rather ill-defined although, theoretically, he headed it. Personality problems aggravated things. (Helms, for example, had virtually no access to Nixon in the last years.) What existed, then, was a collection of intelligence fiefdoms, all autonomous in such matters as drawing up their secret budgets for congressional authorization. For the most part, Congress did not know what it was approving because requested intelligence funds were concealed in other budgetary line items. As a power vacuum developed in the intelligence community, Henry Kissinger moved in 1970 to become the *de facto* boss of US intelligence.

Nixon tried in 1971 to strengthen the DCI through an executive order issued on November 5 (it was drafted by James R. Schlesinger who later became CIA director and Defense Secretary). This order vested in the DCI the power to present a consolidated budget for the whole intelligence community. Reviewing the CIA's history this year, the Senate Intelligence Committee applauded this move on the grounds that a strong DCI was essential for the community's work. However, Helms, when he held the job of DCI, failed to carry out his mandate. The Intelligence Community, already in disarray because of the emerging scandals,

has been drifting ever since.

Ford's executive order last February abandoned the 1971 concept to divide the budget-making responsibility among Bush as DCI, Ellsworth as the Pentagon's delegate, and William Hyland, the deputy to the White House Assistant for National Security Affairs. Bush was described as the top "manager" of this new group known as the Committee on Foreign Intelligence, but because Ford did not want an intelligence "czar," Ellsworth and Hyland can appeal Bush's decisions directly to the President.

Besides its resource allocation responsibility, this three-man panel acts as the steering committee for the intelligence community, replacing the former United States Intelligence Board, which was headed by the DCI and on which all the agencies were represented. Despite the language in Ford's Executive Order, many intelligence officials see Bush as simply *primus inter pares*, with the Pentagon's Ellsworth sharing equally in the committee's responsibilities. This is one aspect of the Pentagon's upgraded role in the management of intelligence.

Below the Committee on Foreign Intelligence, a larger body was set up under Bush for operational coordination. This is the National Foreign Intelligence Board on which all the intelligence agencies are represented. But it lacks the policy powers of the old US Intelligence Board.

Bush, of course, is helped by his easy access to Ford, but the next DCI may not have the same relationship with the next President, and this is where the new system may be damaging to the CIA and advantageous to the military now that a new institutional structure has been built. The Pentagon also has direct access to the President through the Secretary of Defense, personally and through his membership in the National Security Council. The DCI is not a statutory NSC member.

The Pentagon began restructuring itself for its new intelligence role last May when Defense Secretary Rumsfeld issued new directives. Accordingly, Ellsworth was named to the post of a second Deputy Secretary of Defense (William Clements is the other deputy) with intelligence as his principal responsibility. This changed the command structure in the military intelligence community. Until then, Pentagon intelligence was coordinated on a daily basis by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, a lower post than Ellsworth's current deputyship. Formerly, NSA and DIA directors reported directly to the Defense Secretary although the DIA also responded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Rumsfeld and Ellsworth have devised new lines of authority.

In expanding the military intelligence system, Ellsworth, as the Pentagon's top intelligence manager, created the new post of Director of Defense Intelligence to be held concurrently by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (this spot has not yet been permanently filled). The Director of the DIA (Gen. Samuel C. Wilson) now reports to Rumsfeld through Ellsworth and through the new Director of Defense Intelligence (Thomas K. Lattimer is the acting director in his capacity as Acting Assistant Secretary for Intelligence). Also created was the Defense Intelligence Board headed by Ellsworth. The board has three specialized subordinate bodies.

More significantly, the Director of the huge National Security Agency henceforth reports to Rumsfeld through Ellsworth and the new Director of Defense Intelligence rather than directly. So does the Director of Air Force Special Programs, which runs the spy satellite operations. The Defense Intelligence Agency has been streamlined and apparently enjoys less autonomy.

The Pentagon takes the position that the reorganization, which has proceeded virtually unnoticed since May, serves the purpose of centralizing and, therefore, improving the quality of the Defense Department's intelligence output. In a sense, that's true. Ellsworth's elevation and the creation of the post of Director of Defense Intelligence, however, are also having the effect of isolating military intelligence agencies from George Bush's direct control in his DCI capacity, according to many intelligence officials. In the crucial case of the NSA, for example, Bush has to deal with it on policy matters through Ellsworth, his colleague on the Committee on Foreign Intelligence, and through the Director of Defense Intelligence. On operational matters, Bush can deal with the NSA through the CIA's Intelligence Community Staff which is headed by Vice Adm. Daniel Murphy. But the DCI no longer has direct policy access to NSA's Director Gen. Lew Allen. In other words, a series of filters have been established between Bush and the military agencies.

A senior intelligence official, who believes that the new Pentagon system is more rational and efficient, recognizes nevertheless that it poses a serious threat to civilian management of the intelligence community. "Basically, it will depend on the people involved to see what the reorganization does to the intelligence community," he says.

Bush is believed to be satisfied with the existing state of affairs, but that's because he and Ellsworth enjoy an excellent working relationship. As another intelligence official remarks, "today it works because Bush and Ellsworth are reasonable people. But things could get out of hand if there's someone else in Ellsworth's place. There are built-in problems in this whole new system—and all this may well play to the advantage of the military who've always wanted to dominate intelligence."

The contradictions in the Ford reorganization plan include the fact that the DCI—Bush—has been spared the responsibility for running the CIA on a day-to-day basis because of the appointment of a new CIA Deputy Director, E. Henry Knoche, who enjoys unprecedented authority. The idea was that the DCI should have the freedom to run the overall intelligence community. Yet, at the same time, he has been weakened in the central area, the budgetary power held by the Committee on Foreign Intelligence.

In addition to Knoche, a veteran of 23 years in intelligence analysis (this is the first time that neither of the CIA's two top jobs are filled by officials from the clandestine services), Bush has named a new high-level team of men highly regarded in the profession. The new Deputy Director for Operations (clandestine services) is William Wells. The Deputy Director for Intelligence is Sayre Stevens, a specialist in science and technology. So, the CIA appears to be improving professionally; the agency's big problem in the future, however, is the rise of the Pentagon as the increasingly powerful voice in US intelligence.

NEW HORIZON
NIGERIA'S SOCIALIST MONTHLY
MAY-JUNE 1976

C.I.A.'s Who's Who In Nigeria

THE CIA NETWORK IN AFRICA

Culled from the Magazine Liberation
April 2, 1976, Paris.

Since 1969 the implementation of the Nixon-Kissinger doctrine of rapprochement between the United States and the South African white minority regime has greatly damaged America's prestige in Africa. American influence in Africa has further diminished after the war in Angola which is why the American intelligence services are mobilised to remedy the situation and strengthen American standing in Africa once again.

American influence which was very strong, for instance, in Haile Selassie's Ethiopia, has noticeably declined after the coming to power of the military. The change in the political scene in Ethiopia compelled the United States to move around the greater part of its intelligence institutions formerly stationed in Ethiopia. Till recently the backbone of the CIA network in Africa had been concentrated in Addis Ababa, which happens to be the headquarters of the Organisation of African Unity. A regular procedure for American agents operating in Africa was to work for some time in Addis Ababa after which they are assigned to other African countries.

Addis Ababa had been used as the base of CIA's Telecommunications network in Africa which has now been moved to Liberia, considered a more reliable country politically.

The centralised telecommunication centre in Liberia has been reinforced. It is in this centre that all information obtained by associates and agents of the CIA in Africa is collected, processed and then sent over to CIA headquarters in Langley Virginia. Seventy-four experts are in charge of the operation.

With the exception of the Maghreb countries which gravitate rather towards the mediterranean, CIA agents are concentrated in big numbers also in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Zaire. In view of the special relations between Pretoria and Washington South Africa has been upgraded to a privileged position after the Nixon-Kissinger doctrine

was adopted. The intelligence services of the two countries maintain close co-operation both in South Africa and in the rest of the African continent.

The United States has stationed several control posts in Ghana. James Dudley Haase, who held this post in Kampala in 1972, and Jarrel Richardson, the leader of the CIA network in Pretoria in 1974, head the operations in Accra.

In Nigeria the CIA had a network of agents even before the secessionist move. The reason for the particular interest in Nigeria is her specific position on the continent. Nigeria is a more developed African state politically and intellectually. It has the strongest army in Africa. There are two CIA networks in the country: in Lagos which up to July last year was led by David Zimmerman of the political affairs department of the American Embassy and in Kaduna in the north, led by Richard Plues in the consulate.

Two big groups of CIA agents work in Kenya and Zaire. This is because of the geoeconomic location of these countries. As for Zaire, the United States has been in control since the early 1960s.

The French-speaking countries in Africa do not appeal to the CIA as the above-mentioned countries, though African influence is considerably strong in Ivory Coast and Senegal. In most African countries American and French intelligence services often compete with each other, whereas in Angola they are cooperating closely.

CIA operations in Africa do not differ very much from these in other countries. The methods used in Africa are identical to those in other countries: the extension of contacts in the diplomatic services and mass media particularly among numerous American specialists working within the framework of the programme of cooperation in Africa. Cooperation and technical aid are often a cover for CIA agents. The main goal of the CIA operation is to infiltrate governments. In many countries efforts towards this goal have been successful. For instance, William Mosby, Jr., the head of the CIA network in Bangui, the Central-African Republic, receives copies of all the minutes of the cabinet meetings presided by Jean-Bedel Bokassa.

The CIA mounts extensive operations to discredit students and technicians who studied in the Soviet Union or other socialist countries, who are placed under constant control and police surveillance. Lastly, African students in the United States are an ideal target for the CIA.

The CIA establishes contacts with them so as to try to make them work for the agency in their own countries.

For some time now control over CIA operations in Africa has been exercised in Paris. CIA agents who work in Africa regularly pass through Paris in transit to and from Washington.

"Liberation" then published a list of CIA agents who hold posts of responsibility in Africa:

Algeria: Edward Kane, head of the

network of political affairs, telecommunications: Richard Haythorn and Terrence Rods;

Burundi: David Harper, head of political affairs and economic questions, Richard Green and Joseph Pearce telecommunications.

Cameroun: Jegg Corridon, head of political affairs and economic questions, Michael Berger, an associate in political affairs and economic questions, Gerald Branson and David Levandovskic, telecommunications.

The Central-African Republic: William Mosby Jr., head of political affairs;

Ivory Coast: Martin Bergin, head of political affairs, and Gordon Hepman, an associate in political affairs. Pressly East and Andrew Turko Jr., telecommunications;

Dahomey: Montgomery Rogers, head of the consulate office, and Robert Daffide, telecommunications,

Ethiopia: Eugene Jeffers Jr., head of political affairs, Mathew Monczewski, an associate in political affairs, Sheldon Benz, Roy Bigler, Felix Maladoskie, Carl Moss, Raymond Strahm and Kenneth Walters all in telecommunications.

Ghana: Jarrel Richardson, James Dudley Haase and William Stanley in political affairs, Clyde Brown, Earl Ison and Paul Pena in telecommunications.

Guinea (Conakry) Dwight Burgess, head of consulate office with Charles Chowning and Anthony Malesic in telecommunications.

Kenya: William Chair of political affairs, Frank Durfey in administrative services with James McGillvray and David Grottenthaler, in telecommunications.

Liberia: Edward Carrol of political affairs and seventy-four men in telecommunications.

Mali: Terrence Kauffers and Gerald Lindsay in telecommunications.

Mauritius: Vasia Gmirkin, head of the consulate office.

Morocco: Gohn Beam former head of the network in Burundi, Lyle Dittmer in Tangier, and Ronald Gagat, Gilbert Giles, Michael Grandy and Edward Urquhart in telecommunications,

Nigeria: David Zimmermann, head, Richard Plues, an associate based in Kaduna with Alfred Capelli and Charles Jones in telecommunications.

Somalia: David Hunt, head of economic questions with Peter Kerstra, Jr., Frederic Sharbrough and Gerald Zapoli in telecommunications.

Sudan: Ralph Brown, and William McGutcheon.

Tanzania: Sheldon Seltzer, telecommunications,

Chad: Philip Ringdahl, head of political affairs and economic questions,

South Africa: see Liberation, January 30, 1976,

Zaire: Samuel Martin, Peter Hanson, Nancy Buss, Mrs. Vickie Vigier, Stuart Methwen, Jeffrey Panitt, Robert Benedetti and Bruce Brett, all political affairs, with Peter Comar, Martin McFarlane, William Harner, Richard Harrison, David Markey, and others in telecommunications.

GENERALWASHINGTON POST
18 JUL 1976

Living With Terrorism

By Bruce Howard

SOON a diplomatic plague will be visited on Rosslyn, Virginia. Dozens of Boeing 707's will crash into the tropical rain forests along the Potomac, their holds exploded by terrorist bombs. Top secret diplomatic pouches will disappear, bodies will be identified, families will be notified.

The hypothetical disasters are part of a new training program at the Foreign Service Institute in Rosslyn to prepare foreign service officers for terrorism abroad.

Starting Oct. 1, junior foreign service officers will be assigned for several weeks at a time to the "Consulate-General of Rosslyn," there to attempt to cope with the town's never-ending destruction.

In the past three years State has spent more than \$100 million to protect its personnel abroad from terror. But the dramatic rise in security expenditures — from \$14.6 million in 1972 to more than \$40 million this year — has been matched by an increase in terror attacks. In 1969 there were four major attacks against U.S. embassies and/or their employees; last year there were 19.

U.S. ambassadors have been killed in Guatemala (1968), Sudan (1973), Cyprus (1974) and Lebanon (1976); kidnaped and released in Brazil (1969) and Haiti (1973). Terrorists have attacked American embassies and employees in more than 30 countries — above and beyond war zones such as Indochina.

Although most of the incidents occurred in relatively unstable countries in South and Central America, Africa and Asia, attacks have also taken place in Japan, France, Italy, Spain, New Zealand and other relatively stable nations.

On the average, according to department studies, an international terrorist involved in one of the kidnaping incidents of the past eight years had an 80 per cent chance of escaping death or imprisonment. If captured, most terrorists quickly obtained freedom, either through prisoner swaps or light sentencing. The average sentence for the few who were brought to trial was 18 months.

"In a word," says Robert Fearey, special assistant to the secretary of state and coordinator for combating terrorism, "outside the hijacking area, our efforts to make terrorism unprofitable for the terrorists have made little headway."

The Real Target

TERRORISM is aimed at the people watching, not at the actual victims," Brian Jenkins of the Rand Corporation has written. "Terrorism is theater."

The audience is world-wide, but those in a specialized part of it, the foreign service officers, suffer the additional pressure of knowing they are potential victims.

For most of them, psychological adaptation to terrorism has only begun. Until recent years, the diplomat in a foreign country was sacrosanct — he came under a white flag.

One of the first American diplomats kidnaped by the "new" terrorists was C. Burke Elbrick, U.S. ambassador to Brazil, seized in Rio de Janeiro in 1969. "I remember it seemed outrageous at the time," Elbrick said in an inter-

view. "There had been incidents before, but we in the department had thought they were flukes.

"I said to my captors, 'You guys changed the rules.' And they said, 'Yes, we have. But the government is our enemy and you are part of the government.'"

Much of the new anxiety in the foreign service has surfaced in the form of resentment against the State Department itself. "Terrorism has hurt morale in the service," one officer said. "But not as much as the department's policies on terrorism."

State's Hard Line

ONE OF of the department's most controversial policies is its refusal to negotiate for the release of kidnaped foreign service officers.

Secretary Kissinger defends the policy as a long-term deterrent — while today's hostage may be sacrificed, the thinking is, tomorrow's terrorist will see that America won't be blackmailed; yielding only encourages more terror.

But some staffers question whether terrorists really are deterred, especially when some host countries and/or hostage families go on to meet terrorists' demands. (In 1973, the wife of a kidnaped U.S. consul general in Mexico raised \$80,000 to ransom her husband after State refused to yield.)

The critics argue that the department should comply with most demands, especially those involving monetary ransoms, and make efforts to recover the money and capture the kidnapers after the hostage is released. This policy, placing top priority on the safety of the immediate hostage, is usually advised by police and the FBI in domestic kidnapings.

Foreign service personnel stress that the policy, whether it works in an individual case or not, is inhumane and demoralizing. "It's hard to see people you know just written off," said Margaret Dean, a newly enrolled foreign service officer and the wife of an officer.

"It makes you feel like a pawn," she added. "We make morbid jokes about it, but it's horrible to know that the people behind you aren't worried about getting you out. That Kissinger isn't concerned about you. The attitude we have is, Kissinger doesn't know our names; he cares about the world view."

Even Fearey noted in a speech defending the policy that it sounds "somewhat cold and unfeeling."

Some officers rationalize the department's policy by saying that the threat

Howard, a Harvard Law School student, is working this summer on the national staff of The Post.

of death by terrorism is part of the job, a hazard that officers have to accept, much like the military.

But a former soldier who has studied terrorism challenged the military comparison. "Soldiers may get killed in combat, but they don't get written off," he said. "When a soldier gets trapped, the military makes every effort to get him out, even if it means risking greater resources, such as flying in a helicopter. And they do it because it's the only way to maintain organizational loyalty. You can't expect a man to go out there knowing that, if he gets in a jam, he will be abandoned."

Fatal Test

THE FIRST firm enunciation of the no negotiations, no concessions policy came in 1973 when two popular foreign service officers, Cleo Noel, ambassador to Sudan, and his deputy, George C. Moore, were held hostage by Arab terrorists in the Saudi ambassador's residence in Khartoum along with three other diplomats — from Belgium, Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

Sudanese officials were in contact with the terrorists when President Nixon made a tough no-compromise statement. A few hours later the two Americans and the Belgian were murdered. The Saudi and Jordanian diplomats were released unharmed when the terrorists surrendered.

Afterwards, one of the terrorists was quoted as saying, "We had no choice but to execute the three hostages . . . after the categorical U.S. rejection of our demand was confirmed by Nixon's statement."

The incident is often cited bitterly by foreign service personnel. William Broderick, acting director of the Foreign Service Institute, said it was "an outrage for Nixon to go public with that statement."

The controversy has a variety of complexities. "Publicly we say we will not negotiate and even some of our own people think that's that," said one officer who was himself a kidnap victim. "But privately the practice is more flexible or, at least, more confused."

In the Sudanese incident, for example, a high level official, William Macomber, now ambassador to Turkey, was en route to the Sudan when Nixon made his public statement.

"Since then," one official said, "the department's policy has been a patchwork of hard-line rhetoric, more flexible practice, and confusion."

In 1973 the department commissioned the Rand Corporation to prepare a series of reports on terrorism. Rand's report on hostages stated: "The present [department] policy is an accretion of public statements and precedents established in previous hostage incidents which are themselves sometimes contradictory."

The officer who had been a hostage

commented: "The really delicate negotiation — and most of the confusion — surrounds what we tell the host government we want them to do. Publicly we say 'no deals,' and then privately we tell the host government that we're holding it responsible for the well-being of our diplomat. This can lead to chaos."

The official cited the 1973 kidnaping of Terrance Leonhardy, U.S. consul general in Guadalajara, Mexico.

"There the kidnapers wanted money, and the Mexicans asked us if we wanted them to pay," the officer said. "Publicly we were saying we would make no deals. Our embassy got confused and was about to tell the Mexicans we didn't want a deal made when they got an urgent message from the department saying, 'Shut up, don't say anything.' The Mexicans got so confused they almost blew it."

Finally, the Mexicans allowed Leonhardy's wife to pay the ransom and, apparently, provided her with the money, the officer said.

"Much of our public policy," one officer said, "is written after an event, when we're trying to explain to the American people what went wrong." He pointed to the 1975 kidnaping and murder of John Egan, U.S. consular agent in the Argentine city of Cordova.

The account of the incident in a department "public information" document says, "The kidnapers demanded the release of four imprisoned comrades. The Argentine government refused to negotiate. Egan was murdered 48 hours later."

But department officials now confirm reports — which appeared in the media at the time — that the terrorists actually demanded only that the Argentine government produce the prisoners on TV to demonstrate that they had not been tortured or killed.

A bitter department source said, "The Argentines refused because their embalming fluid wasn't good enough to show the prisoners on TV, not because they were hard line."

"The next week, the same terrorist group kidnaped an Argentine judge, and demanded the release of a comrade who happened to be still alive. The government made the deal, and the prisoners were swapped."

The Aftermath

THERE IS angry debate, too, over the department's treatment of hostages after their release. One Rand study reported that hostages returning to the department may be stigmatized. Their careers suffer through no fault of their own, according to the report, and they and their families sometimes develop severe psychological problems.

"The top officials deny the stigma phenomenon," one department expert said, "but then they talk about the 'contagion of the kidnaped.' It's very similar to the social pariah feelings focused on

the rape victim."

The Rand report said, "Many former hostages complained that they were treated like 'social pariahs, as if they were lepers.' These are their own words. Initially, we thought that this might be a reflection of some kind of oversensitivity but, in talking to colleagues of former hostages and to other officials concerned with the incidents, we heard comments such as, 'We had to get him out. He would have destroyed morale.'"

"There's no question that the incident harms the career of the victim, even though it's not his fault," Elbrick said. "There's a feeling in the department that they don't like to go with a loser, that somehow you're accident-prone."

Sean Holly was kidnaped in Guatemala in 1970 while serving as U.S. labor attache there. He now works in Foggy Bottom. "As far as treatment by the department is concerned," he said, "I'd have been better off shot. At least then my wife would have gotten a pension or maybe a job."

"But because I survived they treated me like a damn nuisance, a living reminder to the rest of the department. They gave me a Superior Honor medal, which you get for typing fast, and said, 'Forget it.' They even sent me a bill for \$189 because I left Guatemala before they thought I did and I had gotten paid for a few extra days.

"That's why there's no more real loyalty to the department."

Department spokesmen deny the stigma charge. "I know one [former hostage] who is doing a lot better than I am," an official said.

Former hostages also charge that the department has yet to address squarely the psychological traumas that affect terrorist victims and their families. They pointed to these symptoms — psychosomatic illness, so-called "anniversary reactions" involving ulcer and anxiety attacks on the exact anniversary of the kidnaping, guilt complexes for surviving and for being an "embarrassment" to the service, severe problems within the family. A department spokesman insisted that specially trained psychiatrists are made available to the kidnap victims and their families.

Broderick remembers the pressures on his family during a 1964 coup attempt in Bolivia. The most anguishing moment, he said, was "when terrorists gained control of the radio station and our children heard them urging the people to kill the Americans."

Diplomats are concerned about a new development — the separate kidnapings in Mexico last month of an American businessman's 8-year-old daughter and the Belgian ambassador's 16-year-old daughter. One expert said that, except for the Middle East, these were the first terror incidents ever directed at foreign children.

"We're praying," he added, "they

were isolated, non-political events because, if terrorists start going after school buses with American children, you couldn't calculate the impact. Officers will take risks, but not those risks."

Except in the most hazardous situations, the foreign service expects the individual family to decide whether to leave a difficult foreign post. "It is heart-rending to see a woman break down in tears in my office asking me how she can decide between exposing her children to terrorists or depriving them of a father," said Joan Wilson, the coordinator of the department's workshop for foreign service families.

The department discourages officers from asking for transfer or refusing to go to hazardous countries. "The unwritten rule is three 'no's,'" said one officer's wife. "After each 'no' you get a worse offer, and after the third 'no' you're out."

One method used to maintain morale in high-risk posts is to grant "differentials," or percentage salary increases, after a terrorist incident. The differential is also used to compensate for service in disease-ridden or otherwise unattractive countries.

Even the differential has been viewed cynically. "After our ambassador got shot," said one officer, "we got a 10 per cent differential. Then a year later the troupe from the department came back to readjust the percentage. It was clear that the message was, 'Nobody's been killed for a while, so you'll lose the differential.' Just before they decided, though, one of our attaches got kidnaped and we went up to 15 per cent."

Oddly, the increasing hazards of the diplomatic job have not stemmed the recent rush of applicants. Interest in foreign policy, sparked by the Vietnam war and the tight job market, has pushed the number of applications to the foreign service from 6,700 in 1969 to more than 20,000 this year.

But the applicants and new officers are often poorly informed about the terrorist risks to the low and middle-level service personnel. For the news media focus on the incidents involving ambassadors and largely ignore the others, while the service itself delays most terrorism briefings until the officer accepts an assignment and reaches his post.

"We don't get into it too much," said Joan Wilson of the Foreign Service Institute, which trains the new officers, "because there's a danger of paranoia."

Another officer noted that FSI's "Consulate General of Rosslyn" will include hypothetical violence against American citizens, but not against

members of the foreign service. For those who do accept the high risk posts, the general attitude is "It can't happen to me."

"It's the classic defense mechanism — denial," a terrorism expert said. "People say, 'It won't happen to me, and if it does, there's nothing I can do about it.'"

"It's impossible to even think about it," said Claude Ross, former ambassador to Haiti and Tunisia. "If you thought about it, you wouldn't be able to get your job done."

Help Shortage

THE UNITED STATES has had little success in efforts to get other nations to cooperate in the fight against international terror. Some countries, particularly in the Arab East and Africa, provide asylum, weapons and operating funds to terror groups. Some even provide pensions. At the 1972 U.N. General Assembly the American delegation proposed a convention which would have obliged signatory states to prosecute or extradite international terrorists; only six other countries supported the treaty. The next year the U.N. did adopt an anti-terror convention, but it had no enforcement provisions and it has not yet been ratified by enough countries to become operative.

The American Foreign Service Association, representing some 9,000 diplomatic employees, contends that the United States itself, for diplomatic reasons, has not done enough to bring terrorists to justice. The association points to the aftermath of the killing of Rodger P. Davies, U.S. ambassador to Cyprus, during a Greek Cypriot demonstration outside the embassy in Nicosia in August, 1974.

Last January, during preparation of the House intelligence committee report, word leaked that U.S. intelligence officials had learned the identity of Davies' killers within an hour after the shooting and later confirmed the information through ABC News film taken at the scene. Although the killers were serving in the Greek Cypriot government security forces, angry State Department employees charged, the administration did nothing beyond filing a quiet protest with the Nicosia authorities.

The recent Israeli raid into Uganda to rescue hijacked hostages was, obviously, the talk of the foreign service. AFSA's Harry Blaney said:

"None of us really feel that the United States can afford to use force like the Israelis, if only because we are

a great power. We play a different diplomatic role in the world and we have more to lose.

"But at the same time, our role gives us more leverage in areas like economic aid. The lesson was — the Israelis fight courageously to save their people. We have to ask, 'Why does the United States do so little?'"

Foreign service officers realize that dramatic rescue operations, particularly when they involve not one hundred hijacked passengers under guard in an international airport but a single diplomat hidden away in some obscure apartment, may be impractical. AFSA is pressing for modest reforms:

- An increase in protection for middle and low-level officers overseas.

"There's a lot of resentment out there about the ambassadors in their armor-plated cars," one specialist said. "In Argentina, where the ambassador sleeps in an explosion-proof bedroom with walls lined with steel and plays tennis guarded by a Marine who changes sides of the court when he does, most embassy personnel travel the city streets unprotected."

- A reduction of staffs in high-risk areas to a bare minimum.

The embassy staff in Beirut, one officer noted, was increased from 42 to 53 shortly before the recent assassinations there. The U.S. Information Service continued to operate a printing press in the city for months after two of its employees were kidnaped.

- An increased use of American military personnel, rather than local police, to provide protection.

State has always preferred local police because of the obvious complications in a clash between U.S. marines and local demonstrators. But there is a growing feeling within the service that in many sensitive situations local police cannot be relied upon.

There are also some foreign service officers who argue that an increase in the assigned number of guards, whether local or American, will weaken their effectiveness as diplomats. "How," one officer asked, "can you meet with groups outside the government with guards and local police following you around? The damage will really show in the future, when the out groups get in."

Foreign service people charge that there is a high-level failure of imagination or will to search for formulas providing for their safety. At the same time, they recognize that the total isolation of the diplomatic community in secure bastions would spell victory for terrorism.

MIAMI NEWS
5 July 1976

Disarm the terrorists

On the theory that to be forewarned is to be better prepared, the CIA has made public a study by one of its research analysts, David Milbank of the Office of Political Research, on the subject of terrorism.

Milbank's findings are most disquieting. They will not comfort those persons who would like to believe that the bombings, kidnappings, hijackings and other terrorist acts are an outgrowth of special problems in specific countries and that they will subside as those problems are reduced.

To the contrary, Milbank

found that there is "good reason to believe that at least a few foreign terrorist groups are planning to step-up their attacks on American targets abroad in the near future." Also, "it seems likely that Washington will be targeted by terrorist demands somewhat more frequently in the future." A "no concessions" policy will not alter that prediction, he adds.

Perhaps his most alarming conclusion is that "sooner or later some terrorist group is bound to take the plunge into using weapons of mass de-

struction. Nuclear weapons are not difficult to obtain, he warns, but "a more pressing threat would seem to lie in the field of chemical, biological, and radiological weapons."

Like most such studies, this one is long on problems and short on specific solutions. Obviously, however, the Milbank study calls for better security that now exists at nuclear and military installations. No real solution to the exotic weapon problem will be found, however, until the nations that produce them finally realize that whatever advantages are attached to them cannot possibly outweigh the risks.

THE ECONOMIST JULY 10, 1976

Nuclear arms

Seepage

The United States, which claims it is anxious to curb the spread of nuclear weaponry around the world, is about to supply nine tons of uranium to India and a big nuclear reactor to Spain. Its Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) voted 3-1 for both decisions against the unprecedentedly open dissent of a senior Rand corporation physicist, Mr Victor Gilinsky.

Neither India nor Spain has accepted the 1968 non-proliferation treaty, with its obligatory safeguards. India has already used its reactor-produced plutonium to carry out a nuclear explosion, and its refusal to give adequate assurances about its future intentions has led the Canadians (but not the Ameri-

WASHINGTON POST
19 JUL 1976

U.S. Training, Aid in Indian A-Blast Cited

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

U.S. engineering assistance, training and possibly a crucial U.S. chemical ingredient contributed to India's 1974 atomic explosion, according to data filed for an unprecedented public hearing this week on future U.S.-India nuclear cooperation.

Government documents

obtained under a freedom of information action by lawyers in the case show that the United States received clear signs over many years of India's growing capability and interest in exploding a nuclear device, but did little to stop it.

The newly released docu-

cans) to decide that they will not supply it with any more nuclear material. Spain has retained the right to use non-American fuel in its new reactor (which will annually produce enough plutonium for more than 30 bombs), and can thus use it to build up a stockpile of plutonium over which the Americans will have no control. Mr Gilinsky, it seems, has a point. Or two.

On the sale to Spain, his most pointed point was the revelation that Spain had not even been asked whether it would agree to fuel the reactor only with American material. On the sale to India, he did get the other NRC members to say that it "would be desirable" to find out if India would let the Americans buy the plutonium which its Tarapur reactor will produce from the American fuel. But the answer to such an inquiry seems to be available already, and it

looks pretty negative. Ten days before the NRC vote on July 2nd, India's news agency had confirmed reports that a reprocessing plant was already being built at Tarapur to extract plutonium from used reactor fuel.

Not that the British are in a position to act holier-than-thou to the Americans. Under the deal which the British and French are now jointly making with Japan, 4,000 tons of used fuel from Japan's reactors are to be reprocessed in Britain (at the new site near Windscale) and France. Good, in that it is better to use plutonium separation plants in countries which already possess the bomb than to build them in states which would be close to getting the bomb if they possessed these plants. Less good, in that the plutonium extracted from the Japanese used fuel is to be sent back to Japan.

ments and other sources reveal that late in 1970, more than three years before the epochal atomic blast under the Rajasthan desert, India rebuffed a written U.S. warning against the use of American-supplied "heavy water" (deuterium) in manufacturing a nuclear explosive device. Despite earlier statements to the contrary, there are growing indications that this ingredient was used in making the materials for the Indian blast.

The May 18, 1974, explosion brought India into the "nuclear club" and set off powerful shock waves in the capitals of other underdeveloped nations. The Indian explosion is blamed for a concerted drive by Pakistan to obtain the means for nuclear explosions and, to a lesser degree, for similar drives in Brazil and Iran.

The history of U.S. involvement is of major importance to a Nuclear Regulatory Commission hearing scheduled for Tuesday on whether to continue shipping enriched uranium fuel for India's atomic program. Canada has permanently cut off nuclear supplies to India because Canadian equipment and technology were used in the 1974 explosion, but the United States continues to sell India nuclear fuel.

The controversy marks the first time that U.S. export of nuclear materials has been publicly contested and the first time that a public hearing has been held on such an issue. The outcome is expected to have serious repercussions here and overseas.

The Natural Resource Defense Council, Sierra

Club and Union of Concerned Scientists are seeking to block the sale of more uranium to India under present conditions. They said in a brief submitted for the hearing that in the most critical areas of policy toward India "United States action (and inaction) disastrously sets the stage for further weapons proliferation."

Joining the opposition groups in written statements have been a number of well-known former officials, including former Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, former Ambassador to the United Nations Charles W. Yost and former presidential science adviser George B. Kistiakowsky.

The State Department, in a written response, said failure to approve the fuel shipments would cause "severe economic and social damage" to 80 million Indians in areas dependent on nuclear power and would be "a major setback in our relations with India."

The department maintained that the United States is committed to continue the sale of enriched uranium under longstanding contractual agreements, and that U.S.-Indian arrangements preclude its use for atomic bombs.

To produce its 1974 explosion, India used a Canadian-supplied research reactor known as CIRUS to make irradiated atomic fuel. Then this material was treated by an Indian-built "reprocessing plant" to make weapons-grade plutonium. Though there was no indication of this at the time of the explosion, the new evidence indicates that the United States played a role in both processes.

In 1956 the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission agreed to sell 21 tons of "heavy water" to India for use in the Canadian-supplied research reactor, which requires this rare and expensive substance for its operation. The contract provided that the "heavy water" could be used only for "research into and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes."

Recently disclosed files indicate that some AEC commissioners were concerned about this matter as early as Oct. 8, 1956, when "problems with respect to the safeguard provisions" on the Indian "heavy water" were raised at an AEC meeting.

A memorandum says that this was the first time for the commissioners to discuss "safeguards"—which include strict measurement and inspection requirements—in connection with a sale of "heavy water" abroad.

The staff was instructed to work on a "safeguards" policy which was applied to future sales, but this action was considered too late to affect the deal that had just been made.

From 1959-61 India constructed a "heavy water" manufacturing plant using Italian, French and West German equipment, with the aid of two American firms, Vitro Corp. and National Research Corp. At that time, U.S. companies were authorized to provide many types of nuclear engineering services, including those connected with "heavy water" plants, without special government permission. Later they had to get special permission, which would be difficult for a company wanting to assist a country without nuclear weapons to obtain today.

In the late 1950s India also began building a "reprocessing" facility capable of making weapons-grade material from fuel rods that had been subjected to radiation in a nuclear reactor. An American official familiar with the matter said the United States was "well aware" of the Indian plan to build the facility and offered "some training assistance to Indian nationals" and help in using information on reprocessing that had been declassified by the U.S. government.

At the time, reprocessing facilities—which also have civilian uses—were not seen by the United States as a major bomb proliferation problem.

AEC correspondence indicates that the U.S. firm of Vitro International, a subsidiary of Vitro Corp., participated in the design of this plutonium reprocessing plant, evidently without any requirement for special U.S. permission. But when the AEC asked Vitro about the facility during the final stages of construction in January, 1963, India directed the firm to say nothing.

The United States was told that any information about the plant would have to come directly from Indian atomic authorities, but AEC files do not show any follow-up. "Apparently there was no follow-up because the AEC wasn't that interested," said Jerry Helfrick, director of international program implementation of the Energy Research and Development Administration, successor to some AEC functions.

An AEC memorandum of Sept. 21, 1966, said U.S. agencies agreed to sponsor and finance training for Indian officials at the AEC production works at Hanford, Wash., in "plutonium

recycle." Weapons-grade material as well as reusable fuel can be made in such a process.

Hanford records show that at least two Indian scientists studied there in the late 1960s or early 1970s. According to an AEC compilation, 939 Indians were trained in various skills in AEC facilities from 1949 to the time of the 1974 explosion.

The Chinese explosion of a nuclear device in October, 1964, sharply increased Indian anxiety and interest in bomb manufacture. Nearly 100 members of the Indian parliament signed a petition urging nuclear weapons development, and U.S. agencies received many press reports—and no doubt diplomatic and intelligence reports—of the growing Indian interest and capabilities.

In January, 1970, by far the largest U.S. atomic project in India—the Tarapur nuclear power station—was dedicated by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Late that summer, Gandhi and her atomic energy chairman began speaking publicly of their interest in underground nuclear explosions "for peaceful purposes."

Seriously concerned U.S. officials secretly notified India in writing in November, 1970, that a nuclear explosion—no matter how it was labeled—did not qualify in U.S. eyes as a "peaceful purpose" under the agreements to supply "heavy water" and other materials.

Although the United States had promoted the idea of "peaceful nuclear explosions" in earlier times, officials realized by 1970 that an Indian blast of any description would be considered a military threat by neighbors and might spur worldwide atomic bomb proliferation.

India rejected the U.S. interpretation and a similar approach by Canada, declaring itself free to use nuclear energy for any purpose that it considered peaceful. An AEC memorandum of January, 1971, reported that Indian atomic research chief Homi Sethna—who eventually had charge of the Indian explosion—was "disturbed" over the U.S. approach and insisted that India was far away from a "clean" explosive capability.

"They [India] asserted a position which made us worried," said a participant in Washington discussions of the time. "But they had not actually violated anything and so we didn't take any action."

In May, 1971, Prof. Lincoln Bloomfield of the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-

nology passed along to Washington the disclosure by Srinivasa Krishnaswami, joint secretary of the Indian Defense Ministry, that Gandhi would be making the decision "in the next few months" on whether to proceed with an atomic bomb.

The U.S. embassy in New Delhi estimated in April, 1973, that India probably would not be in a position to make an atomic bomb until 1976 or later. But in May, 1973, a Malaysian official, in a letter to the AEC, reported that the Indian atomic research chairman had spoken of India's "own nuclear explosive, which has been painfully accumulated over the years."

No report has been made public showing any U.S. attempt to dissuade India in the months preceding the May, 1974 underground blast.

Immediately following the explosion, the United States expressed displeasure, though in mild terms considering the worldwide alarm. For a short time the United States held up regularly scheduled shipments of enriched uranium fuel for the Tarapur reactor in an effort to obtain explicit Indian assurances that it would not be used for any sort of nuclear device. When India refused, the United States agreed to a much vaguer statement in an exchange of letters and resumed fuel shipments.

Shortly after the 1974 blast the AEC said there was "no reason to believe" that U.S.-supplied material was involved. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger subsequently said India's explosion did not violate U.S. supply agreements and thus "we had no specific leverage on which to bring our objections to bear."

Kissinger's "no violation" statement was evidently based on a July, 1974, letter from Indian Ambassador T. N. Kaul saying that "100 per cent Indian material" had been used in the atomic explosion. However, American officials now concede that Kaul's words did not rule out the possibility the U.S.-supplied "heavy water" in the Canadian reactor was utilized to make "Indian material for the blast."

Sen. Abraham A. Ribicoff (D-Conn.), who publicly raised the U.S. "heavy water" issue last month, said, "There now are strong and disturbing indications that India did use it to produce plutonium for its nuclear explosion in 1974 and is still using it for its nuclear explosion program."

At the heart of the discussion of the past is the question of current American

policy.

Those who intervened in the NRC case say they see no reason why the United States should withhold foreign aid from India—as it currently does—but con-

tinue sales of potentially dangerous nuclear fuel. They also maintain that "business-as-usual" U.S. nuclear sales are a clear encouragement to other nations contemplating atomic weapons programs.

Those on the opposite side maintain that the practical effect of a U.S. cutoff might be to send India to the Soviet Union (the only other worldwide supplier) for the necessary enriched uranium.

They also say the United States can exercise greater influence on India and other potential atomic weapons nations by a continuing role as a nuclear supplier.

WASHINGTON POST

Monday, July 19, 1976

Stop the Bomb-Peddling

WHAT IS SO rare as a day in June? An American public official who professes to think that the spread of nuclear weapons would be a good thing. And yet, if we may mix our authors a little, everyone talks about the danger of nuclear proliferation, but nobody does anything about it. That last formulation may be a little harsh, but it is manifestly true that both Congress and the executive branch—never mind their noble professions—seem incapable at this point of designing and acting on any coherent policy to curb the spread of a nuclear weapons potential to countries all around the world. Yes, at U.S. initiative the supplier-nations of peaceful nuclear technology have organized themselves into a group and drawn up some guidelines and standards intended to diminish the dangers that flow from their exports. And, yes, the bills being introduced in Congress to curb the outward flow of weapons material have begun to take on the aspect of a good confetti-fling. But none of this begins to come to grips with the choices and problems facing this country in respect to our proliferation policy at the moment.

Let us name the parts. It is a well known fact that nuclear suppliers in other nations, principally the French and Germans, have been entering into negotiations and deals with non-nuclear countries for the export of technology and plant that have a very high bomb-making potential—and that the United States, by contrast, has been much more cautious over the years in both supplying and safeguarding nuclear materials it sends abroad. It is not so well-known, however, that this country has some 30 agreements with other countries concerning our provision of peaceful nuclear technology and that many of these have failed to keep step with changing circumstance and expanded knowledge. The point is that what seemed safe and airtight, say, 20 years ago when some of these deals were made, no longer can be said to be sufficient.

Can we renegotiate these deals upward, so to speak, tightening their terms and sharpening their precautions? That is where a second big problem comes in: Neither formally and officially on paper, nor informally and unofficially in the practical world of real-life Washington, does the government have either the focus or instrumentality or (evidently) the will to produce a plausible and consistent policy. The Department of State has some of the action; so does the Arms Control Agency; so do the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Office of Management and Budget, ERDA and the Congress. Thus when these things are argued out, a multiplicity of competing institutional interests is likely to come into play, along with a certain heavy fatalism. Your average country desk at the Department of State can understandably almost always find a diplomatic reason why it would be harmful to our relations with country X to put new limits on the materials we are sending; the long-term prospect of country X's bomb-making potential hardly seems worth exacerbating the current crisis

or snarl we are otherwise experiencing with its leaders. And besides, what would be the point of tightening the rules on this reactor or that when we don't have complete control over its other reactors? And, anyway, if we deny them what they want, isn't it possible that they will shop elsewhere and that we will lose whatever limited control we might have had if we closed the deal? And, when you get right down to it, isn't it already too late to halt the inevitable development around the world of nuclear arsenals?

To hear these arguments repeatedly stated you could get the idea that the United States has as little leverage in these matters as it apparently has policy. But that is not the case. We remain the preferred supplier of technology and the best-stocked supplier of fuel (although to maintain the latter position much more is going to have to be done to increase this country's capacity to produce enriched uranium). What is needed is some focus and decision and muscle at the top. It is even conceivably possible that a policy review and examination would lead to the conclusion that we might as well toss in the towel on our fitful antiproliferation efforts. But if that is not going to be the case, then a whole lot of tough questions are going to have to be addressed: If we cannot prevent the spread of these weapons, can we not at least retard or better control that spread? Is it possible or even credible for this country to complain about French and German sales of enriching and reprocessing equipment if we ourselves do not act to make our own contracts more consistent with such a position? And if we are to pull ourselves together on this question, will not our very doing so require that we also consider ways to meet the legitimate concerns of client countries that: 1) we will be a reliable producer of the materials they need for their nuclear energy plants and 2) by depriving them of a nuclear weapons capability we are not diminishing their security. Other commitments, in other words, might have to accompany such a policy.

If you want an example of how the thing is working now in the absence of a coherent, consistent government point of view, you need only consider the dilemma of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which must license nuclear exports, but which has no authority to impose conditions on the importing countries themselves. That must be done by other agencies of the executive branch. At the moment the question before the NRC is whether it should grant approval for new fuel supplies for two American-built reactors at Tarapur in India—yes, India, exploder of that famous "peaceful" bomb in 1974, which we now know was made with the help of heavy water supplied by the United States for other (peaceful) purposes. Given that record, it would seem undeniable that the United States is not just entitled, but actually obliged to impose some very strict conditions on what may and may not be done with any further fuel we supply. Yet since the only practical way to do this is to deny the Indians permission to extract plu-

onium from that fuel, the actual imposition of proper terms lies outside the NRC's jurisdiction.

The NRC, however, can impose terms on the U.S. government by refusing to approve the Indian license until the appropriate executive branch agencies have imposed the required terms on India. There seems to be anything but a disposition to do so in certain important reaches of the State Department. Indeed, the State Department's July 8 submission to the NRC on the question reads as if it had been written in New Delhi. But we think the NRC can and must hang tough until it has been given the proper assurances by the people in charge at State and in the White House that the Indians will be denied the opportunity to reprocess any fuel that is licensed and that this condition has been made a part of our arrangement with them.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JUNE 25, 1976

The Gray Area

By Richard Burt

LONDON—Ford Administration officials, led by Henry A. Kissinger, have reiterated their belief that the strategic arms limitation talks must continue to serve as the foundation for a less antagonistic superpower relationship. For more than a year, Leonid I. Brezhnev and his colleagues have voiced a similar view. After signing the United States-Soviet agreement on peaceful nuclear tests recently in Moscow, Mr. Brezhnev stressed that the Soviet Union was doing "all that it could do" to achieve an accord limiting strategic weapons.

Why, then, have negotiators failed to iron out the details of a new strategic-arms agreement that were outlined at the 1974 summit talks at Vladivostok?

The popular answer is that the steam has gone out of superpower détente and that the growth of Soviet military power, coupled with the United States Presidential primaries, has made President Ford reticent to enter into a new strategic arms accord. These are plausible explanations, but they tend to obscure what is probably a more important obstacle to arms control in the longer term—a growing class of United States, Soviet and European weapons that these negotiations are not currently suited to control nor organized to accommodate.

These weapons constitute a "gray area" of military technology: systems that by virtue of their range, deployment, or national ownership are not now covered by the strategic arms talks, but possess the capability, in theory, to deliver nuclear warheads on the superpowers or their allies.

The most celebrated category of gray-area systems is the fleet of United States fighter-bombers deployed in Western Europe. While these aircraft are assigned tactical strike missions, some possess the range and payload to deliver nuclear weapons on the Soviet homeland. Accordingly, Moscow

has argued that they should be limited by an accord, an argument that the United States rejects.

Another gray area includes the hundreds of Soviet medium-range bombers and missiles targeted on Western Europe. Because these weapons cannot be used against the United States, they have been left out of strategic-arms deliberations, but they pose a continuing danger to United States allies, and their use could trigger a United States, Soviet nuclear exchange.

Western European nuclear forces comprise a third gray area. As a bilateral dialogue, the strategic-arms discussions do not attempt to constrain the nuclear capabilities of other countries, but from the Soviet perspective, British and French forces (and China's) must be added to the United States nuclear threat.

As the gray area grows in military significance, superpower arms control becomes immeasurably more difficult. Despite Soviet concern over United States aircraft in Europe, they remained outside of the 1972 strategic-arms agreement, a precedent that was continued in the search for a second accord at Vladivostok. But negotiations since 1974 have bogged down over a new group of gray-area weapons, the Soviet bomber designated the Backfire by the West and the United States long-range cruise missile.

In the case of the Backfire, United States negotiators have refused to accept the notion that it is not intended for use against the United States. The cruise missile raises even more difficult problems, because it is to be built in strategic and shorter-range

The point is simple: If the United States does not act in the Indian case to ensure that our nuclear exports will not be misused or contribute even indirectly to enlarging the Indians' nuclear arsenal, then the game will more or less be over. What credibility will we possibly have in urging the French to abandon their plan to sell dangerous reprocessing equipment to the Pakistanis? What authority will we bring to our efforts to negotiate strict safeguards on the nuclear reactors we have offered to provide to countries in the Middle East? What license in the future will we ever be able to question or curb—at least with a straight face? We can only hope the NRC will insist on the proper commitment from the administration before it releases this fuel—and that the rest of government will get off the dime and start thinking about and acting on its obligations in this dangerous and supremely important field.

tactical versions. While it might theoretically be possible to distinguish between them, in practice this could prove impossible.

Whether the deadlock over cruise missiles and the Backfire will be finally resolved remains to be seen. But even if it is, the gray-area problem is likely to grow worse. The Backfire is only part of a more wide-scale Soviet effort to upgrade medium-range nuclear forces for use against Europe. As these forces expand, their exclusion from East-West arms control will be seen as a growing anomaly.

Diagnosing the gray-area problem, however, is far easier than devising a solution. One suggestion is that these systems be relegated to the other major East-West arms control forum—the Atlantic alliance-Warsaw Pact talks over troop reductions in Central Europe. Unfortunately, most of the gray-area weapons are deployed outside of this region.

A more imaginative idea is the convening of a "third" arms-control conference that would deal specifically with the nuclear systems that continue to elude coverage in the strategic arms limitation talks. Another possible solution would be to incorporate those talks and the talks on the reduction of forces into a single forum, where a larger number of participants would focus on a wider array of weapons.

Whether either of these two approaches is workable is unclear, but both should be examined. What is clear is that the implications of the gray area are ominous—not only for the future of arms control, but East-West relations in general.

Richard Burt is assistant to the director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

LONDON TIMES
5 July 1976

TWO HUNDRED YEARS ON

Those with a taste for the romantic in politics will no doubt regret that the United States did not celebrate its bicentennial when President Kennedy was proclaiming his countrymen's readiness to "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to secure the survival and success of liberty". That was the apogee of American idealism and of their perception of their power. Much has changed since then. The price of global responsibility has become higher and there is no longer the old confidence that American involvement guarantees either the survival or success of liberty. At home the United States has been rent by assassination, racial conflict and corruption. The dominant mood of the moment is of anti-Washington sentiment, which represents the disillusionment of the American people with both their institutions and their political processes.

But it is when things are going badly that one can best assess the enduring strength of a nation. One should never underestimate either the speed with which attitudes can change in the United States or the differing facets of American life. It was only a few years before Kennedy was capturing the imagination with his rhetoric that the country was going through the era of McCarthyism.

There were two factors of particular interest throughout the years of American travail. The first was that there were many Americans who were as disgusted as anybody by the activities of their own Government. Whatever politicians and offi-

cial may have been doing, the voice of protest was never stilled. That is the first test of the political health of a country. It is the evident dissatisfaction of Americans with sordid government that offers the best hope of political renewal now. Mr Jimmy Carter's meteoric rise can largely be attributed to his perception of this yearning for decency in high places. That is the context within which American politicians of all parties are now having to operate, even if they are not all likely to undergo a spiritual conversion overnight.

The second factor was that, bitterly though the United States was criticized by international opinion for its role in Vietnam, the worst fear of many countries was that in reaction there might be a new phase of American isolationism. The point was never reached where the withdrawal of America from an active part in international affairs would have been regarded as a blessing. American authority and moral standing were sadly diminished, but nobody else was able or willing to take on the task of creative international leadership. That is still the American role today. But it does not follow that with an appropriate pause for breath the United States will shortly be able to resume the position it held in Kennedy's day.

The world, as well as the United States, has changed since then. Power has become more fragmented. Neither the Nato nor the Warsaw Pact countries are such cohesive groupings as they were. China has become more active in international affairs. With the greater importance of commodity prices in international

economics the third world has acquired a potential bargaining strength it did not possess before. Less tangibly, but no less significantly, there has been a change in the international atmosphere which imposes restraints on whoever may wield power, whether economic or military.

This means that American power can be exercised effectively only with the approval of other countries, which depends in turn partly upon the United States being a source of creative ideas and partly upon that spark that touches the imagination. That is needed now abroad as well as at home because the active involvement of the United States is as necessary as it ever was. Most obviously, it is essential to preserving the military balance with the Soviet Union, without which the whole international order would be transformed. Secondly, while one of the most constructive acts of statesmanship in the past thirty years has been the positive American encouragement to the establishment of the EEC, international economic and political stability still requires active cooperation across the Atlantic. Then the chances of achieving a better understanding with the primary producers would be much poorer without vigorous American participation in the search for a solution. As the United States celebrates its bicentennial it should know that other countries are looking not just to its romantic past but also to the role of international leadership it still has to play. The context of that leadership has changed, but without it the world would be a yet more dangerous and uncertain place.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Thursday, July 15, 1976

Gunboat Diplomacy

The United States has sent the frigate Beary to Mombasa, Kenya, to help Jomo Kenyatta face down Uganda's Idi Amin in a spat deriving from the Israeli raid on Uganda's Entebbe Airport. The U.S.S. Beary's "courtesy call" is a classic example of gunboat diplomacy, and we think it's fine. In fact, when we contrast such old-fashioned interventions with modern innovations like the current Security Council debate on the Entebbe incident, we have to admit the moral superiority of the 19th Century methods.

As Ambassador Scranton reminded the UN, international law clearly allows for states to use limited force to rescue their own citizens from mortal danger on foreign soil. Precedents are numerous. If there is a country where this inter-

vention is justified, it must be Uganda. The one hijacking hostage entirely in Ugandan hands, Mrs. Dora Bloch, apparently has been dragged from her hospital bed and murdered. Kenyan nationals in Uganda have been slaughtered and now Idi Amin is threatening the safety of 500 British residents because of the British role in the Security Council debate. Through all this, UN Secretary-General Waldheim seems mainly concerned about Uganda's "sovereignty."

The U.S. is taking entirely appropriate steps to support our friends in Kenya. The question is why Britain, which in the 19th Century was willing to defend British citizens anywhere in the world, now feels so powerless to protect its own people.

Monday, July 19, 1976

The Washington Star

INFO **Helsinki Pact a Year Later: Basket of Ideas or Troubles?**

By Henry S. Bradsher

Washington Star Staff Writer

There were sunny smiles, polished politeness and lots of luscious Finnish strawberries last summer in Helsinki. Everybody seemed to agree that peace, friendship and greater contact between nations was a good idea.

And so the leaders of 32 European nations, plus the United States, Canada and the Vatican, signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It talked about "promoting better relations among themselves and ensuring conditions in which their people can live in true and lasting peace."

It sounded fine, but the agreement had been hammered out in controversy between East and West. For every soaring hope expressed in Helsinki of a new era of international understanding, there were Western warnings of pitfalls ahead in turning the agreement into a working blueprint for cooperation and a Communist qualification to the written terms.

Now, a year later, the Helsinki agreement is still controversial.

IT IS NOT JUST the expectable argument about whether it is proving to be a half-full bottle, containing some progress in East-West relations, or a half-empty one notable mainly for its unfulfilled provisions. The very delineation of the bottle is in dispute between a Western understanding of it as a simple, straight-sided thing and a Communist attempt to define it as decidedly curved.

Two years of tough negotiations, basically pitting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations against the Moscow-led Warsaw Pact, produced a very qualified and yet outwardly encouraging document.

The Soviets wanted a European statement that would have the effect of ratifying the borders it grabbed during World War II and might create an illusion of peaceful harmony which would lull the Western defense effort. Using the leverage of Moscow's eagerness, the West was able to insist on humanitarian provisions despite marked Soviet reluctance to accept some of them.

Some families separated by the Communist minefields that run down central Europe have been reunited since the agreement was signed. A few more Western newspapers are available under the counters of tourist hotels in Eastern Europe, if not yet accessible to local people. Visa rules have eased a bit for journalists. And, under the heading of "confidence-building measures,"

advance notifications have been given of some military maneuvers.

But there has not been very much more, and even the limited number of family reunifications is of doubtful attribution to the Helsinki agreement. Some provisions of the Final Act have been unilaterally redefined by Communist leaders from straight Western interpretations to curved conformity with their usual desire to isolate their people from foreign influences. Some other provisions have been virtually ignored.

THIS HAS RILED many in the West who have paid attention to humanitarian problems in Communist countries. One is a cultured lady from New Jersey with a social conscience and a seat in the House of Representatives, Millicent H. Fenwick, a Republican.

Largely as a result of her initiative, and the help of Sen. Clifford P. Case, R-N.J., and many other interested members of Congress, a commission of 12 members of Congress and three representatives of the administration has been voted into existence "to monitor the acts of the Helsinki signatories . . . with

particular regard to the provisions relating to cooperation in humanitarian fields." It has not yet started work.

The Kremlin has been mightily angered by this American attempt to check up on what it does. And signs point to Henry A. Kissinger's State Department not being too happy, either, with what it apparently sees as congressional interference with its management of Soviet affairs.

The Soviet Union began in 1954, in the chilliest part of the Cold War, to seek a European security conference. Waxing and waning over the years, the idea became a massive propaganda play intended as a substitute for a World War II peace conference and a way of promoting "Europe for the Europeans" — meaning "Yankee go home," an unpopular idea with militarily vulnerable West Europeans.

Only when the principles of American participation and of humanitarian provisions were generally accepted did negotiations begin. The tough talks fell under three subject headings, which negotiators called "baskets" of ideas.

security and "confidence-building measures" like giving warnings of large-scale military maneuvers close to borders and inviting observers. Soldiers from neighboring countries have watched maneuvers near both ends of the Soviet Union's European border. The Warsaw Pact did not accept a U.S. invitation to maneuvers in West Germany, however.

No significant progress has been made toward disarmament, which was advocated in Basket One. But in general the first section, which contains sweeping statements on peace and similar lofty sentiments, has not been a problem so far.

Basket Two covers "cooperation in the field of economics, of science and technology, and of the environment." There has been movement in these fields in the past year, but it is hard to single out of on-going trends toward European coordination of this type any specific action attributable to the Final Act. No problem here, either, if also no verifiable claims of success.

It is in "cooperation in humanitarian and other fields," Basket Three, that the trouble has arisen.

Soviet bloc nations never wanted the third basket. They wanted to restrict discussion to relations between governments on security and scientific-economic matters that could be easily controlled from Communist party central committee secretariats. It was only because the West would not play ball on those terms that the Soviets agreed to negotiate on the freer movement of people and ideas.

In accepting such negotiations, General-Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev of the Soviet Communist Party added the significant qualification that humanitarian provisions must respect "the sovereignty, laws, and customs of each country" and serve "the mutual enrichment of peoples, increase the trust between them and promote the ideas of peace, freedom and good-neighborliness."

BASKET ONE COVERS

WHAT THAT CLEARLY

meant was that Warsaw Pact nations were reserving the right to interpret for themselves whether anything they signed was applicable to their rigid systems of controlling information and the movement of people.

In the negotiations the West managed to defeat most Communist attempts to insert qualifying phrases to dilute the value of Basket Three. NATO countries were supported on most key issues by neutral nations, who rejected loaded Communist definitions of human rights.

So the Final Act was signed by Brezhnev, President Ford and other leaders last Aug. 1 in Helsinki's magnificent Finlandia Hall. But addressing the conference on the hot summer day before, Brezhnev reiterated his qualifications just as if his negotiators had never given up their points in trade for border ratification and the lulling illusion of peace in Europe.

Since the signing, this Soviet attitude has been repeatedly demonstrated by an insistence that it is an interference in Soviet bloc internal affairs for the West to push for easier contact among people or a more liberal exchange of ideas and information. What democracies consider the free flow of information would mean opening Communist doors to "anti-Soviet, subversive propaganda, materials preaching violence or stirring up national and racial strife, and pornography," one Soviet commentator said.

The Helsinki signatories "make it their aim to facilitate freer movement and contacts, individually and collectively, whether privately or officially, among persons, institutions and organizations of participating states." But when some Soviet dissidents began to quote this to authorities in Moscow, they quickly found all sorts of limiting reasons being offered — or they were simply silenced.

THE COMBINATION of foreign pressure to open up their doors a crack to the fresh air of non-Communist contacts and of internal efforts to cite the Final Act against Soviet officials soured Moscow's attitude toward the agreement.

Within a few months Moscow had become defensive about it. There began a campaign, which still continues, to claim that the Soviet bloc has adhered to it faithfully but the West has not.

For instance, the controlled Communist press pub-

lished all 30,000 words of the Final Act but Western governments were allegedly afraid to let their people read its terms. The fact that the document is no more tedious and boring than the usual stuff in Communist newspapers, but no commercial paper in the West would be able to sell it, was blithely ignored.

Brezhnev continued this campaign last month in his speech to the East Berlin meeting of European Communist parties. He contended that the Soviet Union is willing to exchange ideas but the West is not. "In Britain and France," he said, "they publish six-seven times less books by Soviet authors than we in the Soviet Union publish works by English and French writers," and the West shows only a small fraction as many Soviet movies as Western movies are shown in his country.

Aside from the unreadability of Soviet books — neither Tolstoy nor Solzhenitsyn qualify, only "socialist realism" — and the boredom of officially approved movies, there is a larger principle involved. The Final Act clearly opens the way to unofficial exchanges of the kind of things people want. The Soviet Union makes the revisionist argument that exchanges should be under governmental auspices, meaning that they can be controlled in accordance with Communist ideology.

This is actually an extension of what has been happening for many years. By exploiting the free enterprise system in the West, the Soviets have been able to distribute books and other materials carrying their message, but Western material is severely restricted if not entirely banned in the East.

Brezhnev went on in his June 29 speech to deny that Communist countries are closed societies. "We are open to everything truthful and honest," he said. It's all a matter of definitions, and signatures on the Final Act have not changed the definitions used by Soviet bloc leaders.

The defensive Soviet attitude on application of the Helsinki agreement has taken the form of "trying to divert attention from the real issues," according to one U.S. official who has followed the subject closely. "They use the reciprocity issue to try to cover up their refusal to let people choose for themselves."

On one aspect, the Soviets have moved from the defense to an offensive. It is

radio broadcasting. The Final Act notes "the expansion in the dissemination of information broadcast by radio, and express(es) the hope for the continuation of this process." But foreign broadcasts break the Communist monopoly on what people are allowed to know.

BREZHNEV CHARGED that the two American-financed stations in West Germany broadcasting to the Soviet bloc, Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, "poison the international atmosphere and (are) a direct challenge to the spirit and letter of the Helsinki accords." The West considers wording of the Final Act to say the opposite.

The section on freer movement and contacts also mentions facilitating "the solution of humanitarian problems," particularly reuniting divided families. This has attracted the particular attention of people like Rep. Fenwick.

"There isn't any government department charged with looking out for human rights," she said in an interview. "No one's telling us what's happening on Basket Three." A governmental commission was needed to bring together information from federal government branches and from private agencies here and in Europe.

Fenwick said it is necessary to focus public attention on humanitarian problems in the Soviet bloc in order to get any action. "The only thing that gets somebody out" is publicity, she said, although with some smaller East European countries quiet pressure is sometimes preferable.

She added that a second purpose of the commission is to help members of Congress judge how well Communist countries are living up to their Helsinki commitments so that this can be used to judge whether they deserve to be voted "most favored nation" privileges in trade.

Some officials see a third reason as preparing a record for the conference scheduled to be held by the 35 signatory nations to review the way the Final Act has worked out after two years. The act says preparations for the review will begin in Belgrade next June 15, with the conference to be held by the end of 1977. Considering the differences so far over the shape of the bottle as well

as its contents, some observers are skeptical that the preparations will ever be completed.

SOVIET SENSITIVITY about the way the Helsinki agreement is working out was shown by a protest from Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin.

Bypassing Kissinger, with whom he virtually always deals, Dobrynin told the assistant secretary of state for European affairs, Arthur A. Hartman, that the new commission was an illegal American assumption of the right to interpret the Final Act arbitrarily and unilaterally. Hartman rejected this.

But, while defending the commission against the Soviets, the State Department has appeared from Capitol Hill to be displeased with it. One muttering has been that maybe a joint congressional-executive group is unconstitutional. Hill experts deny this, since the commission is purely investigative rather than operational.

The man named by House Speaker Carl Albert as commission chairman, Dante B. Fascell, D-Fla., wants to get it to work by the end of July. So far the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce have not designated the members which the law requires them to provide, however.

Hartman will probably be named to represent State, since Fascell wants people of assistant secretary rank from the three executive departments. Kissinger's record of defending the Helsinki agreement against critics of detente makes it a delicate job for a State Department representative to have the job of giving the commission information on Soviet failures to abide by the Final Act.

THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, June 29, 1976

Joseph Kraft

Setting the Stage for a Communist Split

Simultaneous summit meetings—one of European Communist Party bosses in East Berlin, the other grouping leaders of the advanced industrial countries in Puerto Rico—show how far the world has moved past the cold war confrontation of yore.

Inner weaknesses, not confrontation, determined the agenda of both conferences. But while the Communists are clearly in bad trouble, the United States and its allies can mend their own problems and—with a little more flexibility—foster a second major split in the Communist world.

The Russians began talking up the meeting now under way in East Berlin three or four years ago in tones of ambition run riot. According to Moscow the meeting was to condemn the Chinese Communists as heretics. It was also to accept the principle of "proletarian internationalism"—a code word for loyalty to Russia.

But virtually all the other Communist parties of Europe resisted these Soviet aims. The Yugoslavs and Rumanians, having already divorced themselves from Moscow, outspokenly opposed condemnation of Peking and acceptance of Soviet supremacy. The Italians and less independent west European parties followed suit more cautiously. Except for East Germany, the other East European countries used the occasion to wriggle a little further out from under the Russian thumb.

As the debate wore on at meeting after meeting, it became an obvious loser for the Russians. Not only did they make no headway themselves. But the Italian Communists, in particular, deliberately stood up to the Russians the better to win support at home.

The stunning gains achieved by the
Los Angeles Times

Sun., July 18, 1976

"It makes sense for the governments of North America, Western Europe and Japan to show a more flexible attitude toward local communism — to drop barriers and open dialogues."

Italian Communists in the elections last week rammed the point home. The Russians decided to call off the debate and proceed to an immediate conference in East Berlin. According to the Italian Communists whom I saw in Rome last week, it will offer precious little satisfaction to the Russians.

The document issuing from the East Berlin conference will not condemn the Chinese, nor acknowledge Soviet supremacy with the formula "proletarian internationalism." It will reassert the principle that the party of every country is entitled to find its own national way to socialism. What the Russians get is an acknowledgement that all the Communist parties are heading toward the same goal—a flig-leaf for diplomatic defeat.

As to Puerto Rico, the advanced countries talked about their No. 1 problem—economics or, more precisely, maintaining prosperity without setting off another inflationary wave. No major decisions have been taken—in large part because the U.S., Japan and West Germany all face early elections.

But there was widespread agreement that a general recovery from last year's recession is now under way. Equally that measures should be taken to hold down inflation—among them limits on government spending, on wage rises, and on barriers to the free exchange of goods including fiddling with currency rates. With a little give and take and

some special help for Italy, the United States and its allies ought to be able to achieve sustained non-inflationary prosperity for several years to come.

But in their preoccupation with their own problems, the advanced industrial countries are missing an opportunity. It is the opportunity to end the knee-jerk hostility to local Communist parties in Western Europe and Japan.

These parties are now showing steadily growing opposition to dictation from Moscow. They have acquired, especially with the U.S. and Russia negotiating under the aegis of detente, a kind of legitimacy. They cannot be fobbed off much longer by the old Red-menace argument that they are mere tools of Moscow. Moreover, some of them at least can play a constructive role in fighting inflation by holding the line on wages.

So it makes sense for the governments of North America, Western Europe and Japan to show a more flexible attitude toward local communism—to drop barriers and open dialogues. The Communists will thus have some new incentives to cooperate, and pull further from Moscow. As they take their distances from Russia, the stage is set for the next logical blow to Moscow's pretensions to world leadership—the development of a Euro-communist split off, like Communist China, from the Soviet Union.

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Drug Agency Failing to Curb Traffic

WASHINGTON (AP)—A reorganization intended to strengthen federal efforts to combat illicit drug traffic has failed, Senate investigators said Saturday.

In the three years since the Drug Enforcement Administration was established, the nation's illicit drug traffic has increased, a report of the permanent investigations subcommittee, a unit of the Senate Government Operations Committee, said.

"The number of drug addicts continues to increase at a rapid rate, brown heroin from Mexico continues to come into this country in massive amounts, and drug abuse continues to spread into rural and suburban areas," it said.

In comments on the report, Peter Bensinger, DEA administrator, said that although the agency welcomed and needed the interest of the committee, "the findings of this report, simply put, are dated."

"They may represent the committee findings on past DEA operations, but do not portray DEA's mission or strategies in July, 1976," he said in a statement.

The subcommittee's report was based on an investigation and hearings conducted last year.

It said that "although DEA has presented statistics to demonstrate considerable numbers of arrests of violators and seizures of illicit drugs, the ability of higher-echelon dealers and financiers to ring illicit drugs into the United States has not been effectively deterred."

The subcommittee said the agency had concentrated too much on pursuing low-level drug dealers and addicts and not enough on conspiracy cases targeted against high-level narcotics traffickers.

It also complained of a lack of cooperation in exchanging information between the agency and the U.S. Customs Service, which is responsible for protecting the nation's borders and ports of entry against smugglers.

Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), acting chairman of the subcommittee, said in a statement accompanying the report that the agency and the Customs Service had "declared war on each other—not on the big-time, international narcotics smugglers and dealers."

The drug agency was established in the Department of Justice on July 1, 1973, under an executive order of President Richard M. Nixon consolidating the enforcement functions of a number of agencies.

Eastern Europe

THE ECONOMIST JULY 3, 1976

Between Brezhnev's toes

The Polish workers who ripped up the railway line outside Warsaw on June 25th to stop their government putting up the price of food may have given the signal for a change of western policy towards the Soviet empire. It is no longer necessary to assume that any change for the better in Russia's dependencies in eastern Europe can be brought about only through the approval of Mr Brezhnev; maybe it can be done despite Mr Brezhnev.

On the same day as Polish strikers were vetoing their government's price policy, Mr Henry Kissinger was saying in London that the Americans "recognise no spheres of influence and no pretensions to hegemony" in eastern Europe. That is not quite how his assistant Mr Helmut Sonnenfeldt put it last December: Mr Sonnenfeldt said that the smaller east European countries ought to become more independent of Russia, but then he ruffled the hawks' feathers by adding "within the context of a strong Soviet geopolitical influence." Mr Kissinger has deleted that complaisant phrase. What is the connection between the Soviet Union's relationship with the governments of eastern Europe and the problems those governments face in dealing with their own peoples? It is that, for the past 10 years, the west has acted as if the key to change in eastern Europe lay exclusively in Moscow: as if nothing could be done to improve the lot of Poles and Czechoslovaks and the rest without the blessing of the Soviet government. For three reasons, it is time to ask whether that western policy is still the right one.

The policy that ran into the stops

First, the policy of concentrating on Moscow has achieved just about as much as it was ever likely to achieve, which was not very much. Back in the late 1960s it made sense to think that the road to change in eastern Europe would have to run through Mr Brezhnev's office. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 appeared to confirm the lesson of the Soviet interventions in East Germany in 1953 and Hungary in 1956: nothing could happen in Russia's dominions, it then seemed, that Russia did not like. And indeed, in Russia itself, the west's decision to focus its efforts on influencing Russian policy did produce some modest benefits. It was western pressure that helped to get exit permits for quite a lot of Soviet Jews, and some other dissidents as well; it is the scrutiny of the western media that has kept some of the other dissidents who remain in Russia out of prison. This willingness by Mr Brezhnev to let a few hornets go on buzzing has spread into the more liberal east European countries, such as Poland and Hungary. But in what matters most to Mr Brezhnev—the preservation by communist governments of all the rest of their apparatus of political and economic control—the Soviet Union's leader has made it quite plain that there will be no change if he can help it.

Second, however, it has begun to look as if he may not be able to help it, at least as much as he originally thought. The long delayed conference of all Europe's communist parties which was eventually held in East Berlin this week confirms that Mr Brezhnev's power to give orders to other communists is much more limited than it used to be. The slogan of "proletarian internationalism"—meaning do as Moscow tells you—made no appearance at the conference; and Mr Brezhnev was obliged to listen to Rumanian and Spanish communists telling him that each communist party should do what it thinks is in its own best interests.

In the short run, this may not do much for the east Europeans who have Soviet divisions squatting on their territory. But in the longer run the sight of Italian and Spanish communists insisting on going their own way—and, which is the heart of the matter, winning public support by doing so—is unlikely to go unnoticed by the governments in Warsaw and Budapest, and even in Prague and East Berlin.

Third, therefore, it is important to note this past week's evidence that eastern Europe is by no means the docile and quiescent place the Russians have spent the past few years trying to make it seem. *The Economist* had better make it clear that, on the economics of the issue which blew up in Poland last week, we think the Polish government was right and its worker-opponents wrong. Food prices in Poland have been kept artificially static, partly by holding down the real incomes of farmers while the real wages of industrial workers have risen quite fast, but mainly by subsidies which now take up almost 8% of the national income. These are nonsense, and will have to be stopped some time. But the real point of the Poles' protests on June 25th is a lesson for the communist world's politicians, not its economists.

The Polish explosion shows that even in the most economically successful of all the communist states—Poland claims that its real gross national product has been going up on average by over 10% a year in the past four years—a large number of industrial workers still feel disgruntled enough to resort to violence rather than accept a modest, temporary and economically rational check in the improvement of their living standards. It also shows that they can make their protest stick: the people, when they feel strongly enough, have a veto on the party's will. But it can hardly have escaped the attention of the Polish government, and of the other east European governments, that a system which jerks between the party's yea and the urban population's nay is a peculiar way to run a country. The isolation of Poland's communist party from the public opinion it claims to represent has not been cured by Mr Gierek's perfectly genuine attempt in recent years to meet more people, and explain his policies better, than most other communist leaders do.

The moral of the Polish affair is a radical one. If communist parties are not to keep on losing contact with public opinion, they will have to change the way they organise themselves; which means introducing the principle of pluralism; which means abandoning Lenin's idea of a monolithic and all-powerful party, which is the basis of the way all communist parties except (perhaps) a few west European ones now organise themselves.

What the west can do

All this suggests that there is more possibility of change in the smaller east European countries than there is in the ironclad rigidity of the Soviet Union itself; and that the western democracies should look to these countries, rather than to Russia, as the focus of their eastern policy. Can the west do anything to help a gradual and controlled liberalisation of eastern Europe? Yes. For instance:

- It can make it clear to these countries that they have rather more scope for running their affairs in ways Mr Brezhnev may not enjoy than some of them perhaps realise. Hungary runs a looser (and therefore more efficient) economic planning system than Russia does.

Poland allows its middle class a bit more freedom of speech and travel, and has a decollectivised peasantry. Rumania runs a markedly non-Brezhnev-type foreign policy. If an east European country tried to combine, say, two of these measures of independence, it is unlikely that the Russia of the second half of the 1970s would intervene to prevent it by force—because such behaviour would cost Russia dear in its hopes of western economic assistance, and in its already fragile influence over the communists of western Europe.

- The west could shape its credit policy, including helping to finance the movement of western technology into parts of the communist world, so that more of its economic help goes to those east European countries which show most signs of liberalising themselves. This year's West German deal with Poland gave the Poles a large, cheap loan in return for their release of more ethnic Germans who want to go and live in Germany. It would make even better sense for future help to be steered towards countries that seem to be loosening the Leninist system—because such countries' economies are likely to work more efficiently.

- The EEC might offer to include more east European

WASHINGTON POST

15 JUL 1976

Defending the Penkovsky Papers' Authenticity

Some weeks ago Stephen Rosenfeld stated in an article that the Church committee had proved the Penkovsky Papers to have been fabricated or falsified by the CIA. This has since been asserted as fact in your editorial columns. May I, as one much involved in the original controversy on the subject, point out that this is not so?

The Church committee merely said, "the book was prepared by witting Agency assets who drew on actual case materials." It said this in passing in a section of its report criticizing the CIA on the different matter—and one far less grave than falsification—of concealing the source of the material from the publisher. (It is surely far from being a principle of American journalism that the rather perfunctory concealment of a source should be thought to invalidate a document.) The committee's phrase as it stands could perhaps at a pinch be construed to mean forgery. But if it had meant to charge the CIA with this serious crime, it would

certainly have made it a major point in the indictment and would have asserted it flatly and unambiguously. The natural interpretation of the sentence is that those sections of Col. Penkovsky's reports which were not of intelligence interest were edited and arranged by a friendly intermediary. The book as it appeared in fact contained a good deal of commentary quite explicitly written not by Penkovsky but by the editor. This has never been at issue and is not relevant to the present charges.

Mr. Rosenfeld cited Victor Zorza as having, at the time, thrown doubt on the authenticity of the book on internal textual grounds. True, but his objections were almost unanimously rejected by students as eccentric and without substance. We are now told, solely on the basis of the Church committee's remark, that the inauthenticity is established. Mr. Rosenfeld found it possible to quote with approval a Soviet description of the papers as a

countries in its system of generalised preferences. So far only Rumania enjoys this advantage, because only Rumania has decided to brush aside Russian disapproval; but others might risk it later. And helping eastern Europe is another argument for reforming the EEC's common agricultural policy; if the CAP were changed to put less reliance on the common price system which helps rich farmers and poor alike, and more on direct subsidies for the poorer ones, there might be room for the east Europeans to sell more of their (very good) farm produce to west Europeans.

None of this, it should be clear, is within a mile of the "rollback" policy that John Foster Dulles talked about in the early 1950s. It would not re-establish a pre-communist system in eastern Europe. Its aim would be to encourage those communist parties in the region which see the advantage of trying to move in the direction in which Mr Berlinguer's Italian Communists claim to be pointing. The west's reply to "proletarian internationalism" is self-determination; and it should help the people of eastern Europe who want to try to struggle out from under Mr Brezhnev's toes.

"coarse fraud, a mixture of provocative invention and anti-Soviet slander." And he specified as false the accounts of "high-livers" and "first-strikers" among the Soviet elite. (The papers do not, as he implied, say that this was universal.) All evidence, including public evidence, shows that both these rather different types are indeed not uncommon in Soviet political and military circles.

It will be plain that the Church committee provided no new information at all—and its very absence tends to confirm the official story. There is, in fact, no evidence whatever that the papers were in any sense faked, or that the material attributed to Col. Penkovsky was in any way fabricated. Proof positive of their authenticity is a matter for the CIA. The agency has been accused of procuring a falsification. I hope it will now settle the question once and for all.

ROBERT CONQUEST

Washington

NEW YORK TIMES

26 JUN 1976

A Soviet Scientist Is Critical of Ford On Human Rights

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, June 25 — The highest-ranking Soviet scientist to apply for emigration accused President Ford today of indifference to violations of human rights in the Soviet Union and elsewhere.

In an open letter to the President, Veniamin G. Levich, a physical chemist and corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences, stressed that he was not making an appeal for help in his case but a more general call for a reassessment of American policy.

"We want a President who is for détente," he said in an

interview, "but who will not forget the humanitarian problems."

In his letter, Mr. Levich asked: "Why have those who have been waiting for long agonizing years in this country for their legitimate rights to be implemented never sensed any moral support either from you, Mr. President, or from any one of your Administration?"

Noting Administration contentions that "one should trust in the efficiency of quiet diplomacy," especially on the question of Jewish emigration, Mr. Levich declared:

"No one sensible can deny that there is certainly plenty of scope for this sort of diplomacy. In this case, however, the voice of quiet diplomacy was so quiet that hardly anyone could hear it."

After a surge in the number of Jews permitted to leave for

Israel, a flow that reached an estimated 35,000 people in 1973, the number dropped last year to 11,700, according to official statistics.

The drop occurred after Moscow had rejected an arrangement linking favorable United States regulations for trade with the Soviet Union to progress on the relaxation of Soviet restrictions on emigration. The linkage, known as the Jackson amendment after its author, Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, was opposed by both the Nixon and Ford Administrations as counterproductive.

Mr. Levich said he could not be sure how far the Soviet Government would yield to American pressure on human rights. But he said that emigration, or as he put it, "one of the fundamental human freedoms, the free choice of country of resi-

dence," could be catalyst for broader liberalization within Soviet political and social life.

"If those who want to emigrate can do so freely, that has a great significance for those who stay behind," he said in an interview with Western correspondents. "Each state with free emigration must address itself to its internal problems, and this promotes the liberalization of the whole society."

Western Europe

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
25 June 1976

Italy's stay of execution

I SUPPOSE that a condemned man who is told, on the morning he was to be hanged, that he has been granted a stay of execution feels a certain sense of relief. But this is the only kind of satisfaction that can be derived from the results of Italy's elections.

This might seem a curious way to sum up the outcome of elections in which the Italian voters did not do either of the two things that had most been feared. They did not give more votes to the Communists than to Christian Democrats, and they did not give an overall majority to the Left. So the entry of the Communists into the Government is not yet inevitable. But it is very much in doubt whether Italy is governable without them.

The Communists have gained a considerable moral victory, increasing their vote in the polls for the Lower House by over 7 per cent. They are confident, disciplined, and ready to bide their time—especially since they want to avoid shouldering any of the blame for the country's economic crisis and have built up a formidable power base through the regional governments they control. A further reason why Signor Berlinguer is in no great hurry is that he knows that the arrival of the Communists in power (except as part of a coalition including Christian Democrats) is the one thing that might finally bring the confused and fractious anti-Marxist forces together and produce a vigorous public reaction.

In contrast, the democratic parties are left floundering without any apparent sense of direction. Fear of the Communist danger did move a third of the people who voted for the Neo-Fascist MSI in 1972 to switch their votes to the Christian Democrats—but they were only just enough to make up for the Christian Democrat voters who defected to the Left.

The smaller parties of the Centre that might, united, have supplied a viable alternative for voters who are fed up with the corruption and economic incompetence of the Christian Democrat establishment were virtually wiped off the slate. So the creation of a new Government depends on a renewed courtship between those aged divorcees, the Christian Democrats and the Socialists. The Socialists swore blind during the elections that they would not go back into government without the Communists. But if the Christian Democrats offer them rich enough rewards—including the Presidency of the Republic—they will no doubt remember that promises are only promises.

Which could lead only to another

ROBERT MOSS on a Communist threat that will not go away

rudderless Government, after an interlude of rudderless non-government. Given the near-total disarray of the non-Marxist forces, the lira in an even sorer state than the pound and major strikes looming, it is hardly surprising that many people who are far from being Marxists have turned wistfully towards the Communists. Maybe they can govern, the argument goes. Anyway, it would force the other lot to get rid of the crooks and tired old men so a decent anti-Communist Government could emerge later.

This is a seductive argument, but it must be resisted—and also publicly resisted by Italy's friends abroad—not just because a Communist is a Communist is a Communist (and not just a social reformer or a liberal in a hurry) but because Italy is too crucial to the precarious strategic balance in the Mediterranean for the West to tolerate a Chilean-style "experiment" to determine whether Signor Berlinguer is what he says he is. The Italian Communists have succeeded in convincing a surprising number of people that their entry into government would not jeopardise the country's relations with Nato, the EEC or the Western bankers, and this helped them in the elections.

The Italian Communists were compared in the *Guardian* the other day to the British Labour party. Now, I would not dispute for a moment that there are a fair number of people in the Labour party who would not feel at all ill-at-ease in Signor Berlinguer's party, so long as they could learn to eat pasta instead of potatoes. But the point is that Signor Berlinguer's party is a Marxist-Leninist party in which each member is subjected to that system of "democratic centralism" which is about as far away from genuine democracy as you can get. For instance the editors of *L'Unità* censor Signor Berlinguer's own speeches when he says something overly revisionist in order to woo the middle-class voter. In an interview with *Corriere della Sera* shortly before the elections he expressed qualified enthusiasm for Nato: from a Marxist-Leninist viewpoint there was no contradiction involved in publishing something in a national paper and then suppressing it in the party organ. By talking that way to *Corriere*, he was making another tactical move towards the peaceful assumption of power; the editors of *L'Unità* were reassuring the party faithful

that if the Communists do come to power, they will behave exactly as they have in the past.

Nato at risk

Whatever we feel about Signor Berlinguer and his friends, it remains irrefutable that their entry into government would put at risk Nato's entire southern flank.

This is why it is still more urgent now than it was before June 20 for Western leaders to make it clear that an Italian Government that included Communists would be viewed rather differently than a Government that did not. Dr Kissinger was widely criticised for his pre-election talk about how a Communist victory in Italy would be "unacceptable." It may well be that it is not much good talking this way unless you are clear about what sanctions the West would apply if such a thing actually came about. But I believe that, on balance, it was better to have spoken as he did rather than to have kept silent or, worse still, to have made complacent or sympathetic noises à la Olof Palme or Willy Brandt.

The British Government maintained a silence that was punctuated only by a remarkable leak. On June 15, the pro-Communist paper *Paese Sera* published a lengthy article based on a summary of an off-the-record briefing that Mr Crosland had given to diplomatic correspondents. Mr Crosland was quoted as saying that the Italian Communist party had "evolved in a European direction" and that he did not consider that its entry into government would pose a serious threat to Nato.

Mr Winston Churchill, M.P., has now tabled a question to Mr Crosland. But whether or not the Crosland quotations were accurate, there is no doubt that the resounding silence of the British Government was interpreted by Berlinguer as a blessing.

The same thing must not happen again. It should be made clear that not all would be sweetness and light between Italy and Nato (or between Italy and the Western bankers) if the Communists gain power.

I am not calling for the ostracism of Italy in such an event, still less for a total break with Nato. I am calling, instead, for a system of "incentives and penalties"—to use the now somewhat tarnished phrase that was initially applied by Dr Kissinger to the management of détente with the Russians.

Under such a system, the aid and credits that are currently going to bolster the sagging Italian economy would be granted (if granted at all) only if the Italian Government respected certain clearly defined conditions, with full guarantees for the free Press and the security of the Nato bases rating high on the list. Communist or pro-Communist officials would be ruthlessly kept out of Nato counsels. Despite its status as one

of the four permanent members of Nato's Nuclear Planning Group, Italy would have to be excluded from many sensitive discussions.

But such a system of controls could not remove the strategic dangers that the new situation would present. America's nuclear stockpile and naval and air bases would be in jeopardy, as would Nato's system of air surveillance and communications. Israel's vulnerability would be increased in

the event of a new Middle East war.

These are sufficient reasons for Western leaders to sound a note of warning to the Italian public. Such warnings sometimes backfire. But it is better to risk that than to tolerate a situation in which the Communists have succeeded in reassuring at least a part of the Italian electorate that Italy's relationships with the West would remain fundamentally unchanged if they took office.

Los Angeles Times

Mon., July 12, 1976

Berufsverbot Gone Berserk

West Germany is concerned about protecting its flowering, but still shallow-rooted, democratic institutions that grew out of the shambles of World War II. But it seems to have overreacted in the application of a policy popularly known as "berufsverbot"—a ban on performing a job or following one's profession.

The policy is designed to prevent extremists of the right and left from joining the civil service of federal and state agencies—a device to protect democracy from those who would destroy it.

But some see in it the specter of totalitarian conformity, and former Chancellor Willy Brandt, a champion of German democracy, is having second thoughts about it. Brandt's government, in 1972, urged vigorous application of the policy as part of a postwar program to prevent a resurgence of totalitarianism.

Critics say the policy is invoked against leftists and Communists while leaving rightists and former Nazis untouched.

Berufsverbot is determined through a security check, which supporters say is little different from that of other West European countries, on whether a civil service applicant is a supporter or opponent of democracy. Such applicants, like those in other parts of Western Europe, are also required to take a loyalty oath—a requirement that predates berufsverbot.

There are conflicting claims on the impact of the policy. One anti-berufsverbot group says that 750,000 persons have been investigated, and that 1,200 of them have been turned down because of their political views or past activities, such as taking part in antiwar demonstrations.

But before there is a rush to judgment over such statistics, it is important to bear in mind the peculiarities of West Germany.

Besides having the fragility of a young democracy, the nation is especially vulnerable to antidemocratic forces. It is continuously under assault from the Communist north and east by spies and subversive groups.

There are an estimated 15,000 espionage agents at work against the government at any one time, an affliction that is far worse than that affecting

other Western governments.

These agents have infiltrated the highest reaches of government, and even the inner sanctums of Bonn's security services. Brandt resigned the chancellorship in 1974 because of the discovery of an East German spy among his aides.

Because of the postwar split of Germany into east and west portions, most of the spies are East Germans who enjoy a unique advantage in undermining democratic institutions. They share a common language and cultural tradition with West Germans that enables them to infiltrate such institutions with relative ease.

Then there is the determined antidemocratic movement among non- and anti-Communists like the notorious Baader-Meinhof gang, which has assaulted West Germany with bombings, kidnappings and assassinations.

From the west and south of the nation there are suspicion and jealousy, which do little to fertilize West German democracy.

The suspicion is based on history. The jealousy is based on West Germany's emergence as a world power that has brought unprecedented freedom and prosperity to its people. Through self-discipline and hard work, the nation has made the most of Marshall Plan dollars in achieving a largely successful mix of social democracy and enlightened capitalism.

As such, West Germany stands as an affront to the totalitarian right and left. Antidemocratic forces cannot point to West Germany, as they might to Italy, and say the days of enlightened free enterprise are doomed. Thus, to provide credibility to their claims, such forces must attack West Germany with special vigor. This is no doubt a factor in the opposition to berufsverbot.

There is also no doubt that there have been abuses in the policy, just as there have been abuses by the FBI and CIA in attempting to protect the institutions of this country.

Like the United States, West Germany must do all in its power to eliminate—through democratic means—those abuses, and if need be abandon or amend its berufsverbot policy to conform with its postwar ideals.

THE ECONOMIST
17 July 1976

Norway

The little hut

FROM OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

Kirkenes

A pale yellow wooden summerhouse is up for sale outside Kirkenes, 150 miles north of the Arctic circle. It is just like thousands of others in northern Norway, although it commands a fine view to the east and overlooks a first

rate salmon river. Yet the government has decided to buy it and destroy it, because it stands just 10 yards from the border line with the Soviet Union. The Norwegians fear that the house might be taken over by the CIA or at least by somebody with unfriendly intentions towards the Russians. They do not want any awkward incidents.

The border is marked by two rows of striped posts and a wire fence to stop reindeer straying across. The skyline is dotted with occasional watchtowers

raised above the forest, but no troops are in sight. Relations between the Norwegian and Russian border commissioners have never been better. The two men meet regularly to share a vodka and sort out routine problems. In between meetings, they are linked by a "hot line"; said to be the world's second because it was installed after the Washington-Moscow link. The telephone at the Norwegian end is an ancient crank-handle model, but is painted bright red.

The Kirkenes locals still remember that northern Norway was one of the few regions of Europe which the Russians liberated during the second world war and then withdrew from. Here at any rate, it seems, detente is alive and well.

Yet the nominal border line is deceptive. The border where the Soviet Union actually begins lies several miles away, beyond the Pasvik river and shrouded by pine trees. It is marked by a high barbed-wire fence and is patrolled by border guards. Their efficiency is simply measured: no refugees have succeeded in escaping into Norway in recent years. Behind the line, the Russians keep a tight check on all movement in the area, so that most would-be escapers cannot get anywhere near the frontier.

The military importance of this Arctic area is greater than it seems. In the Kola peninsula Russia maintains a large part of its strategic nuclear capacity. Its population has increased from 360,000 in 1940 to 1m today. Murmansk and the adjacent ports are the only Soviet ones with direct and ice-free

access to the Atlantic, and some 180 submarines are based there. There are also, in round figures, 110,000 military and civilian personnel stationed there (including two army divisions and a naval infantry brigade), 200 combat ships, 200 naval patrol aircraft and 300 fighter-bombers.

See no evil

The naval and military build-up in the Kola peninsula is still going on, and the defence ministers of Scandinavian countries have been voicing understandable anxiety about it. The three Norwegian observers who were recently allowed to attend a Soviet exercise north of Leningrad under the terms of the Helsinki agreement did not see much, and Nato experts do not expect the agreement to make any practical difference. Indeed, General Sir John Sharp, the British commander-in-chief of Nato's northern forces, recently claimed that the build-up in the Kola peninsula represented "the most important strategic threat to the western alliance at present". This is one reason why Nato chiefs have been pressing

Norway and Denmark to increase their defence budgets.

Nato has asked the Norwegians for a 4½% annual growth in real defence spending. Norway is unlikely to agree to such a big rise, despite its new oil wealth, but a defence commission set up by the government is likely to recommend some rise when it reports later this year.

Nato is also trying to improve its ability to resist a Soviet invasion of Norway. It is thinking about preparing a stockpile of equipment, including tanks and trucks, for use by other Nato troops, like the British and Canadians, if troops had to be airlifted in a hurry. At present, however, the Norwegians will not allow any foreign troops or nuclear weapons to be based in Norway. They fear that the Russians would see this as a Cuba-like threat. This is the dilemma for Norway: it wants to improve its defences, but also to avoid doing anything which the Russians could interpret as a provocation. That is why a yellow summer-house on the border will shortly be only a pile of firewood.

NEW YORK TIMES

9 July 1976

U.S. NATO FORCE CALLED 'UNREADY'

G.A.O. Report on German Unit
Cites Personnel Shortages,
Equipment Problems

By JOHN W. FINNEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 8—A General Accounting Office investigation has established that the readiness of United States Army armored units in Western Europe is "woefully deficient," Senator Hubert H. Humphrey said today.

The Minnesota Democrat made the statement in making public a digest of a classified report by the G.A.O. on the readiness of frontline armored units stationed in West Germany.

The G.A.O., the investigative arm of Congress, found that the units suffered personnel shortages, ammunition supply problems and deficiencies in their equipment. Despite these shortcomings, the report said, the units "continued to report that they were substantially ready with minor deficiencies."

Part of the problem, the digest of the report suggested, is that army standards for computing and reporting on readiness "have been relaxed to the point where units could almost always be reported as combat-ready."

Not Fully Manned

The office, which undertook its investigation at the request of Senator Humphrey, found that because of serious person-

nel shortages, particularly among skilled enlisted men, not all of the armored vehicles were fully manned.

Without giving specific figures, the digest said that many of the vehicles were not combat-ready, largely because of problems with their radio equipment.

Among the ammunition problems cited in the report were lack of adequate storage areas, insufficient information on serviceable ammunition, inadequate access roads to stockpiles, not enough tools to cut the banding around ammunition boxes and a lack of conveyors to expedite loading.

In one instance, Senator Humphrey said, drawing from the classified portion of the report, a unit of the First Armored Division did not have a set of keys to the ammunition bunkers and would have to travel about an hour to obtain one.

'Serious Mismanagement'

"There is, in my judgment," Senator Humphrey said, "serious mismanagement and inefficiency in our European forces and in the program that is supposed to assure the combat-readiness of those forces."

"It should be emphasized that these problems are the result of management inadequacies within the army. They have not been caused by inadequate support from Congress or the taxpayer."

The Defense Department had no immediate comment on Senator Humphrey's statement. In the past, however, army officials have emphasized that the readiness of the forces had suffered because of Congressional cuts in the defense budget, particularly in the operations and maintenance accounts.

At the same time, army leaders have emphasized that the combat-readiness, which a few years ago was acknowledged to be low, has been improving as

the divisions in Europe, stripped of their skilled personnel for the Vietnam War, were rebuilt.

The G.A.O. said that many of the problems cited in its report were recognized by the United States Army command in Europe, which it said was moving "actively and positively" to eliminate the deficiencies.

Indirectly, the readiness of

NEW YORK TIMES

16 July 1976

RED BID TO SUBVERT ALLIED TROOPS SEEN

LONDON, July 15 (UPI)—Communist and other extreme left-wing groups are stepping up efforts to subvert allied forces in Europe, with American soldiers "a particularly tempting target," the Foreign Affairs Research Institute said today.

An institute study said subversive campaigns against United States servicemen in Europe were directed in large part against blacks and Puerto Ricans.

"The threat to the loyalty of armed forces in Western Europe must be taken seriously," it said, describing American forces in the Western alliance

as "a particularly tempting target for the professional agitator."

According to the study, "Servicemen and women who are away from their home environment and carrying out a deterrent role with its attendant dangers of boredom can become disaffected relatively easily. This applies particularly to ethnic minority groups such as blacks and Puerto Ricans."

The study for the privately financed body was written by Anthony Burton, described as a lecturer and writer, who served 16 years in the British Army.

Near East

WASHINGTON POST

21 JUL 1976

Israel Apparently Aiding Beirut Right

By Joseph Fitchett

Special to The Washington Post

BEIRUT—Lebanon's Maronite Christian forces, displaying new military muscle, are apparently receiving direct but covert military aid from Israel.

Evidence in the field, calculated indiscretions by Christian politicians, the street mood on the Christian side and unattributable statements by Western diplomats in Arab capitals all tend to confirm it.

An ambassador who is closely involved called it an "objective concurrence of interests" among the Lebanese Christians, Syria and Israel. The United States has not lodged any complaints to anyone about the practical steps by the three in furtherance of their mutuality of interest, U.S. officials confirm privately.

A key factor in the recent strengthening of Christian forces is the supplies of new, heavier materiel pouring into their arsenals.

The main Christian port, Jounieh, was closed last week for days, and Palestinian intelligence reports say that during that period, two large shiploads of heavy-appearing armored vehicles were landed. This weaponry is expected to appear in a new drive in which the Christian militias attempt to follow up their recent victories and expand the zone under their control to include the hills above Beirut.

New equipment is only part of the explanation of bolstered Christian boldness. Equally important is the manifest confidence of Christian commanders that more materiel can be obtained promptly and in quantity. This has convinced military observers that Christian arms procurers, who initially had to shop around from arms dealers all over the world, now can obtain their supplies directly from the military inventories of a government that itself has good delivery facilities to the Christian enclave.

Christian commanders say their forces now have all the weaponry which their troops can absorb — a marked change from the earlier phases of the 15-month-old war.

Christian fighters brandish their weapons, claiming that the NATO-style assault rifles come from Israel and pointing to the serial numbers and insignia scraped off the gun and leather sling. On conquered buildings, Christians scrawl a Star of David as readily as a Cedar tree, the symbol of Lebanon.

Part of this reaction is natural defiance of an Arab enemy, perceived as the Palestinians. Part reflects the Maronite Christians' desire, as a minority people, to view themselves as "Israelis"—Western-minded, capable achievers beating back a numerically superior Moslem tide. It also reflects a common sense conviction among the Christian rank-and-file that Israel is providing help on the theory that my enemy's enemy is my friend.

At a deeper level, the Christian mood stems from nervousness about relying on the regime of Syrian strongman, President Hafez Assad. While the Christians believe they fit Assad's strategy of weakening the Palestinians to facilitate an Arab-Israeli settlement, they realize that a coup or an assassin's bullet could change Syrian policy.

In that case, they see Israel as the only potential savior—a Jewish state which would be happy to have a Maronite Christian partner as an allied island in a Moslem Arab sea.

While recent Maronite military successes have depended heavily on Syrian support, many Maronite leaders expect Syria eventually to tip the balance in the other direction, once the Palestinians have been humbled. Such divide-and-conquer tactics were used to rule this region by the colonial French. By tightening

their links, both Israel and the Maronites have signaled to Syria that they are determined to help one another to resist any attempt to establish Syrian hegemony over Lebanon.

In the Lebanese war's initial stages, Christian leaders procured a range of weaponry, mostly automatic arms, from a wide variety of sources from dealers in Western Europe to the hard currency-hungry state agencies of Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria.

Then, Israeli-supplied arms, suitably untraceable, were also reaching the Lebanese Christians via Cyprus. Turkish radio has charged that the EOKA-B Greek Cypriot underground, which sympathizes with Lebanese Christians fighting Moslems, was also useful in this connection.

This system was costly, unreliable and rarely able to furnish heavy arms of the kind the Christian forces needed after war escalated last spring, when the regular army dissolved and took various sides with stolen tanks and artillery.

When the Maronites were combing the arms markets last year, Israeli agents were able to provide valuable help. Israel is known to have strong contacts in parallel arms markets because of the Jewish state's concern to have alternate arms sources in case weapons deliveries from an ally were to be halted, as France did in 1968.

The Israeli government apparently decided to go over to direct assistance to the Christians this spring. The results began to show in June.

Commercial skippers in the eastern Mediterranean report dense traffic at night off the Christian-controlled coast. The information in the region's ports is that the traffic is coming from Israel to Jounieh.

The Christian-held coast teems now with barges of the type that could unload armored cars from a tramp steamer in international water and carry them to the small jetties, recently built in tiny coves.

By getting weapons directly from Israel, the Maronite forces enjoy many advantages over their previous method of shopping around. Heavier weapons are involved, deliveries are faster, resupply is more reliable and there is a degree of standardization.

The Palestinians so far have been unable to identify positively the Christians' equipment or its source since nothing significant has been captured. It is deployed on fronts where the Palestinians are relatively weak and unlikely to capture it.

But the Israelis have large stocks of Soviet-made weapons captured from Egypt and Syria in two Middle East wars. These could be used, as "sanitized" arms, for an operation of this kind. Israel helped previous minority revolts such as those of Iraq's Kurds and Sudan's southerners which challenged the hegemony of Arab nationalism represented today by the Palestinian guerrillas.

The "Israeli connection" is widely said to be former Lebanese President Camille Chamoun, leader of the second largest Christian militia. A hawk in the Maronite camp, Chamoun, whose own house was looted by Palestinians, has said publicly that he will never lay down arms until the Palestinians are eliminated as a military threat in Lebanon.

Repeatedly there have been public allusions, from Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and others, to recent arms deals between Chamoun and the Israelis.

Another hawkish Christian leader, Charbel Cassis, a monk, visits Israel regularly to perform pastoral duties for Maronite Arab Christian monks there.

Recent Western visitors to Israel report a widespread general assumption and acceptance there that Israel is supplying military aid to Lebanon's Maronite fighters.

This support is implicitly justified in Israeli propaganda, heard here on Israeli overseas broadcasts, which argues that Israel is the only government ready to help Lebanon's Christian minority, who have been abandoned, this argument runs, by Western governments intimidated by their humiliations in Southeast Asia and by the growing power of oil-rich Moslem States.

Maronite Christian politicians share the tacit assumption behind this Israeli analysis that Arab oil power will peak within the decade and then states with strong Western connections—like Israel has already and like a Maronite-dominated Leba-

non would seek avidly—will come back into their own.

The timing of the Israeli-Lebanese Christian effort to step up their covert cooperation stemmed apparently from several considerations.

Militarily, Lebanese Christians were being rolled back last spring, making them psychologically ready to take help "from the devil himself," as one spokesman put it.

The Christians' alliance with Syria against the PLO

gave Israel an extra incentive and also insured that Arab regimes implicitly against the PLO would be less likely to publicize and criticize the Christians' new links.

Early in the Lebanese war, the Lebanese Christians received substantial financial help from conservative Arab states including Saudi Arabia. Payments ordered by Saudi intermediaries totalling more than \$200 million were reported ear-

lier by American bankers here familiar with the transactions.

But Saudi Arabian help apparently ceased early this year, shortly after newspaper photographs circulated in the Arab world showing cross-wearing Christian fighters mistreating and humiliating Moslems in Karantina, a Moslem slum here razed by the Christians.

The ready willingness of American and European diplomats here and elsewhere

in the Middle East to confirm the Israeli connection has aroused some suspicion that the prominent Israeli role might actually be a cover for assistance from American and European countries.

CIA sources here have confirmed that the agency assisted a Christian militia with a program of stockpiling light arms in the 1950s as part of the agency's use of minorities to stop any Communist advance.

WASHINGTON POST

18 JUL 1976

Marxist Challenges Sadat's Economics

By Thomas W. Lippman
Washington Post Foreign Service

CAIRO—A Marxist member of the original group of officers who helped Gamal Abdel Nasser overthrow the Egyptian monarchy in 1952 has returned to political prominence as the leader of a new leftist organization that opposes many of the policies of the current government.

He is Khaled Mohieddin, 55, a former cavalry officer who was recently selected to head the National Progressive Unionists, one of three political groupings whose creation was authorized in Marcy by President Anwar Sadat.

In his new role he exerts little if any direct influence on the course of Egyptian affairs, but he hopes to change that by leading his group to a strong showing against government candidates in this fall's parliamentary elections.

The Peoples Assembly, thoroughly dominated by supporters of Sadat, "will move left this year," Mohieddin predicted in an interview. The Egyptian people, he said, are disillusioned with the results of Sadat's economic open-door policy, which has benefited only the "parasite classes and land speculators" and will show their feelings in their votes this October.

That kind of talk is unusual in contemporary Egypt, but it could become more common as the country moves into the new political phase opened by Sadat when he authorized the creation of the new political groupings.

Egypt abolished political

parties after the revolution and the new groups are not officially classified as parties. During the national debate that preceded their establishment, many Egyptians who remember the misdeeds of the old prerevolutionary parties warned that a return to the party system could be a disservice to the country.

Sadat, who has been gradually liberalizing the political climate, decided instead to authorize the creation of three "forums" or "platforms" within the Arab Socialist Union, the country's sole legal political body since it was created by Nasser.

Beneath their cumbersome official names, the three forums are commonly referred to as right, center and left, and the full weight of the pro-Sadat political establishment has come down heavily in the center group. Its leader is Sadat's Prime Minister, Mamdouh Salem, and its secretary general is Mahmoud Abu Wafia, Sadat's brother-in-law.

The government-controlled press supports the center and Mohieddin is regularly criticized on front pages. The sheikhs of Mosques all over Egypt are reportedly urging the faithful in their Friday sermons not to join the leftist forum.

Under the circumstances, Mohieddin said, the creation of the forums is hardly true democracy but "it's a start. It's not bad. I have the right to come down into the street and present my program, which I didn't have before. And after the elections, we will be a political party,

whether they call it that or not. We will make our views known and we will have our supporters in the assembly."

He said his group has no hope of winning a majority of the 350 seats—outside analysts say 10 per cent would be too high a goal—but that he is aiming less for short-run political gains than for long-term changes in attitude among the Egyptian people.

Mohieddin and Sadat were both members of the "Free Officers" who joined Nasser in ousting King Farouk, but they had a political falling out shortly afterward and have usually been at odds since then.

Mohieddin has retained his membership in the central committee of the Arab Socialist Union, however, which made him eligible for selection to head the leftist forum. It is taken for granted that Sadat personally approved this choice.

One theory is that Sadat consented because Mohieddin, despite his devout adherence to Islam, is known throughout Egypt as a Communist, which makes it impossible for him to win any widespread political support.

"Ours is a leftist program but not a Marxist program," Mohieddin said. "We have 30,000 members and we are aiming for 100,000. About 600 of them are Marxists, a very small percentage."

He said 70 per cent were Nasserites, whom he defined as those who "believe that the laws of 1961 were the proper starting point for Egypt."

Those were the laws on

land reform, nationalization and confiscation of private fortunes that set the course of Egypt's state socialist economy under President Nasser. Sadat, who has been encouraging the inflow of foreign capital, reopened foreign banks and lifted many restrictions on luxury imports, has changed the economic atmosphere here in ways that Mohieddin and his allies do not like.

"This is now a society where you can't find beans or lentils in the shops but you can find Gruyere cheese. The people are astonished. They were against the old policy and thought they were going to eat better when the American money flowed in, but now they see it's not happening," he said.

On foreign policy, the leftist forum emphasizes Egypt's ties to the socialist countries.

Mohieddin's was one of the very few voices in Egypt raised to protest Sadat's abrogation of the friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. After that, the country's biggest newspaper printed a series of letters to the editor and man-in-the-street interviews telling him he was out of tune with the Egyptian majority.

Mohieddin said he knows exactly how far he is permitted to go in espousing leftist positions and opposing the government, although he did not say how far that was.

"We have to work within the system," he said. "There are points beyond which we cannot go. They can finish us off any time. But what would be the results of that?"



THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, JULY 18, 1976

U.S.-Soviet Stakes in Africa

By LESLIE H. GELB

WASHINGTON—The Soviet Union and the United States now face each other through surrogates in a checkered belt that runs down across Central Africa, from Somalia to Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Zaire and Angola. It is the position of the Ford Administration that it neither intended nor willed this situation, but officials talk as if the United States now has no choice but to maintain it.

Although arms shipments from East and West are rising sharply in the area, Administration officials acknowledge that no serious diplomatic efforts are underway through the Organization for African Unity or with the Soviet Union to discuss restraints and consequences.

None of the officials places much hope in the prospect of future negotiations. Their comments in interviews are laden with caution and a sense of drift. But they ascribed more purposefulness to Russian moves in the area.

As one State Department official explained the discussions within the Administration, "Whenever one of these states asks for military aid, the winning argument is 'We've got a relationship with that state, its neighbors are being armed by Russia, they're asking for help and we can't turn them down.'"

None of the officials interviewed was concerned about the risk of a direct Soviet-American confrontation or even a war between African states. The troubling factor is that continuing tensions in the area would divert resources from economic development to military hardware and continue to poison Soviet-American relations—as did Angola.

Russia has poured hundreds of millions of dollars in arms into Somalia, Uganda and Angola. The Ford Administration has been making up for lost time by trying to fill with diplomatic signals the interval before its new arms arrive in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Zaire. In the last few days, the Pentagon dispatched a frigate and patrol aircraft to Kenya.

The Credibility Factor

"What happens," one Administration official asked, "if after this symbolic show of American support, Uganda were to attack Kenya? What would we do then? Not much. And then what would happen to our credibility?"

"Credibility," the American watchword in Vietnam and Angola, is creeping into the Administration's vocabulary on Central Africa. The officials traced the concern about credibility back to early 1975 as the Angolan civil war began to build toward a victory for the Soviet-backed forces.

At that time, the Administration's immediate focus was on Zaire. President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, trying to govern a mineral-rich underdeveloped country and helpful to the Administration in North-South economic negotiations, was of particular interest to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger.

Zaire is landlocked and its primary river and rail routes to the sea run through Angola. Mr. Mobutu feared that a Communist-controlled government in Luanda would cut those links. He has also faced internal security problems.

Russia, according to Administration intelligence, delivered

NEW YORK TIMES

19 July 1976

POOR NATIONS FEAR U.S., NYERERE SAYS

President Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania is quoted in the latest issue of Time magazine as saying that the poor nations of the world "fear America and we struggle against America, even while we admire the great principles of America and her

people's achievements."

The root of this fear is "the use to which America's great power is often put, and the extent to which American principles have been flouted in the international exercise of American power," the black African leader said.

Mr. Nyerere's comments here made in a "Message to America" in the magazine's cur-

rent issue. It was one of a series of statements by world leaders being published to mark the United States Bicentennial.

Mr. Nyerere, a socialist who is generally regarded as a moderate said that in its 15 years of independence Tanzania had seen American military and economic power "time and again being used to fight freedom on

the plea that it is fighting Communism."

He also said that the United States was offering "direct and indirect" support to the "racist and colonialist" forces of southern Africa.

Mr. Nyerere unsuccessfully attempted to mediate an agreement between the white supremacist and black nationalist forces in Rhodesia. 41

\$200 million in arms to Angola in the last two years. To counter this, Administration arms transfers to Zaire rose from about \$1 million in 1975 to \$19 million in 1976, and there are reports of a \$50 million credit sale for 1977. France recently sold Zaire 15 Mirage jet fighters. Belgium also sells arms to Zaire.

As the Angolan situation quieted down, Administration attention centered on Kenya, Somalia and Uganda. There is bad blood between the Kenyan President, Jomo Kenyatta, and the Ugandan leader, Idi Amin Dada.

American arms sales to Kenya went from zero in 1975 to about \$7 million in 1976 to a proposed \$74 million deal for a dozen F-5E jet fighters in 1977. Administration officials also said that Britain was about to conclude a major arms transaction with Kenya. A resolution of disapproval is expected to be introduced in Congress to the proposed sale to Kenya, not so much to prevent the sale as to compel the Administration to present a long-term policy.

The situation in Ethiopia is more confused, complex and volatile. African experts and high policymakers alike seem to believe actual war is both likely and possible between Ethiopia and Somalia.

The military Government of Ethiopia is fighting rebels in Eritrea and faces the prospect of war with Somalia over the French territory of the Afars and the Issas. The French will leave this last of their African colonies in about a year. Its port city of Djibouti is the main trade outlet for Ethiopia, but its people are overwhelmingly Somali.

According to Administration officials, Ethiopia has been trying to establish its socialist credentials and a new relationship with Moscow. In recent months, State Department officials said, Moscow rejected Ethiopian requests for arms, but now Moscow and Ethiopia have concluded an economic aid agreement.

Ethiopia continues to make large arms purchases from the United States. Since last October, official estimates put the total at \$100 million, including more than a dozen F-5E's.

United States economic aid to the states in the region has kept steady at about \$70 million per year, significantly more than Soviet economic aid. But aid is much less important to the development of the African states than the matters now being negotiated in North-South meetings such as those on the stabilization of export earnings.

This belt of states does not constitute an entity. The situation there is complicated by the presence of Cuban military advisers and because Libya provides arms and money to left-wing Moslem friends and opposes American interests. Further complications arise from the internal instability in countries such as Sudan and Chad where coups and coup attempts frequently are threatened.

Arms requests from all of the African states are expected to increase. Administration officials are not eager to sell. But for the time being, they see no alternative to the evolving American role as supporter of the regimes in Kenya, Zaire and Ethiopia and as maintainer of the regional balances of military power.

Leslie H. Gelb is a diplomatic correspondent for The New York Times.

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Wednesday, July 21, 1976

Communist campaign against Western mercenaries

By Russell Brines

The show trial of 12 foreign soldiers captured during Angola's civil war has set off a worldwide campaign by communists and their "revolutionary" supporters to build the word "mercenary" into a knee-jerk anti-Western symbol, like "imperialism" and "racism."

Their immediate purpose is to block the further use of mercenaries or foreign volunteers in Africa's upcoming wars. This would give Moscow and its Cuban allies the sole concession for foreign meddling in troubled southern Africa.

The Luanda trial of three American and nine British soldiers of fortune was staged for the explicit purpose of condemning the United States for financing the noncommunist mercenaries who showed up in the Angolan civil war.

"The Americans (mercenaries), they are nothing..." said the Angolan prosecutor, Manuel Rui Alves Monteiro. "We are not out to get them, only the people who sent them in." President Agostinho Neto added that the United States is an "international recruiter of mercenaries and agents of subversion..."

Angolans made no attempt to prove these charges. Instead, they merely tried to hammer them into the world's psyche, as part of the continual conditioning by the multibillion dollar communist propaganda apparatus. Years of manipulating "imperialism" and "racism" have made it virtually impossible for Washington or any other Western capital to send troops in support of any threatened country outside of Europe and a few other spots, however worthy the cause. If the same opprobrium can be attached to mercenaries — or "mercenary prostitutes," as the Luanda prosecutor called them — the Western capacity to help a threatened friend, particularly in Africa, will be blocked.

The Angolan civil war was not a struggle for freedom, but a ruthless and successful communist effort to steal the anti-Portuguese revolution which already had been won by Angolan factions supported by the majority of the people. The Soviet-backed Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) won power and established the present government when a Cuban expeditionary force of perhaps 15,000 men defeated noncommunist rivals with tanks and other modern arms.

Cuban forces remain in Africa, despite pious propaganda gestures toward withdrawal, because their modern arms and fighting morale will be vital if Moscow sets off the race war against Rhodesia and South Africa that it is working overtime to detonate. The Cubans al-

ready out-gun such black nations as Zaire which communist propagandists virtually have called their enemies. Moscow has established the capacity and credibility to flood the region with arms.

In fact, the Soviets and their allies have created the strongest strategic position in the history of "liberation wars" to win a region by hijacking revolution. The last link in this trap is to prevent the infusion of trained Western fighting technicians capable of matching the Cubans' military sophistication. They are to be condemned as "mercenaries," whether they fight for money or idealism.

To set off this campaign, the Angolans mounted a non-case against their 12 hapless foreign captives. They had no charges that would have stood up under any realistic definition of international law. So they staged a sad bit of Gilbert and Sullivan in Leninist dress. The American, Daniel Gearhart, was given the death sentence, for example, for allegedly advertising his military prowess in a magazine. He claimed he had not fired a shot during his four days in Angola, and the point was not disputed.

Instead of ridiculing or condemning this perfect example of "socialist justice," as the Angolans term it, the noncommunist world accepted it with general indifference. Therefore, it endorsed the fact that the real "crime" of the mercenaries was in fighting or preparing to fight against communist usurpation of the Angolan revolution.

The Organization of African Unity consequently was emboldened to begin a drive to formally label all foreign mercenaries as criminals and to treat them accordingly. In the United States, the National Conference of Black Lawyers (NCBL) has initiated a campaign to use American neutrality laws to prevent any possible infusion of American experts into African battlefields, and has struck a response in Congress. The NCBL was represented at the Luanda "trial" and was also represented at a special Moscow-Cuban-Angolan propaganda conference on Africa held last February in Havana.

Such is the process by which the word "mercenary" is being singled out for criticism.

Mr. Brines is a free-lance writer on foreign affairs.

East Asia

WASHINGTON POST

Wednesday, July 21, 1976

U.S. Navy Scapegoat In Manila

By Bernard Wideman

Special to The Washington Post

MANILA, July 20—President Ferdinand E. Marcos' martial law government apparently has used the recent reports of four Filipino fishermen's deaths by U.S. Navy bombs to stir up sentiment against the United States during the current negotiations on U.S. bases here.

Although Philippine officials have exonerated the U.S. Navy of responsibility in the incident, the government-controlled press has given little coverage to the official findings.

By contrast, the original reports of the deaths received headlines and prompted harsh anti-American commentary in the press.

For example, a columnist in the Daily Express, wrote: "First they killed four and wounded two. As if that were not enough, they killed two more. These U.S. Navy

air exercises are too realistic for our purposes. They're posing the most telling argument against having foreign bases in this country. We can't afford visitors who use us for target practice with live shells."

The original story distributed by the government's Philippine News Agency on July 8 said four Filipino fishermen were killed June 13 by a bomb dropped by a U.S. Navy plane.

The press here also gave prominent display to a report a few days later of an alleged incident June 14 in which two fishermen were machine gunned and seriously wounded by U.S. Navy planes.

The government-controlled press campaign must be viewed in light of the base negotiations, in which Marcos is not trying to get rid of the bases but to obtain more control over them and more money.

[Marcos told reporters today that he hoped the negotiations would be completed by December "notwithstanding the fact that the United States faces an election year," UPI reported.]

A week ago, the constabulary commander of Zamboales Province, where the Subic Bay U.S. Naval Base is located, completed an in-

vestigation of the bombing incident and cleared the U.S. Navy of blame.

A government report, by Lt. Col. Ernesto Venturina, said four men from a village 90 minutes by boat from the bombing range had been killed by a bomb but that the explosion had happened when the four tried to tow an unexploded dud from the restricted target area.

Venturina's report said that the U.S. forces had complied with all required procedures before conducting the live ammunition bombing exercise and that Philippine authorities had warned villagers to stay clear of the area.

Collecting munitions fragments from U.S. exercises, however, is a profitable cottage industry for the inhabitants of a half dozen nearby villages, including Pundakit, where the four victims lived.

"Some of them when they learn of a scheduled bombing exercise go to the area and watch for duds and race against one another to recover dud bombs," Venturina's report said.

A bomb with explosive charge and primer intact can bring up to \$666.

On a recent visit to San Miguel, the village of the two men allegedly wounded

on June 14, most villagers said they knew of no one who had been injured, but later two men said they had been shot by a U.S. Navy plane. Both were recovering from wounds.

The attending physician at the hospital where the two were treated said the bullets, which caused leg and arm wounds, were small caliber, unlike those fired from aircraft, and had been fired from close range.

The medical findings in the case of the two men, although known to the military, have not been released to the press.

The day the report exonerating the U.S. Navy in the bomb deaths was released, Philippines Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo sent a note to the U.S. embassy requesting that the United States stop all bombing "forthwith" pending "more effective measures of safety."

The U.S. Navy, in the midst of the sensitive base negotiations, has suspended live ammunition exercises and stepped up its own investigation, which is not yet completed. In an apparent good will move, it has offered to compensate the families involved and is treating the two wounded men in the U.S. Navy dispensary.

NEW YORK TIMES
16 July 1976

M.I.T. Help for Taiwanese
Halted After U.S. Objection

CAMBRIDGE, Mass., July 14 (AP)—Massachusetts Institute of Technology said today that it had cut off a training program for engineers from Taiwan because of State Department objections.

Informed sources said the Government feared the Taiwan technicians could use technology gained at M.I.T. to build missiles to attack China.

The \$917,000 program, paid for by the National Taiwan University, began in January 1975 to teach 15 engineers to design and produce aircraft navigation systems. The program ended last month, six months early.

LONDON TIMES
17 July 1976

Police called in over leak of secret papers in Australia

Canberra, July 16.—Mr Malcolm Fraser, the Australian Prime Minister, has called in police to find out how 15 secret government documents have been leaked to the press since he assumed office in December. These have included defence reports, foreign affairs documents, and papers from Mr Fraser's Department as well as from the Departments of Business and Consumer Affairs and Employment.

The latest leak, a letter to the Prime Minister from Mr Tony Street, Employment Minister, occurred shortly after a

secret transcript of part of Mr Fraser's talks in Peking with Mr Hua Kuo-Feng, the Chinese Prime Minister, fell into foreign correspondents' hands.

Mr William McMahon, a former Liberal Prime Minister, today called for an Official Secrets Act in Australia to prevent politically motivated civil servants giving material to the press. At present, civil servants who reveal government secrets can be dealt with under the Public Services Act. The Crimes Act can be invoked in some cases.—Reuter.

Latin America

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JULY 16, 1976

Jamaica's Emergency Rule Cuts Political

By RALPH BLUMENTHAL
Special to The New York Times

KINGSTON, Jamaica — Stringent emergency rule by the leftist Government here has kept the peace between violent political factions for a month now, but disorders still threaten this Caribbean island 90 miles south of Cuba.

The Government of Prime Minister Michael Manley has charged that Jamaica is being "destabilized" by foreign and domestic conspirators. The opposition Labor Party counters that the Government is using its sweeping police powers to intimidate critics as national elections approach.

The turmoil is ruining the once flourishing tourist industry and is aggravating the already high 25 per cent unemployment rate. Businessmen, fearful of an anticapitalist trend, have been smuggling out their assets, draining Jamaica of its monetary reserves.

1,000 Are in Custody

According to official figures, about 1,000 Jamaicans have been taken into custody without charges since the Manley Government had the Governor General invoke the emergency on June 19 for 30 days.

Most detainees were released after several days of questioning in a former British military camp in central Kingston. But more than 200 have been held on various charges and at any given moment more than 50 remain under detention.

To the relief of many Jamaicans, the emergency rule has sharply reduced the political shootings and firebombings that have focused on Kingston slum-dwellers and plunged the island into the worst crisis of its 14 years of independence from Britain.

Serious Crimes Down

Serious crimes — murders, rapes, robberies — which were running as high as 160 a week before the emergency were down to 54 after several weeks, according to security officials.

But the crackdown has provoked a counterreaction from the Labor Party, which has charged Mr. Manley with using the emergency to advance the prospects of his People's National Party, whose five-year mandate expires by next March.

The emergency, which has curtailed civil liberties and banned utterances and printed articles "likely to be prejudicial to the public safety," came in response to what Prime Minister Manley described as a bizarre plot to smear the Government and provoke a new wave of violence.

An emergency was invoked

once before, under a Labor Party government, from Oct. 3 to Nov. 2, 1966. It applied, however, only to a particular region around Kingston where partisan violence had erupted.

Manley Explains Measures

According to Prime Minister Manley, the state of emergency was precipitated by information that "a new wave of violence was planned" to coincide with Carifesta, the festival set to start here later this month.

"We became aware of a specific development that could only be described as strange in the extreme," he said, alluding to a report that an informant was prepared to denounce a Government agency for allegedly distributing guns, presumably from Cuba.

Then, Mr. Manley said, the man retracted his allegations and said he had been forced into trying to embarrass the Government.

Smokescreen Is Charged

But the opposition calls this a smokescreen.

"From the day we saw what happened in India we said this is going to happen here," contended Edward Seaga, Labor Party leader.

Mr. Seaga, a financial consultant of Lebanese ancestry and finance minister in the Labor Party Government before 1972, maintained that his party had been gaining support. Mr. Manley, to frustrate this, directed the emergency powers "to set the stage for immediate manipulated bogus elections," Mr. Seaga said.

From the beginning, more members of the Labor Party than the People's National Party were picked up for detention.

While maintaining that only security considerations and not politics were the grounds for detention, the Prime Minister in effect acknowledged the imbalance when he told Parliament that "both as a matter of evidence and common sense" the governing party was not planning to overthrow itself.

Hysteria Is Charged

The 51-year-old Prime Minister, son of a former Prime Minister and leading Jamaican patriot, Norman Washington Manley, in turn charged his conservative opposition with embracing violence in despair of winning power constitutionally and seeking "to spread a wave of hysteria throughout the country based on the oft-repeated allegation that the Government was Communist."

Mr. Manley calls his Government "democratic socialist." He has said he favors state economic involvement but also

private enterprise and democracy.

The elections will take place as required in coming months, Mr. Manley said.

Mr. Manley and his ministers have also suggested that the Central Intelligence Agency has a hand in the "destabilization" of Jamaica.

The allegations have been protested by the American ambassador, Sumner Gerard, who has transmitted to Mr. Manley assurances from Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and William E. Colby, then Director of Central Intelligence, that no United States clandestine operations are under way or contemplated in Jamaica.

Approached by C.I.A.

Jamaican Government officials have retorted that such assurances were also given Chile while the C.I.A. was undermining the late President Salvador Allende Gossens.

Investigation and interviews here this month produced no substantiation for the charge of United States-sponsored activities, although the C.I.A. is understood to maintain what is called an "acknowledged presence" here, as in many countries overseas, to collect intelligence.

For example, one longtime American businessman recalled an occasion about a year and a half ago when he was approached by a C.I.A. man for help in obtaining the plans for a newly built extension to the Chinese Embassy.

The American passed the request on to an architect he knew. The architect checked into it, turned the information over to the American who, in turn, reported back to the C.I.A. man: "The room is 30 by 80 feet. They eat on one side. Then they play Ping Pong on the other side."

Close Ties With Cuba

At the same time, there does not appear to be any significant intrusion by the Cubans with whom Mr. Manley, an advocate of third world solidarity, has been building a closer relationship.

Western diplomats who have been watching the situation closely say that while the growing exchanges are bringing

Violence

over more Cubans, Havana seems to be taking a cautious approach toward any entanglement in Jamaica.

In fact, apart from the tragic violence that has claimed so many dead and injured, there is a kind of opera-bouffe quality to events on this island of blue mountains, white beaches and throbbing reggae music.

Some nights ago, for example, a few sleepy lovers were lingering under the palms around the Sheraton Kingston pool when a soldier in battle gear stepped out of the shadows. He was followed by several other soldiers and suddenly the garden was aswarm with soldiers carrying rifles and submachine guns.

As 50 soldiers ringed the hotel and about 25 covered the garden, 15 burst into the Junkanoo Lounge to seize a suspected gunman nicknamed "Skully," who was talking with two women. He went quietly. But two days later, released, he showed up back in the bar.

Dollar Drain Serious

One of Jamaica's gravest problems cannot be resolved by police action. It is the dollar drain. Although the outflow has been impossible to gauge accurately, the Minister of Mining put the amount of recently illegally exported currency at more than \$225 million, a huge loss for a nation the size of Connecticut with a \$1 billion annual budget.

Jamaica recently borrowed \$90 million from Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and Guyana, but this is expected to see the nation through only to October.

Bauxite production, the island's leading money earner, is running at 70 percent of last year's output, which earned the Government \$170 million. Tourism, which brought in \$135 million in foreign exchange last year, will, from all indications, suffer a disastrous blow when the winter season arrives.

As an indication of what tourist promoters are up against, the Tourism and Industry Minister, P. J. Patterson, recently sought to assure prospective visitors that any tourists caught in curfews or cordons "would be treated with courtesy and understanding by the security forces."